“General Military Intelligence Directorate Report Assessing Political, Military, and Economic Conditions in Iran”

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Intelligence Report on Iran
for the period of January 1 to June 30, 1980

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(1-85)
Please review our annual report for 1979.

The internal politics

1. The political system

A- On February 4, 1980, Abu Al-Hasan Bani Sadr swore his oath of allegiance in front of Al-Khomeini in the cardiovascular hospital in Tehran, as the first president of the Republic of Iran, after gaining 75% of the electors’ votes. He was appointed as the head of the Revolutionary Council on February 8.

B- The election of the Shura Council (Parliament) was carried out in two stages. The council began its first opening session on May 28, 1980. It was attended by 241 members, whereas the election of another 29 members was not completed because provisions of the constitution state that the Parliament must consist of 270 members. The Islamic Republican Party headed by Doctor Muhammad Beheshti gained 51% of the seats.

C- The Revolutionary Council shall assume at the present all legislative and executive powers until the formation of the Ministry. Then, it may be looked at for dissolution and for relying on the Shura Council and the ministers, because Bani Sadr has failed until now to form the government, despite the passage of close to eight months since it was dissolved.

2. The political parties

A- There are more than 100 political parties and organizations in Iran. They differ in their sizes and activities, in addition to differences in their political ideologies. From this aspect, they generally can be divided into 3 groups as follows:

First  The religious parties and organizations.
Second The national parties and organizations that follow a strategy based upon the national interest. They are more inclined to the Western liberal political conception in their dealings and handling of affairs.
Third  The leftist parties and organizations (Socialist and Marxist). These follow the
path and practices of the Eastern Bloc countries, although some of them are accused of having direct relations with the intelligence [agencies] of the Western Bloc countries.

B- These political parties and organizations include about six million people. The following is a concentrated summary about the most important ones:

First  **The Islamic Republican Party**

This party was formed on February 19, 1979, or eight days after the fall of the Shah. Since the first day it has tried to associate itself with Khomeini, wherein the central committee of the party was composed of 30 members, --

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-- which included ten of the most distinguished clergymen who are well known and close to Khomeini. In the people’s view, this has caused the party to be considered the party of the clergymen. Among those men is the doctor Ayatollah Muhammad Beheshti (who occupied the position of the head of the Revolutionary Council), and is currently the Chief of the Justice Department, the leader of the Party; Ayatollah Hashimi Rafsanjani, who supervised the Interior Ministry; Ayatollah `Ali Khamenei, the Imam of Tehran mosque (also the Deputy Defense Minister and the previous supervisor of the Revolutionary Guards); Doctor Ayatollah Muhammad Jawad Bahni, a member of the Revolutionary Council; and Doctor Hasan Ayat. The party has quickly attracted the support of a great number of workers, farmers, and businessmen because of the political vacuum due to the absence of programming political parties, in addition to what was mentioned. Because this party is in harmony with Khomeini’s view, it was officially recognized. Up to this moment, it has been the only party that was recognized with this description out of all the other parties that were practicing their activities. In less than two months, it was announced that its number of members reached about three million people.

Second  **the Islamic Republican Party for the Muslim People of Iran**

1- This party was formed on February 20, 1979. It associated itself with Ayatollah Muhammad Kazim Shari’at Madari, and mainly limited its activities and influence in Azerbaijan province due to nationalistic/sectarian considerations, where it spread among the Azerbaijani (Turk) citizens. --
-- Shari’at Madari offered support and aid to the party for his recognition in this province, as it is considered the highest traditional religious authority in the province.

2- The party has continuously demanded the securing of national rights to reduce the scope of Persian domination. However, it was strongly confronted at the beginning of this year, which led to the killing of dozens and the injury of a few hundred party members and government forces. During the last months, Shari’at Madari stood up in defense of the distinguished political vision of the people of Azerbaijan, the main stronghold of his power. Khomeini managed to stop the activity of the Islamic Republican Party for the Muslim People of Iran and gradually put Shari’at Madari under strict house arrest after exploiting the following circumstances:

A- Confirming that what is going on in [Iranian] Azerbaijan represents a separatist movement with American imperialism standing behind it.

B- The continuous objection of Shari’at Madari to some of the paragraphs of the suggested constitution when the popularity of Khomeini was the most powerful and tenacious.

