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Emergency Plan for the year 1996

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General Security Directorate

26 Feb 1996

Security Brigadier General 'Ajil Hazza' Salim's statement — he ages 45 years, living in Baghdad, and the Security Director of Baghdad-Al-Karkh. He states the following:

Question: What are the procedures you took in regards of the escape attempted by the condemned Husayn Kamil and Saddam Kamil when you received the order from the General Security Director at 4:30 in morning of 23 Feb 1996, until the break-in operation on his residence in Al-Sidiyyah?

Answer: At 4:30 in the morning of 23 Feb 1996, Mr. General Director called me on the phone and told me to arrest Husayn Kamil and his companions in case they get out of Baghdad, and to shoot him if he didn't comply with the patrols' orders. I immediately called all our patrols in the Karkh Sector and informed them with the order, and at the same time I ordered the patrol's director at our directorate's headquarters to send an officer and a detachment to each patrol and remain there for reinforcement. The order was carried out, in addition, for more proficiency; I notified all the patrol officers at the divisions of the Baghdad-Al-Karkh security directorates to send officers to the patrol points for observance. And during the telephone observation with the patrols, I was informed

(Signed)

To be followed

Head of the Commission

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Continuation of Security Brigadier General 'Ajil Hazza' Salim's statement

On the existence of Special Security Organization vehicles at the patrols for the same mission, and they were notified to coordinate with them and inform them that they are both on the same duty. At 9:15 hours of the same day, our patrol headquarters director told me that he was informed by patrol officers from the Bayya' Security Directorate about fire shots on one of the houses in (Illegible) Al-Sayidiyyah, Subdivision 925, Lane 25, House 5 and the (Illegible) officials are present in the place. And because the information was still unclear, and the need to get it quickly; I ordered two of our officers (Lieutenant Muhannad Majid and Captain Mahmud Fayyad) with a detachment to head to the accident location and keep me updated with the details. At that moment, the Manager of the General Director's Office, Lieutenant Colonel Fadil called me asking about the accident, and replied saying that I don't have enough details yet, and then he told me that he will inform the General Director about the primal information that he got straightly from the Bayya' Security Director. After this conversation, Major Ra'id from the Bayya' Directorate called me and said that he went with a force to the accident location, and saw a house surrounded by civilians changing fire at each other with people inside the house, and he noticed the presence of Mr. Ali Hasan Al-Majid, 'Uday and Qusay sons of the President may God keep him safe.

(Signed)

To be followed

Head of the Commission

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26 Feb 1996

Continuation of Security Brigadier General 'Ajil Hazza' Salim's statement

And Rukan (Illegible) and others. And that he was informed by Mr. Zuhayr from the Special Security Organization to withdraw, for it was a tribal matter involving the traitor Husayn Kamil (Illegible), and they excluded the official authorities from interfering. We informed him to stay close from the accident location to monitor the accident ... (Illegible) ... from the General Director. In addition, the officers referred to previously, whom we assigned to go to the location, (rest of the page is illegible.)

(Signed)

To be followed

Head of the Commission

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26 Feb 1996

Continuation of Security Brigadier General 'Ajil Hazza' Salim's statement

And comrade 'Ali Hasan Al-Majid was at the location, with Lieutenant Rukan and individuals wearing civilian and Arabic uniforms, including 'Ala"Abd-al-Qadir, Marwan Shakir and others members in the clan. Before I reached the location, with the distance of 120 meters, Mr. Zuhayr, a manager in the Special Security Organization, came up to me and we felicitated each other for Eid occasion. What I understood from him after I suggested that if he could offer help to them ... (illegible) ... that the clan undertook the matter of attacking the house of Husayn Kamil and his companions without any interference from the authorities... I remarked that it would bring a lot of casualties for the attackers; for they were a large number and weren't entrenched (rest of the page is illegible.)

(Signed)

Head of the Commission

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Continuation of Security Brigadier General 'Ajil Hazza' Salim's
statement

By phone, and I told him that the event is not over yet, and fire shots are still present, providing that gathering critical information is hard, because we are prohibited to go near the location and only to follow up from a distance, providing that the protection force should stay in case of emergencies. We informed the Bayya' Security Director about the garrisoning at the location, and after I came back, Lieutenant Colonel 'Aziz, Director of the General Headquarters Force, and Lieutenant Colonel Fadil, Office Director, called me asking for the current status. We kept communicating with the General Director, telling him that the situation is still unclear. I returned back to the accident's location around 530 hours in the afternoon, and the situation was not (Illegible) in a whole, and after a little while, signs appeared showing the end of the situation, where an ambulance entered near the house, and few fighter from the clan pulled back. I went back to the department, and after I arrived around 6 o'clock the Security Director of Al-Bayya' informed me that the accident came to an end completely, though someone named "Ahmad" died and another one "Jamal" wounded in the last minutes. A phone called the General Headquarters Patrol Director and informed him with the situation ... (Illegible) ...

(Signed)

Head of the Commission

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26 Feb 1996

Continuation of Security Brigadier General 'Ajil Hazza' Salim's statement

Question 2:- When you were recalled by the General Security Director at the General Security Directorate at 200 hours in the morning of 24 Feb 1996, and when you were ordered to do the supplementary tasks related to the same matter, what was the procedure that you took?

Answer: - At 0145 hours in the morning of 24 Feb 1996, the General Security Director called me and recalled me to the General Security Directorate, so I went there at 200 hours of the same date. I was notified on putting a work plan to maintain the accident's location secretly, and keep anyone from reaching there for the purpose of collecting information or taking pictures, whether they was hostile on friend groups. At the same time I went back to my work headquarters and recalled Lieutenant Colonel Taha Yasin, Al-Mansur Security Director, Major Hamid, Al-Bayya' Security Director, and Major Hamid, Surveillance Section Officer, and informed them that they are the work team under my supervision. They were sent around 300 hours in the morning to scout the area and to provide their opinion on the needed requirements, and so they got what they needed and took their next procedures in secrecy.

(Signed)

Head of the Commission

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Continuation of Security Brigadier General 'Ajil Hazza' Salim's statement

(Whole page is illegible)

(Signed)

Head of the commission

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General Security Directorate

26 Feb 1996

The statement of Security Major Majid 'Abd-al-Hamid 'Abd-al-Majid Ali Ani, he ages 44 years, Al-Bayya' Security Director, living in Baghdad-Al-Karradah Al-Shargiyyah, [REDACTED]

His statement contained the following:-

At 500 hours of the morning of Friday 23 Feb 1996, I was informed by the patrol officer from Al-Bayya' Security Directorate, Captain Muhammad Hasan Sulayman, that Baghdad Security Director informed him to reinforce the patrols with officers, because there was a possibility that the traitor Husayn Kamil and his brother Saddam Kamil had escaped, and if they didn't comply with the arrest order they would be shot at. At that time I was in the department, providing that I was on vacation, and then I went to inspect the patrol and notify them with the order. I was informed by the patrols that the Baghdad Security Director called them on the phone on that same matter and that he sent them two detachments for reinforcements.

Question: When were you informed about the fire shots in the area? And who informed you?

Answer: At 850 hours of the morning of the same day 23 Feb 1996, I was informed by 2nd Lieutenant Husayn 'Ali 'Ubayd, sector officer in the Bayya Security Deputy Directorate, that one of their sources named "Mahir" told him about fire shots in the area, near the electricity station in Al-Saidiyyah. I immediately moved with a force from the directorate's emergency to the source of the fire shots. As soon as I reached the area I heard the shots from Lane 87, Subdivision 825 in Al-Saidiyyah area, and I saw standing there Mr. 'Ali Hasan Al-Majid, Mr. 'Uday Saddam Hussein, Lieutenant Colonel Rukan 'Abd-al-Ghafur, Al-Hajj 'Abd Hasan Al-Majid, and Comrade

(Signed) / to be followed
Security Major
Majid 'Abd-al-Hamid 'Abd-al-Majid

/ Head of the Commission

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page 2/ Continuation of Security Major Majid 'Abd-al-Hamid 'Abd-al-Majid's statement

Shabib Sulayman Al-Majid. I was standing from a (100) one hundred meter distance, Comrade Zuhayr Khalaf, Directorate's Security Director at the Special Security Organization, called me and informed me that it was a tribal matter that concerns the traitor Husayn Kamil, and it has nothing to do with the authorities and other officials. He also told me back out of the accident's location and if he needed me he will call me. After that I went to the department and kept the force widely spread in the area. I informed the General Manager's Office Director and Major General Basil Isma'il, Political Affairs Director, about the accident, I also informed the Baghdad Security Director. After a while I returned to the location of the accident and saw the Baghdad Security Director there, but the issue was not solved yet. I stayed at the location until 1830 hours of the same day, after the issue was solved decisively, and as soon as I reached the department I informed the Baghdad Security Director that the matter was solved, providing that I kept the force within the area, and the mentioned house was protected by the Special Security Organization, and the street's entrance that leads to the house and nearby areas has a force from the Baghdad - Al-Karkh Emergency Police.

Question: What are the procedures that you were informed to take after receiving the notification from the Baghdad Security Director after the operation was finished?

Answer: At 300 hours of next day's morning 24 Feb 1996, according to the Baghdad Security Director's notification, I went to the Baghdad Security Directorate's Headquarters with the surveillance officers to perform security procedures, and to put a plan on that matter.

(Signed)
Security Major
Majid 'Abd-al-Hamid 'Abd-al-Majid / to be followed /

(Signed)
Head of the Commission

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page 3/ Continuation of Security Major Majid 'Abd-al-Hamid 'Abd-al-Majid's statement

Supervising the plan was Lieutenant Colonel Taha Yasin Mahmud, Al-Mansur Security Director. We went out to implement the plan on the field with Major Khalid 'Adnan, the surveillance officer in the directorate' headquarters. Baghdad - Al-Karkh Security Director supervised the plan, and control points were placed at the entrances, exits, and the crossroads of the area. The plan included the following:-

1. Placing three points close to the accident location, where we assign authorized agents to sell cigarettes in the area.
2. Occupying (2) empty houses close to the accident location and assigning authorized agents in it.
3. Assigning an officer near the Huda mosque, located in the alley behind the wanted house.
4. Assigning (2) detachments as night guards in the area. Their shift starts from the 6 o'clock in the evening till the morning.
5. Assigning six personnel from Bayya' Security Directorate Emergency, with patrols from Baghdad Police and personnel from the Special Security Organization.
6. Assigning a detachment in the Saidiyyah Electricity Station with police officers at the side door.

At 1600 hours in the afternoon of 24 Feb 1996 the Engineering Affairs Department of the Presidency Office commenced in demolishing the house. The next day the house was totally demolished, and our detachments remained in the area according to the above plan. And this is my statement.

(Signed)
Security Major
Majid 'Abd-al-Hamid 'Abd-al-Majid

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Commission's decision

Through the thorough investigation that the commission did in regards of the accident of killing the traitor Husayn Kamil and his brother in Al-Saidiyyah area on 23 Feb 1996, the commission decided the following:-

- 1- All of the General Security Directorate's formations should perform their duties in the right way, for it was prepared to interfere and perform any duty that they were asked to do. Some of the officials and detachments of this department were close from the accident's location, and were prohibited from interfering by officials from the Special Security Organization, so they just settled with surveillance and being steady. In addition, to notify their references at the general headquarters with the current situation and it's developments. No loitering was stated during these duties.