C- Confirming and reminding of the lenient and peaceable stance of Shari’at Madari towards the Shah, calling for considering the possibility of reaching a solution for the situation under a constitutional monarchy with the implementation of some reforms.

By that, Khomeini was able to get rid of the greatest of the oppositionists. This blow was a threat and seclusion for the other traditional clergymen who have common views of Shari’at Madari.

Third **Mujahedi Al-Sha’ab Organization**

This organization is considered the most dangerous among the political parties and
organizations opposing the Khomeini regime as far as organizational power, armament, and deployment. It carries out religious matters in a progressive spirit far from fanaticism. The organization’s power is centered on students’ classes and has broad relations with the Fatah movement, wherein some of the organization leaders trained in its camps, and Mas’ud Rajawi, the organization’s president, participated in the War of September 1970 on the side of Fatah. Due to the Khomeini regime’s awareness of the increasing popularity of the organization, he instructed the Revolutionary Council to issue a decree to close its offices, and the offices of the Fida’i Al-Sha’ab organization in the Iranian Universities and schools. This led to violent clashes that resulted in the deaths of dozens and the injuries of more than one thousand people. The organization agreed to close those offices last April.

Forth  
Fida’i Al-Sha’ab Organization

1- It is a movement that seceded from the Tudeh Party. It believes in armed struggle to achieve the Leninist-Marxist regime, according to the path followed by the revolutionaries of Latin America. It had a well-known role in fighting the regime of the Shah.

2- It often takes a hostile stand against our [Iraqi] revolution.

Fifth the Tudeh Party

1- This party has a long history and we have already mentioned it in our book, A Look at Iran. Since the fall of the Shah, the party has been trying to pretend that it supports Khomeini’s decisions and not to express any opposition to them, for temporary reasons. It has offices in 35 large cities and 80 other points in Iran’s cities and centers. However, in spite of this, it does not have wide support for the following reasons:

A- Its betrayal and breach of faith with Musadaq.
B- Its well-known subordination to Moscow.
C- Its leadership exists outside Iran and does not interact with the events.

2- Its stances are continuously hostile to our revolution, even during the Shah’s rule. It opposed the abrogation of the (1937) treaty at that time with respect to the timing, but it never endorsed the Arabization of the Shatt [al-Arab] and the Gulf. On February 30, 1980, the Mardam newspaper that speaks for the Tudeh Party wrote an article hostile to our revolution, describing the country as the enemy, and asked the Iranian government to reply to what it called the conspiracies. Moreover, this party issued a statement on March 11,
Sixth the Other Parties

The most important remaining parties and political blocs are:

1- The National Front headed by Karim Sanjabi
2- The Democratic National Front headed by Matin Daftari
3- The Kurdish parties and blocs

Their roles vanished recently and they have no mentionable effect.

We will discuss them in a special report and there is a brief summary about them in Appendix (A).

3. The Internal Problems

A- On June 15, 1980, Bani Sadr stated the following: “In reality, we have many problems in our country: economic, administrative, military, and social, in addition to the problems of the regions of Baluchistan, Azerbaijan, Khuzestan, Kurdistan, and Mazandaran.” These problems can be attributed to the following two reasons:

First: multiple centers of power.
Second: the armed movements of the opposition.

B- Multiple centers of power

Iran has been controlled for the last six months by two main blocs. They are the Islamic Republican Party, headed by Beheshti, and the bloc of the President of the Republic Abu Al-Hasan Bani Sadr. The differences and contradictions between these two blocs were not obscure or secret --
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-- because Bani Sadr has already described (on March 14, 1980, or forty days after the start of his presidency) the multiple centers of power inside his regime as the greatest catastrophe that has hit Iran, and that they have threatened it internally and internationally. He pointed out that the Revolutionary Council could not issue strong decrees, and if it did, its decisions were neglected and could not be applied. Moreover, Khomeini acknowledged on June 10, 1980 the state of chaos that spread through Iran. He said that his country was quickly changing into a country that was hard to rule. His speech came after a series of press articles in which Abu Al-Hasan Bani Sadr exchanged accusations with his rivals in the Islamic Republican Party. Bani Sadr accused his rivals of turning the revolution into courses leading to dictatorship, while the newspaper of the mentioned party defamed those whom it described as opportunists meddling with the Revolution and it meant, by that, Bani Sadr.