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2- The venerable Presidency wasn't notified about the accident, that's because the persuasions and estimations of the officials at the General Security Directorate were that the officials being at accident location had already informed the venerable Presidency about the accident and its details.

On that the decision was based

Member	Member	Commission Head
Security Brigadier General	Security Brigadier General	Staff Lt. General
'Adnan Nasif Jasim	Yasin 'Ali Salih	Taha 'Abbas Ahmad
Surveillance and Political Coordination Director	Department Security Director	General Security Director

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Acquainted by Mr. 'Alwan 'Ali

From/ An' am/ 151 (Secret and urgent telegram) Day and Date
19 Feb 1996

(Stamp)

To/ governorates' security directors (0) copy to the department's security officers in the governorates

Originator number (0) Tracking (0) 2157 (0)

It was decided that you remain in your directorates throughout Eid days, and not to leave without a previous permission from the General Security Director personally (0) to report and execute (0) with appreciation (0) over (0) reply

(Signed)
Director of 151
19 Feb 1996

Copy to
Deputy of the General Director for political affairs/ for review with appreciation

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Respectable Mr. Political Affairs Director

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Mr. General Director
Greetings,

Your order that came to us at 400 hours of 23 Feb 1996 through the General Headquarters' Patrol Director, we took the following procedures:

- 1) Notifying the governorates' security directors on executing the emergency plan, controlling the points, strengthening the inspections, observing the critical passageways, and taking precautions.
- 2) Observing the duties of the General Headquarters, and taking precautions.
- 3) Attendance of the political directors and making sure that their personnel will follow any security related matter.
- 4) We assured the governorates' security directorates to follow and execute our order number 5089 on 17 Feb 1996
- 5) We contacted the security directors of Baghdad, Al-Karkh, Al-Rusafah, and Al-Bayya' on facing any security related matter.
- 6) At 100 hours, noon 23 Feb 1996; we were informed on the primary procedures, then we contacted all the governorates' security directorates to follow that order.

(Signed)
Security Brigade
Deputy of the General Director

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For no to interfere with that matter, and the Security Director of Baghdad — Al-Karkh kept officers and the Security Director of Al- Bayya' in the location of the accident until the situation is resolved and in a near place.

Head of the commission

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Mr. General Director
Greetings,

Hereunder we list the procedures taken during the Eid Al-Fitir vacation and Friday 23 Feb 1996:

- 1- Your Excellency's order that was carried out to the Deputy of the General Security Director for Political Affairs, consisting of taking the needed procedures during the abovementioned period. It was circulated among the governorates' security directorate and the involved directorates at the General Headquarters, upon our letter number 5089 on 17 Feb 1996, that included the following recommendations:
 - a- Increasing the patrols and concentrating on the locations and point that the enemy can take advantage from. This should happen with coordination with the lead Party, authorities, security commissions, and military sectors.
 - b- Moving resources and monitoring the targets.
 - c- Following and monitoring serial sources.
 - d- Monitoring enemy publications.
 - e- Monitoring hotel and its customers.
 - f- Increasing the activities of the patrols and its workers, and concentrating on the search of explosives and other sabotaging equipment.
 - g Maximizing the guards in parking lots and prisons, also protecting the department headquarters.
 - h- Dealing with any shortcomings when it occurs with good judgment.
 - i- Insuring communication between the officers and personnel, even if they were on vacation, during the Eid period.

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- 2- Your Excellency's order that was carried out to the department's Security Director, consisting of keeping the governorates' security directors and the department's security officers within the department, and not to leave during the Eid without a previous permission from your Excellency. It was circulated among them upon the department's telegram number 2157 on 19 Feb 1996
- 3- Your Excellency's order that was notified to the Political Deputy through the General Headquarters' Patrol Director at 400 hours of 23 Feb 1996, he did the following:
 - a- Notifying the governorates' security directors on executing the emergency plan, controlling the points, and follow the Eid's plan.
 - b- Attendance of the political directors and making sure that their personnel will follow any security related matter.
 - c- Contacting the security directors of Baghdad / Al-Karkh, Al-Rusafah, and Al-Bayya' on taking precautions and on dealing with any security related matter.
- 4- Your Excellency's order that was notified to the office manager on 23 Feb 1996, he did the following:
 - a- Communicating with the governorates security directors and the General Headquarters to take maximum precautions.
 - b- Following the general security status with the Baghdad — Al-Karkh Security Director and Al-Bayya' Security Director, from the starting point of the accident until the end of it.
- 5- Your Excellency's order that was notified to the Department's Security Patrol Officer and Security Surveillance Director at 530 hours of 23 Feb 1996, consisting of keeping track of the case with the governorates' security directors and the department's security officers. In addition to maximizing the guards in parking lots and prisons of the General Headquarters, and notifying the Director

(2 - 3)

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...The security of correction department to exist and sleep in headquarter has been done.

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In the name of Allah, the most merciful, the most compassionate

Office of the General Manager

The General Manager

Regards and respects

As an execution for your orders, the following procedures have been taken:

1. Emphasizing the directors of the general headquarter and "Existence" not to leave Baghdad Governorate and to follow up the "Existence" Force each in his department.
2. Contacting the governorates security directors and inform hem to take maximum degree of precaution and safety and to notify the headquarters of any information has to with the national security by telephone on Friday 23 Jun 96. We have talked with all directors about the subject.
3. Following up the status with the Baghdad Al-Karkh and Al-Bayya' Security Directors since the time of notification until the situations are settled down.