As for Beheshti, he stated the following after Bani Sadr had won: “I always said that there was, and still is, a conflict of ideas between Bani Sadr and us. For this reason, we did not support him in the presidential election.” He also said before the election of the Shura Council, “We will not fight for only one seat, but we will fight for all the seats.” These statements reflect part of the gap of differences and contradictions that go back to these causes:

First  Beheshti’s bloc sees that Bani Sadr has no deep Islamic background that qualifies him to execute what Khomeini wants.
Second  The bloc feels that Bani Sadr lacks the ability to confront America --

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-- and has the tendency for mutual understanding with the West and America, at some stage. This view agrees with the path of the members of the National Front that Bani Sadr was a member of for a long time.

Third  Disagreement about the case of the American hostages, where Bani Sadr wants to release them, while Beheshti wants to exaggerate the issue.
Fourth  The desire of the religious bloc, especially Beheshti, to rule; the contradiction represents the front of the struggle for authority.

C- The oppositionist armed movements

They include the following:
First The Arab revolution in Al-Ahwaz.
Second The Kurdish armed movement (it will be issued in a special report).
Third The Baluchistani armed movement (even though it is still limited, it is considered a factor of concern for the government).
Forth The Turcoman movement.
   1- The desert Turcoman people live in the city of Kanbad Kawus, in the province of Mazandaran, near the Caspian Sea and the Soviet Union. Its population is 369,414 according to the census of 1976. It is occupied by a Turcoman majority that is called the Turcoman of the desert. There are about 750,000 people in the whole province, and they have religious ties with the Kurdish Casnazaniyah Sheikhs in Iraq. They are known for their bravery. There has been an extension of the Marxist influence in the area since 1920.

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2 - Many armed uprisings have taken place lately in the region. They started in April 1979, and then were renewed last February. The region is still witnessing successive periods of tension, and it was among the regions that Sadiq Khalkhali visited to try the oppositionists and to execute about twenty of them.

Fifth The Movements of Military Oppositionist Elements

It includes many military groups working in various modes. The joint command of the Iranian forces (General Chief of Staff) issued a statement that revealed a planned attempt to launch a military coup that was to be executed on May 24, 1980 by moving military troops from the western areas close to Iraq to Tehran to occupy the vital points and to arrest the leaders of the ruling regime. The aforementioned command acknowledged the distribution of leaflets inside the camps under the name of the Iranian Liberation Army. After that, an opposition organization among the 14th Infantry Division units was discovered in Rada’iyah.

D- To understand some of the results of the disorder, we mention herein the basic changes that took place in the following important positions:
First  Four persons rotated at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs within 16 months.
Second Four persons rotated at the Ministry of Defense within 16 months.
Third  Six persons rotated at the General Staff Head within 16 months.
Forth  Four persons rotated at the Air Force Command within 16 months.
Fifth  Four persons rotated at the Naval Force Command within 16 months.
Sixth  Three persons rotated at the Revolutionary Guards Command within 12 months, although the last commander, `Abbas Al-Sayyid Zamani, nicknamed Abu-Sharif, was appointed on May 23, 1980 and resigned on June 16, 1980. No successor has been appointed yet.

E- A state of chaos, crimes and law-breaking are spreading in many parts of Iran. For example, it was officially announced that 131 people were shot dead in the city of Tehran last May while armed thefts on roads are spreading, [and] many people were executed for these accusations.

The Foreign Policy

4- Iranian foreign affairs witnessed noticeable activity during the last six months. The foreign minister visited France three times in addition to his tour of the Arabian Gulf states, Syria and Lebanon. Then, he attended the International Socialist Conference that was held last June. Moreover, Tehran welcomed a delegation of this movement on June 25, 1980, that included [Bruno] Kreisky, the Chancellor of Austria, and [Willy] Brandt, the Chancellor of West Germany. It was decided to establish diplomatic relations with Democratic Yemen and the Republic of the Western Sahara. Those steps are aimed at reducing the effect of the Western embargo and finding alternatives for the economic sanctions.

5- The following is an evaluation of the mutual relations with the countries of political and economic influence.

A- Good with Syria, Algeria, and the Palestine Liberation Organization.
B- Bad (but not openly so) with the Arab Gulf states, where the rulers of Iran are continuously declaring their intentions in the region. Abu Al-Hasan Bani Sadr announced last March that there was no withdrawal from the three islands [Abu Musa and the two Tunbs] and described the Arab governments in the region as not being independent. Moreover, Sadiq Qutub Zadah stated many times that the islands were nothing else but Iranian.
C- Wavering with Libya because of the Musa Al-Sadr issue.
D- Good with Yugoslavia, Poland, and Bulgaria.
E- Bad with the Western Bloc because of the insistence upon not releasing the hostages.
F- Bad with Afghanistan.
G- Normal with Pakistan, Turkey, and India.
H- Wavering with the Soviet Union where the Soviet newspaper Pravda attacked Sadiq Qutub Zadah, on June 19, 1980 for his statements against the Soviets about Afghanistan, and described him as the biggest propagandist for the United States of America in the region.

Evaluation of the Iranian Policy

6- The internal and external Iranian policies have failed since the fall of the Shah, until now. This is due to many reasons. Some of them are:

A- The quick victory of the Iranian Revolution has not allowed the formation of broad, coordinated organizations and revolutionary cadre. The result was that the elements that formed the interim government and all the executive apparatuses did not come from a revolutionary cadre that would follow liberal policies. In addition, many agents of the West inside the forces opposing the Shah have advanced to high authority, like Ibrahim Yazdi and Amir `Abbas Intizam.
B- The nature of the political circumstances that Iran went through has deprived the popular bases of the most qualified leadership. This has led to denominational control due to the quick end of the Shah. Most of them have no knowledge of political matters.
C- Most of the personalities that took control in the interim government had ideas and policies that they believed in from the past and were not interested in the latest developments.
D- In view of the social class to which those who were managing the Iranian policies inside and outside belonged, it is clear to us that necessity compelled them to mix their specialties in politics, and they took their stance on this basis. This stand is called bourgeoisie-liberalism. The bourgeoisie points to their economic class and the liberalism points to their political stance. Therefore, they were preventing the revolutionary elements from entering into the government. This vacuum has caused the executive organizations to lose their harmony and coordination.
The motivation of the new regime for the old Persian imperialist greed and notions that led to wide clashes, disturbances, and to an increase of the size of the internal and external problems.

The multiplying centers of power and decision-making had the worst effect on the internal and external policies.

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The Economic Situation

General

7- Iran is going through a severe economic crisis, which all the Iranian officials, including Abu Al-Hasan Bani Sadr, have admitted. On June 14, 1980 he said, “Our economy is a subsidiary. The Americans, who have a deep and sufficient knowledge of our economy, have always intended on tearing it down since the success of the revolution.” Moreover, the speeches of Ayatollah Husayn `Ali Muntazeri, the Imam of Qom mosque, did not fail to mention the exploitation. The reasons for that are:

A- The oil exports dropped to 300,000 barrels a day for the period ending on May 21, 1980. Because the price of Iranian oil was not more than 35 dollars per barrel, their daily revenue reached 10.5 million dollars. That is 10% of their daily revenue at the start of 1979. This was mentioned by `Ali Akbar Ma’in, the Iranian Oil Minister, on May 29, 1980, one month before his statement, in which he admitted that 90% of the state budget was allocated for the payment of employees’ salaries, when their oil exports were close to 700,000 barrels a day.
B- The Western economic sanction that was imposed from May 28, 1980, in a retroactive effect, for the contracts signed since the capture of the American hostages, on November 4, 1979.

C- Industrial production dropped 40% from the previous year. A report from the Central Bank of Iran stated that the industrial sector was afflicted with financial problems and a shortage of materials.
D- The rate of inflation increased for the following materials, through March 1, 1980:
First  Food materials by more than 35%.
Second Raw industrial materials by 28%.
Third  Agricultural and animal products by 41.5%.
Forth  Fabrics and cloths by 34%.

E- Unemployment is so widespread that unofficial reports indicate that the proportion of unemployment has exceeded three million people.
F- The Iranian accounts in the American banks with the amount of about six billion dollars were frozen, according to what the American sources declared. This is among 11.3 billion dollars that represents the sum of Iranian cash reserves that were available on September 6, 1979.
G- The military movements in the various provinces.