Kindly, look into...with appreciation

Signature
Office of the director

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General Security Directorate
26 Feb 96

Record opening

In accordance with what has been mentioned in order number ...on / / 96 that includes forming a committee under our head and the membership of Security Brigadier General Yasin 'Ali Salih and Security Brigadier General 'Adnan Nasif Jasim, the record was opened and the committee started its procedures.

Head of the committee

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General Security Directorate

26 Feb 96

Statement of General Security Deputy Director for Political Affairs- Security Brigadier General Basil Isma'il Muhammad, 45 years. He said the following:

What do you know about the event of killing the traitors, Husayn Kamil and his brothers? What were the directions issued to you and your procedures regarding them?

A At 500 hour of 23 Feb 96, I was informed, through Director of General Headquarter Guard according to directions of the general manager, about the escape of Husayn Kamil and his brothers. From my side, I followed the subject up with governorates security directorates to implement the emergency plan set for them and to control check and surveillance points for the main entrances with maximum degree of precautions. We also contacted Baghdad Al-Karkh and Al-Bayya security directors to take the necessary precautions to confront any hostile action or riot. The organizations of the general headquarter were directed to follow up the subject, and we emphasized the governorates security directorates to implement the emergency plan of Lesser Bairam informed to them by our note number 5089 on 17 Feb 96.

Do you have more information to add?

No, and this is my statement

Head of the committee

—

Signature
Brigadier General
Basil Isma'il Muhammad
26 Feb

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Statement of Security Brigadier General Mu'ayyad Ibrahim Kazim Al-Dandawi, guard head for Thursday 22 Feb 96

Q what is your information about the event of killing the traitors, Husayn Kamil and his brothers, what were the orders and directions issued to you and your procedures regarding them?

A During the guard day that was on the third day of the Bairam, the hours passed calmly; the Control and the office called more than once to inform me that the general manager inquires if there is something he should know. My reply was there is nothing. The general manager came to the directorate and left it about 11 at the night.

At 415 hour, the outside telephone of his Excellency rang and I did not answer because it was his private telephone. After minutes, I felt the guards and his drivers preparing to go out and that what happened because his car left. He came to the directorate at 430 and I noticed the multiple outside phone calls on his car telephone, then I realized that there are important things are going on.

About 5 o'clock, his Excellency called me to tell that Husayn Kamil and his brother Saddam are trying to escape and he told the governorates security directors directly, and Baghdad directors to inform the control points to arrest them and shoot them if they tried to escape. He did not ask anything else.

From my side, I asked the Guard Director Assistant to be careful and to inform the guard officer of checking the guard points in the headquarters without any further notification.

Due to the importance of the subject and because the director of Political Affairs Guard had no knowledge of the subject as I was told, I asked him to divert all phone calls to me to manage the situation, especially Wasit director called him and it was obvious that he does not know anything.

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From my experience with the important matters, to make sure that the directions have been informed to all governorates, and to control the incoming phone calls, I decided that the presence of the political deputy is necessary, so I called him and asked him to come, and he did and met the general manager.

–Al-Qadisiyyah Security Director called me to tell that he has implemented the directions. - The Control informed me of Baghdad-Kut control point accident of Comrade 'Aziz Salih Al-Numan procession, and I transferred it written to the General Manager through the office.

–The Control informed me of Al-Bayya' control or telephone exchange call about the encirclement of a house in subdivision 825 by a force headed by 'Ali Hasan Al-Majid and 'Uday and Qusay Saddam. I transferred the news to the office director immediately, after I had known of his presence so he can transfer it to the general manager.

- At 1000 hour, Lieutenant Colonel 'Aziz 'Abd-al-Samad (in charge of guard for Friday) came and I told about the development of the events and about what has been done. I left the room and I was tired, because there was no rest during the guard.

do you have information to add?

A NO, and this is my statement. From my side, I directed my organizations to follow up the subject with government departments during the coming hours and inform us of the replies, especially the organizations that were related to Military Industrialization formerly.

Signature
 Brigadier general
 Mu'ayyad Ibrahim
 26 Feb 96

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Statement of Security Lieutenant Colonel Fadil Muhsin 'Ali- in charge of the General Manager's office, he is 41 years and lives in Salah-al-Din Governorate/ Biji county. He said the following:

What is your information about the event of killing the traitors, Husayn Kamil and his brothers, what were the orders and directions issued to you and your procedures regarding them?

On Friday 23 Feb 96, I came to the department and I received information at 1002 hour from Brigadier General Mu'ayyad Ibrahim (he was the in charge of guard on Friday) and he asked me to tell the general manager that there is a house in Al-Sidiyyah area in subdivision 825 encircled by Special Security Forces and Intelligence. The mission was headed by ('Ali Hasan Al-Majid), ('Uday Saddam Hussein) and (Qusay Saddam Hussein) according to Al-Bayya' Security Directorate (telephone exchange). To give the director of General Security an accurate description for the situation, I called Al-Bayya' Security Directorate through the telephone exchange and asked for the director, who was outside the directorate for a duty. I talked to Captain (Taha) explaining about the accuracy of the news requesting the time they received the news and the answer was at (930) hour. I also called Brigadier General 'Ujayl, director of Baghdad Al-Karkh Security, to see if he has information; he affirmed the information and told me that the service detachments have been drawn from the control points. After one hour or more, the general manager called me and ordered me to call the emergency regiment to go back to their normal duties. I called the commander of the regiment and informed him of the general manager order, and I called the political deputy who told me he received the order of the general manager, who in his turn affirmed that because the traitors' subject was not over, and I stayed inside the directorate until midday prayer time.

26 Feb 96

Head of the committee

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General Security directorate

page 2- 26 Feb 96

I went to the in charge of general headquarter guard, Lieutenant Colonel 'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Abd-al-Samad and I found that the general manager had left. After prayer, I went home to have lunch, during which Lieutenant Ahmad 'Abd-al-Malik (the secretary) called and told me that the general manger returned to the directorate. I went back to the directorate and I entered the office of the general manager at 1745 hours. The telephone rang and the general manager answered that they are using the highway and waiting until they descend the bridge (not more than 20 minutes). The general manager called with Emergency Regiment Commander and gave him the location asking him to do his best to be to the mission level. I went to my office then I received a phone call at (1900) hour from Al-Bayya' Security Director, Major Ra'id, who told me that the traitors' subject is over and (Major Ahmad and Tha'ir 'Abd-al-Qadir) died, Jamal Mustafa was wounded, and the traitors were killed besides women and children. I went to the general manager to tell him about the phone call, but he had the news and he told me that he called Baghdad, al-Karkh and Al-Rusafah Directors besides the political deputy of Salah Al-Din Security Directorate. The General Manager asked me to call the political deputy and governorates security director to take the maximum degree of caution through what they have of personnel, and not to call those who are in vacation. I called the political deputy and I did not find him, I told the governorates security directors of the general manager directions. Al-Bayya' Security director mentioned that they were not able to approach the area because they the Service detachment did not allow them and they were ready at call. This is my statement

Signature

26 Feb 96

Head of the committee

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General Security Directorate

26 Feb 96

Statement of Security Lieutenant Colonel 'Abd-al-'Aziz' Abd-al-Samad Al-Rawi, Director of the First Political Affairs Department, director of General Security Directorate headquarters' guard for Friday 23 Feb 96.

what is your information about the event of killing the traitors, Husayn Kamil and his brothers, what were the orders and directions issued to you and your procedures regarding them?

A At (1000) hour of Friday morning 23 Feb 96, I joined the General Security Directorate to take the responsibility of guarding the general headquarter. Brigadier General Mu'ayyad Ibrahim, the in charge of guard in Tuesday, assigned me to guard and told me that at 4:30 am orders were issued to all control point to arrest the traitors (Husayn Kamil and "illegible" Kamil) and in case they escaped, they are to be shot. He added that he called the general manager and he came to the directorate and called all the governorates. Brigadier General Mu'ayyad called Major General Basil Isma'il and he came to the directorate. He told me that Al-Bayya' Security directorate told him that a house in Al-Sidiyyah Area, subdivision (825) is surrounded by Special security and Intelligence, and the in charge of the mission are 'Ali Hasan Al-Majid, Director of ...

Signature
Security Lieutenant Colonel
'Abd-al-'Aziz' Abd-al-Samad

Head of the committee

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General Security Directorate

26 Feb 96

Continuation of Security Lieutenant Colonel 'Abd-al-'Aziz' Abd-al-Samad statement

Special Security Organization, Qusay, and 'Uday. The Director of General Security was inside the directorate. Brigadier General Mu'ayyad left me to be responsible for guard and I was not informed of anything until (1200) hour, when Director of the General Security called me to tell about the house in Al-Sidiyyah area being followed up by Brigadier General 'Ujayl, Director of Baghdad Al-Karkh. I called Brigadier General 'Ujayl and told him of the news so he can notify the general manager when he calls, but he told me that the General Manager had called him and informed him of the information.

At (1300) the in charge of telephone exchange called me on the palace's telephone exchange asking for the general manager; I told him that he is out of the directorate and he asked me to call him and let him call on the palace's telephone exchange. I called the general manger to tell him and he came back directly to the directorate. "illegible words" to mention that one of the president's escort called me to ask about the latest information, and that was before calling the palace's telephone exchange and the General Manager.

The General Manger was in the directorate. Brigadier General 'Ujayl called me and told me that the subject is over.

Security Lieutenant Colonel 'Abd-al-'Aziz' Abd-al-Samad

26 Feb 96

Head of the committee

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Continuation of Security Lieutenant Colonel 'Abd-al-'Aziz' Abd-al-Samad statement

I asked him if he told the general manager of that and he answered yes. After while, Al-Bayya' Security Director, who was in the mission's area, told me that the mission ended by killing Husayn Kamil. Tha'ir and Ahmad were killed in this mission. I called the office director explaining if the general manager knows about the complete of the mission and the answer was yes.

Q Do you have more information you would like to add?

A during the first call with Brigadier General 'Ujayl, he told me that the mission has to do with the clan and Mr. 'Ali supervises the mission. He also told me that no one is allowed to approach the area of the mission, so he has no accurate information...this is my statement.

Security Lieutenant Colonel 'Abd-aliAziz' Abd-al-Samad

Al-Rawi
26 Feb 96

Head of the committee

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General Security Directorate

26 Feb 96

Statement of security Colonel Sufyan Dahham 'Ali, Commander of Emergency regiment- 46 years and lives in Baghdad-Al-Sidiyyah/officers' houses. He said the following:

what is your information about the event of killing the traitors, Husayn Kamil and his brothers, what were the orders and directions issued to you and your procedures regarding them?

A At (600) hour of Friday morning 23 Feb 96, we received a phone call from the commander of Emergency Regiment guard, security Major Sa'id 'Ali Kazim and he told me that the General manager has called him and directed him to prepare a force; consequently, I headed directly to "illegible" headquarter. Upon reaching there, we have called the director of Political Affairs; he was in the general manager office at that time, and the secretary. The force was prepared and armed and all the requirements of the mission of ammunitions, weapons and vehicles were prepared. Force in break time was called to implement the emergency plan of the regiment for such cases.

At (1030) hour, the general manager called and told us the situations are normal and we can go for break. Accordingly, I allowed the half of the force to go for a break at (1200) hour, and I kept 50 % of the force ready for any mission with their weapons, ammunitions and vehicles.