8- On June 24, 1980, the Iranian Oil Minister announced that oil production has amounted to less than two million barrels a day. One million barrels a day are used domestically, and a quantity of 800,000 barrels is exported. It is known that this quantity is distributed over the following contracts:

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India: 125 thousand barrels
Romania: 96 thousand barrels
Brazil: 60 thousand barrels
Turkey: 40 thousand barrels
North Korea: 20 thousand barrels
South Korea: 80 thousand barrels
Sri Lanka: 15 thousand barrels
Bangladesh: 5 thousand barrels
China: 30 thousand barrels
Spain: 32 thousand barrels
Finland: 18 thousand barrels
Sweden: 20 thousand barrels
Other Eastern Europe Countries: 80 thousand barrels

621 thousand barrels

Free sales without contracts: 100 thousand barrels
Total exports: 721 thousand barrels

From the abovementioned, the total of revenues is 800,000 x 35 = 28 million dollars a day and
10.080 billion dollars a year, at best. This sum represents a portion of about 25% of the oil revenues of the general budget for the period of March 21, 1978 to March 20, 1979, if we estimated the other revenues as 75% of what they were in 1978, and this is a high rate.

If we noticed a decrease in the production level, then the general budget for the period from March 21, 1980 until March 20, 1981 could be estimated to be 25 billion dollars. That is a decrease of 34 billion dollars from the budget of 1978-1979.

**The Economic Activities and Relations**

9- To reduce the severity of the economic problems, Iran took the following steps:

A- Withdrawing some of its gold assets from European countries. It withdrew more than 300 million dollars since the beginning of this year.

B- Concluding a trade agreement with Romania, on June 8, 1980. According to it, Romania would supply Iran with wheat and spare parts for industrial equipment and consumer goods.

C- Concluding a trade agreement with Turkey to fulfill a part of Iran’s need for grain and building materials, in return for supplying Turkey with oil.

D- Coordinating with Yugoslavia to join in the Iranian petrochemical projects in return for increasing its purchases of oil.

E- Asking Pakistan to provide aid to overcome the problems arising from the shortage of consumer goods, after the implementation of the western economic sanctions. A Pakistani delegation visited Iran for this purpose last May, composed of 18 members. It is observed that, since the occupation of the American Embassy in Islamabad in the last year, --
economic rescue measures.

F- The agreement with the Soviet Union to increase the volume of bilateral trade, and the approval of re-exporting [natural] gas after it had stopped because of Iran’s demand to increase its prices to five times what they were so that it would be 164 dollars for every one thousand barrels. The negotiations between the two sides have failed many times because the Soviets refused the rate of increase and agreed to pay little more than 112 dollars. It is known that Iran used to export 9 billion cubic meters of gas to the Soviet Union every year since 1970. The quantity was reduced to 4 - 4.5 billion after the fall of the Shah. In addition to that, it gave special interest to the ports of the Caspian Sea, where it carried out expansion operations at Anzli port to receive the Soviet goods, or those that arrive through this way.

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G- An increase of the opportunities of economic cooperation with Bulgaria, which has promised to supply it [Iran] with its needs of food materials.

H- It was agreed with Japan to complete the petrochemical project that is being undertaken at the Khomeini port area (previously Bandar Shahbur) at a cost of 3.2 billion dollars. 85% of it was completed, but there are still some minor disagreements.

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D- 64th Infantry Division

The division headquarters in Al-Rada’iyah consists of:

First 275th M47 Tank Regiment in Khaneh
Second 245th M47 Tank Regiment [the note “255 in Kua Gharbi” is crossed out in the original document]
Third 230th Tank Reconnaissance Regiment in Khuy
Forth 512th Transportation Regiment
Fifth 523rd Medical Services Regiment
Sixth Salvage and Repair Regiment
Seventh 407th Engineering Regiment in Al-Rada’iyah [there is a hand-written comment to the side of this line, saying “we have it confirmed through wiretapping”]
Eighth 482nd Signals Regiment in Al-Rada’iyah
Ninth the Artillery
- 304th 105 mm Artillery Regiment in Khaneh
- 306th 105 mm Artillery Regiment in Shahbur
- 308th 105 mm Artillery Regiment in Mahabad
- 385th General Support Artillery Regiment in Khuy
- 380th 23 mm Anti-aircraft Artillery Regiment in Al-Rada’iyah

Tenth the 1st Infantry Regiment in Khaneh

- 164th Infantry Regiment
- 173rd Infantry Regiment
- 198th Infantry Battalion

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Tenth the 3rd Brigade in Sarbil-e-Zahab, camp Abadhir (Qal’at Shahin)

- 215th Tank Regiment in Sarbil-e-Zahab (confirmed through wiretapping)
- 211th Tank Regiment in Sarbil-e-Zahab (confirmed through wiretapping)
- 143rd Mechanized Infantry Regiment in Sarbil-e-Zahab (confirmed through wiretapping)