At (1500) hour of the same day, the general manager called and ordered us to prepare a force of (20) persons and four officers with their full weapon and supplies and they should wear sport clothes.

(To be continued) Head of the committee

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The required force was prepared under the headship of the security Major Muhammad Mustafa 'Allawi and the four officers: First Lieutenant Haydar Shuli Sa'd, and lieutenants Ziyad Tariq Ahmad, Saddam 'Ali 'Abdallah and Husayn Jarwan Jasim in addition to (20) of the enlisted personnel. The force was divided into four detachments, each detachment headed by an officer, and the force was supplied with all requirements (rifles, attack and defense bombs, tear gas, launchers R. B. G 7, armors, ropes, ladder, loudspeakers and a generator). At 1520 hour, the general manager called me to make sure that the force is ready and they are deeded well.

At (1740) hour, the general manager called and ordered the force to move to the specified place focusing on carrying out the mission courageously, and we replied that we are ready to for any mission then the force moved immediately. Besides the force, a support military force was prepared under the command of Security Captain Zahir 'Ali Daraj and Security Lieutenant Muhammad Bilal Yasin and (15) persons supplied with weapons born on vehicles (machine gun (SATTS: MTRWF), Yuka launcher 30 mm and "SATTS: BRN" machine gun) and all the required ammunicions. Moreover, there was a Traffic car supplied with connection devices to contact with the Command and to open the road when the force moves, and there was an ambulance for emergency.

(To be continued)

Head of the committee

Page 33

The force moved from the command when the general manager called us immediately.

At (1745) hour, the general manager called to make sure the force has moved, and we notified him that the force has moved to carry out the mission and he commended the fast movement of the force. At (1805) hour, the general manager called asking the force to come back to command's headquarters. We contacted the force asking it to come back to the center, after it reached (Al-Dawrah-Al-Bayya') intersection. At (1845) hour, we notified the general manager of the force return without any accidents, and we kept the regiment force ready for any mission or direction. At (1100) hour of Saturday 24 Feb 96, we called the secretary of the general manager, Captain ('Arif) to ask whether we have to keep the force stand by or not. At (1130) hour, Captain 'Arif called and told us that the situation is normal and things are to come back to normal. At (1200) hour, half of the force went for a break and 50% of the regiment force kept stand by.

Signature

Head of the committee

To be continued

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Q Do you have more information you would like to add?

A no further information regarding preparing the force, arming it, preparing all the mission requirement, preparing the force morally and psychologically for any duty assigned to it. This is my statement, taking into consideration that the force assigned for the mission has been prepared and directed in a way guarantees the success of the mission. A contact point with an affiliate of Special Security Organization in Al-Sidiyyah Area was specified by the general manger to be next to electricity station, where the affiliate should wait them there.

Signature

Head of the committee

Page 35

General Security Directorate

26 Feb 96

Statement of Security Major Sa'ib Hami "illegible", director of follow up in Department of Directorate protection. He is 37 years old and he lives in Baghdad-airport area. He said the following:

At 535 hour of Friday morning corresponding to 23 Feb 96, officer of our directorate guard informed me that the general manager called him and informed him to call security officers in governorates to increase the control points, because (Husayn Kamil and Saddam Kamil) escaped to unknown place and he is afraid they escape to Syria or Iran. The general manager informed the guard officer that he informed all directors personally. After 30 minutes, the general manager informed us that there is no need to call security officers because he did that personally, taking into consideration that we informed a number of directorates. We stopped informing the other directorates as an execution to the directions of the general manager.

The guard officer for Friday informed me that the general manager called him at 1520 hour and explained about "illegible" in protection unit. He also explained about "illegible sentences".

In the evening of the same day, the general manager called us and inquired about the number of existed officers, commander of protection unit, guards, and he focus on intensifying the guard on the prison and parks. The general manager asked me to inform the Correction director to exist in the city with his force and that what happened. This is my statement.

Signature

Director of follow up and coordination in
Department of the directorate Security
27 Feb 96

Head of the committee

Page 36

General Security Directorate

Security of Baghdad Al-Karkh
26 Feb 96

Statement of Security Captain Mahmud Fayyad 'Ubayd, who lives in Al-Fallujah. He was born in 1962. He is a security officer affiliated to Baghdad Al-Karkh Security Directorate. He said the following:

Q1 Show us in details what you know about the incident of assaulting a house in Al-Sidiyyah Area.

A1 At 8:45 of Thursday morning, I was assigned by Baghdad Al-Karkh security Director to go to incident location to make sure of received information about gun shots. Security Lieutenants Muhannad Majid and Khalid 'Ajaj accompanied me. When reaching the area, a control point of Special Security Organization stopped us and they were blocking the road by two cars type "illegible". After presenting ourselves to the control point allowing us to pass, we saw comrade 'Ali Hasan Al-Majid, 'Uday and Qusay and other eminent persons "illegible". Upon reaching the there, a man carrying Walkie Talkie and Kalashnikov came and told us that this mission is special and we have to leave the place. Captain "illegible words" and informed us to leave, so we retreated and went back to the directorate to inform the director. After that, ordered some officers to follow up the subject from a far distance. At 12:00 pm, I moved to incident location and with security Captain Layth Mizhir and Lieutenant IChalid 'Ajaj and we saw the director and Al-Bayya' Security Director near the place.

Q2 do you have any other sayings?

A2 no, this is my statement.

Signature

Captain
Mahmud Fayyad 'Ubayd

Head of the committee

Page 37

General Security Directorate

26 Feb 96

Statement of Security Captain Ahmad 'Abd-al-Karim Bani 'Abd-al-Karim- 37 years/ security officer in Baghdad Al-Karkh Security Directorate-headquarter. He said the following:

Q¹ Show us in details what you know about the incident of assaulting a house in Al-Sidiyyah Area.

A¹ we have moved to the incident location according to direction of Baghdad Al-Karkh Security Director, who asked us to follow up the subject from a distance. There were members from Special Security organizations prevented us reaching the incident locations and informed us that the incident is tribal and no need for our interference. After the incident, we retreated to Directorate headquarter and reported guard director of Baghdad Al-Karkh security Director.

Signature
Ahmad 'Abd-al-Karim
26 Feb 96

Head of the committee
—

General Security Directorate

26 Feb 96

Statement of security First Lieutenant Ahmad Hamzah 'Abbas Hamidi, affiliated to Baghdad Al-Karkh Security Directorate. He said the following:

Q1 Show us elaborately the details of the incident when you went to the location

A1 On 23 Feb 96 at 12 pm, I went with security Captain Mahmud 'Abd Fayyad, security Captain Layth Mizhir, security Lieutenant Khalid to incident location and we found Baghdad Al-Karkh Security Director there. We saw some persons carrying different kinds of weapons and some military persons positioning behind the persons who shoot. We were asked not to interfere and leave the subject for Special Security Organization members to deal with it. We stayed for a while, then we left the location leaving Al-Bayya' Security Director and some officer there.

Q2 do you have any other sayings?

A2 no, this is my statement.

Signature

Security Lieutenant
Ahmad Hamzah 'Abbas

Head of the committee

Page 39 contains a blank salary payment receipt form belongs to Al-Mansour Melia Hotel

PAGE 40

General Security Directorate

26 February 1996

Lieutenant Muhannad Hamid Muhammad 'Ali, aged 31, a Security Officer at the Baghdad Security Directorate — Headquarters, informed us of the following.

Question: Please share with us what you know about a breaking-in that took place in a house in Al-Saydiyyah?

Answer: At 08:45, the honorable director dispatched me, along with Police Captain Mahmud Fayyad and 2nd Lieutenant Khalid 'Ajaj, to the scene to verify the information we had received concerning shots being fired there. Upon arriving to the region we were stopped by a control post in the street manned by the Special Security Organization personnel and two cars of Super model. After we identified ourselves, they let us through and we were stopped by another control post where we were also allowed to go through. When we neared the location of the incident, we saw Comrade 'Ali Hasan Majid, Messrs 'Uday and Qusay and a number of armed civilians. At that moment a civilian carrying a walkie-talkie and a (Illegible) rifle approached us; he informed us that a special duty was being carried out and asked us to leave the scene. Afterwards, Captain (Illegible) of the Special Guard approached us and repeated the same announcement. In light of the above, we withdrew and returned to the department to report to the honorable Director. After a while, I left in the company of the honorable Director for the scene of the incident; when we arrived, the honorable Director talked to an official of the Special Security Organization and ordered that a (Illegible) Security Director and officer to stay at the scene and inform him of the results. We then headed back to the department from which I left again for the scene of the incident by order of the honorable Director in order to follow up from a distance on the subject. Mr. (Illegible) Security Director, Captain Ahmad 'Abd-al-Karim and 2nd Lieutenant 'Uday were with me. Civilians equipped with communication devices and weapons came to us repeatedly and informed us that it was their duty to prevent us from interfering. We saw several police members also at a distance from the scene of the incident.

Question: Do you have anything else to add?

Answer: No, this is my statement.

Head of the Commission

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In the Name of God Most Merciful Most Compassionate



(Republic of Iraq Logo)
"Secret and Personal"

Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic — Secretary
General Security Directorate
Number: (SATIS : S)\ 5089
Date (Islamic Calendar Date)
17 February 1996 A. D.

Security Directors of the Governorates
Subject\ Security Procedures

In a few days, the Al-Fitr Holyday will be upon us and will coincide with the Iraqi people's joy accompanying the beginning of the end of the embargo imposed on our resisting state. For the sake of frustrating our enemies' intentions and thwarting their evil plans of using this occasion, we need to confirm work in the following areas: —

1. Increasing patrols, concentrating on vantage points and locations that could be used by enemies; this should be accomplished in coordination with the Security and Party services.
2. Observing identified targets and surveying them, assigning your secret informers to these targets in order to discover their intentions and movements beforehand.
3. Direct coordination between your directorates, the security commissions and the military units present within your governorates in case you receive news of sabotage operations planned by our enemies (IC: continued from PAGE 43).

In the Name of God Most Merciful Most Compassionate



(Republic of Iraq Logo)

Republic of Iraq
 Presidency of the Republic — Secretary
 General Security Directorate
 Number:
 Date (Blank Islamic Calendar Date entry)
 (Blank Julian Calendar Equivalent)

4. Observing and surveying elements sneaking into Iraqi territory and establishing control over possible illegal entry points.
5. Giving importance to the following-up on the distribution of seditious publications and the writing of subversive graffiti on walls, in addition to arresting those caught perpetrating that.
6. Observing and checking the identity of individuals staying at hotels, especially residents of other governorates.
7. Intensifying the work of officers and personnel at control posts and instructing them to increase focus and search for explosive materials and other items used in sabotage actions.
8. Immediately informing the general headquarters of important events taking place in your line of work as per central directives.
9. Following up on and increasing the security over positions, prisons and especially prisoners, in addition to confronting them during the Al-Fitr Holidays.