The 88th Armored Division

The division headquarters is in Zahedan and consists of:

First Reconnaissance Regiment
Second Engineering Regiment
Third Signals Regiment
Forth Transportation Regiment
Fifth Medical Services Regiment
Sixth Repair and Rescue Regiment
Seventh the Artillery
- 155 mm Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment
- 155 mm Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment
- 155 mm Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment
- General Support Artillery Regiment
- Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment

Eight Brigade Headquarters
- 1st Brigade Headquarters in Zahedan
- 2nd Brigade Headquarters in Khash
- 3rd Brigade Headquarters in Jah Bahar

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[Page 42 of the PDF is page 33 of the Arabic document]
- 1st Brigade Headquarters in Al-Ahvaz
- 2nd Brigade Headquarters in Dezful
- 3rd Brigade Headquarters in Haftikal

Ninth Infantry and Tank Battalions

- Chieftain Tank Regiment in Dezful
- Chieftain Tank Regiment in Dezful
- Chieftain Tank Regiment in Al-Ahvas
- Chieftain Tank Regiment in Al-Ahvaz
- 231st Chieftain Tank Regiment in Haftkel
- 100th Mechanized Infantry Regiment in Haftkel
- 105th Mechanized Infantry Regiment in Dezful
- 121st Mechanized Infantry Regiment in Al-Ahvaz
- 145th Mechanized Infantry Regiment in Naft-e-Sefid
- 165th Mechanized Infantry Regiment in Al-Ahvaz

Note
The presence of the 151st Infantry Regiment in Al-Muhammarah has been confirmed and its connection is still (being followed up).

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[Page 43 of the PDF is page 34 of the Arabic document]
Training Armored Brigade (belongs to the Armor school in Shiraz)

No Change

Army Aviation

First  Cancel all past information and namings.

Second  The Army Aviation consists of:

- Army Aviation Command (in Tehran - Qal’at Marghi area – headed by the Staff Air Commodore Iskandar `Amadi, the previous commander of Kermanshah group, and one of the supporters of the Khomeini regime).

[Fifth  Group number 55 in Esfahan for training which is composed of:

1- 394th 105 mm Artillery Regiment
2- 155 mm Artillery Regiment
3- 130 mm Artillery Regiment
4- 351st 57 mm Self-propelled Anti-aircraft Artillery Regiment
5- 23 mm Anti-aircraft Artillery Regiment
6- Grad (BM-21) 122 mm Launchers Regiment

Sixth  The following is the battalions’ personnel:

1- 105 mm regiment: 19 officers, 72 non-commissioned officers, 58 privates
2- 130 mm regiment: 27 officers, 127 non-commissioned officers, 333 privates
3- 155 mm towed regiment: 33 officers, 139 non-commissioned officers, 327 privates
4- 175 mm self-propelled Regiment: 64 officers, 164 non-commissioned officers, 268 privates
5- 203 mm towed regiment: 23 officers, 129 non-commissioned officers, 307 privates
6- 203 mm self-propelled regiment: 24 officers, 130 non-commissioned officers, 268 privates
7- Grad launchers regiment: 22 officers, 195 non-commissioned officers, 233 privates]
8- 23 mm regiment: 23 officers, 168 non-commissioned officers, 249 privates

Seventh Group’s Headquarters personnel numbers

Groups 11, 22, 33: 19 officers, 72 non-commissioned officers, 48 privates
Group 44: 19 officers, 72 non-commissioned officers, 58 privates

The Air Force and Air Defense

- Numbers and Types of Aircraft

A- The number of F-4D aircraft has gone down from 31 to 28 aircraft
B- One AH-1J Cobra helicopter crashed.
C- The number of Chinook aircraft has risen from 42 to 61, where 19 of the 50 aircraft that were contracted for during the Shah’s rule have been received. Then, the number was reduced to 30 aircraft, 11 of which Italy refuses to deliver.
D- The number of RF-4 aircraft dropped from 14 to 11 aircraft.
C- About seven different helicopters have crashed.