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In the Name of God Most Merciful Most Compassionate



(Republic of Iraq Logo)

Republic of Iraq
 Presidency of the Republic — Secretary
 General Security Directorate

Number:

Date (Blank Islamic Calendar Date entry)
 (Blank Julian Calendar Equivalent)

10. Focusing on the protection of your directorates' headquarters and the formations affiliated to them through checking the IDs of individuals visiting them and inspecting the materials they carry with them, in addition to advising your personnel to be weary as to the fact that these individuals could use the materials they are carrying for evil purposes. "Evil uses of cars and personal items". Moreover, increasing security over the aforementioned headquarters to prevent any assault.
11. Resolving any outbreak as soon as it occurs in you governorate as per the plan adopted in these situations.
12. Resolving any situation calmly, wisely, patiently and as per your safety judgment, bearing in mind what was mentioned in clause "11" above, especially when it comes to situations where the enemies would be attempting to achieve destructive goals.

3—4

(IC: Continued on PAGE 45)

In the Name of God Most Merciful Most Compassionate



(Republic of Iraq Logo)

Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic — Secretary
General Security Directorate

Number:
Date (Blank Islamic Calendar Date entry)
(Blank Julian Calendar Equivalent)

- 13. Checking the fulfillment of your personnel's guard duty by having them not abandoning their duties on that occasion. Furthermore, it is necessary to achieve certain equilibrium among officers and personnel in times of rest, in addition to instructing officers on leave to always carry communication devices or leave their personal phone number in case they need to be recalled when needed.

Please review and carry out.

	(Signature)	(Signature)
	General Security Director	General Security Director
(Signature)	(Islamic Calendar Date)	(Islamic Calendar Date)
17 February	17 February	17 February 1996 A. D.

One copy to: —
 Director 29
 Tourism Affairs Deputy General Director Review and follow up.
 Director 151
 Reports List Directors — (SAT'IS B)\ Review for the same purpose.

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In the Name of God Most Merciful Most Compassionate



(Republic of Iraq Logo)

Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic — Secretary
General Security Directorate
Number:
Date (Blank Islamic Calendar Date entry)
(Blank Julian Calendar Equivalent)

13. Checking the fulfillment of your personnel's guard duty by having them not abandoning their duties on that occasion. Furthermore, it is necessary to achieve a certain equilibrium among officers and personnel in times of rest, in addition to instructing officers on leave to always carry communication devices or leave their personal phone number in case they need to be recalled when needed.

Please review and carry out.

(Signature)
General Security Director
(Islamic Calendar Date)
17 February 1996 A. D.

One copy to: —
Director 29
Tourism Affairs Deputy General Director Review and follow up.
Director 151
Reports List Directors — (SATIS B)\ Review for the same purpose.

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(Illegible) _____ In the Name of God Most Merciful Most Compassionate

Presidency of the Republic
 Secretary
 General Security Directorate
 Second Region Security Director
 Number: \ (SATTIS :) 7\ 73
 Date: (Islamic Calendar Date)
 27 February 1996 A. D.

4335
 28 February



((Secret and Personal))

To\ General Security Directorate\ (SATTIS : S)
 Subject\ Security procedures

Your letter numbered 5089 and dated 17 February 1996.

We have undertaken the following security procedures during the Al-Fitr Holiday for the purpose of frustrating any disturbance attempt by our enemies.

- 1- We have sent out our patrols intensively and continuously by day as by night in all regions of our governorate.
- 2- Intensifying security and observation measures undertaken in regards to the targets of our surveillance, in addition to assigning our paid secret informers to these targets in order to find out their plans for the Al-Fitr Holiday.
- 3- Coordination with the security commission and military units in the governorate is still ongoing; we have a daily logbook of information concerning saboteurs' intentions in the Northern Region which are supplied to us by our informers and which we transfer to the security commission and the 1st Corps Intelligence.
- 4- We have established control over all exits and roads used to sneak into the Northern area through setting up ambushes and sending out patrols in coordination with the security commission in the governorate.

(1 — 3)

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In the Name of God Most Merciful Most Compassionate
 Presidency of the Republic
 Secretary
 General Security Directorate



Number: \
 Date: (Blank Islamic Calendar Date entry)
 (Blank Julian Calendar Date equivalent)

- 5- Our secret informers, personnel and spies have been deployed in all regions, especially important high- traffic ones in order to discover any case which might be taken advantage of in the distribution or writing of subversive slogans.
- 6- Searches and security checks were conducted in all hotels of our governorate and with residents of these hotels, especially those originally from the Northern Region.
- 7- We have increased the presence of officers and personnel at control posts during the Al-Fitr Holiday and we have imposed stricter search measures upon entry to and exit from our Governorate.
- 8- Our work is uninterrupted as per the central directives in regards to immediately reporting any incident occurring within our theater of operations.
- 9- We have increased the guard and organized visiting hours for the relatives of arrested individuals, in addition to intensifying guard procedures during this period.
- 10- We have increased the guard over the Directorate's headquarters and other affiliated formations, in addition to reinforcing our security procedures concerning searches and identity checks for visitors to our department.

(2—3)

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In the Name of God Most Merciful Most Compassionate

Presidency of the Republic
Secretary
General Security Directorate



Number \\
Date: (Blank Islamic Calendar Date entry)
(Blank Julian Calendar Date equivalent)

- 11-We have undertaken all necessary measures and have instructed our officers to respond swiftly and immediately in terms of security procedures to any situation that might arise.
- 12- We have instructed all our personnel to operate calmly, wisely and patiently and not to act hastily in situations which could be taken advantage of in the media by our enemies for their benefit and as per the directives we issue as we see fit in such cases.
- 13-We have checked up on daily duties (guard) and conducted inspection routines to follow-up on them, in addition to having informed all our directorate's personnel of the need for them to provide us with a telephone number where they could be reached during the Al-Fitr Holiday.
- 14-Because of our aforementioned procedures, not a single negative incident worth mentioning occurred on that occasion.

Please review... With appreciation

(Signature)
Al-Tatmim Governorate Security Director
27 February 1996

(3—3)

(Secret and Personal)

Honorable Mr. General Director

With appreciation.