The Air Bases

A- Mehrabad base

Base Number 1

First the Aircraft

11th Reconnaissance Squadron 11 RF-4 aircraft
12th Reconnaissance Squadron 12 RF-5 aircraft
11th Fighter Squadron 28 F4-D aircraft
12th Fighter Squadron 20-25 F-4E aircraft
8 (F-5B) tactical fighters used for training
28 (C-130) medium transport aircraft
18 (F-27) Dutch Fokker Friendship transport aircraft
4 (C-130) aircraft modified for reconnaissance and electronic jamming
7 Boeing 747 aircraft, 2 of them are modified for airborne refueling
10 Boeing 707 aircraft, 5 of them are modified for airborne refueling
A number of helicopters are for rescue purposes, and a part of the army aviation are in the range of 50 helicopters.
Shelters that are enough for 20 aircraft

Second the Location

Within the fenced area of Tehran International Airport
The Coordinates: 3541.4 North and 5118.8 East
The Runway Dimensions: The right one is 4000 meters long and 45 meters wide
The left one is 4000 meters long and 60 meters wide
The elevation of the base above sea level: 3963 feet
The magnetic deviation: 3° East

Third the Air Defense
Hawk Missiles Regiment
Mixed Regiment (Rapier, 23mm, and 35mm)

B- Tabriz Base Base Number 2

First the Aircraft

F-5E Fighter 21st Squadron 20-23 aircraft
F-5E Fighter 22nd Squadron 20-23 aircraft
F-5E Fighter 23rd Squadron 20-23 aircraft Nine F5E reserve aircraft

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At the northwestern end of Tabriz city
The coordinates: 38.08 North, 46.15 East
The Runway Dimensions: The main one is 3658 meters long and 45 meters wide
The secondary one is 1900 meters long and 45 meters wide
The Elevation of the Base above sea level: 4483 feet
The magnetic deviation: 4° East

Third the Air Defense

A mixed regiment (four 35mm Oerlikon batteries and two Rapier batteries)

C- Hurr Al-Riyah Base at Kapudarahnik near Hamadan Base Number 3

First the Aircraft

F-4E Fighter 31st Squadron  20-25 aircraft
F-4E Fighter 32nd Squadron  20-25 aircraft
F-4E Fighter 33rd Squadron  20-25 aircraft
Limited number of rescue helicopters
15 aircraft shelters; 10 of them are arch shaped

Second the Location

In the area of Kapudarahnik north of Hamadan
The Coordinates: 35.13 North, 48.39 East

Third the Air Defense

Soviet towed 23mm anti-aircraft artillery regiment
Rapier missiles regiment

D- Mussadaq Base (Dezful) Base Number 4

First the Aircraft

F-5E Fighter 41st Squadron  20 aircraft
F-5E Fighter 42nd Squadron  20 aircraft
F-5E Fighter 43rd Squadron  20 aircraft
15 F-5F aircraft for training, 5 for each squadron
One helicopter for rescue
15 aircraft shelters; 10 of them are arch shaped
Second the Location

In the area enclosed between Dezful and Yamshik
The Coordinates: 32.25 North and 48.23 East
The Runway Dimensions: The right one is more than 3000 meters long and 45 meters wide.
The left one is more than 3000 meters long and 45 meters wide.
The elevation of the base above sea level: 499 feet
The magnetic deviation: 3° East

Third the Air Defense

Hawk Missiles Regiment
Rapier Missiles Regiment (Unconfirmed)
Anti-aircraft Artillery Regiment

E- Bushehar Base

First the Aircraft

F-4E Fighter 61st Squadron 20-25 aircraft
F-4E Fighter 62nd Squadron 20-25 aircraft
Limited number of rescue helicopters
A part of the Navy aviation
Thirty arch shaped aircraft shelters

Second the Location

The coordinates: 28.57 North and 50.49 East
The runway dimensions: The main one is 3320 meters long and 45 meters wide.
The secondary one is 3279 meters long and 30 meters wide.
The elevation of the base above sea level: 14 feet
The magnetic deviation: 2° East

Third the Air Defense

2 - 3 Hawk Batteries
Mixed Regiment (Rapier - 35mm - 23mm)

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F- Tadin Base in Shiraz  Base Number 7

First the Aircraft

F-14A Fighter 71st Squadron  25 aircraft
23 C-130 transport aircraft
Limited number of rescue helicopters
10-15 arch shaped aircraft shelters

Second the Location

The Coordinates: 2932.6 North and 5235.2 East
The runway’s dimensions: The right main one is 4270 meters long and 46 meters wide.
The left main one is 4270 meters long and 46 meters wide.
The elevation of the base above sea level: 4912 feet
The magnetic deviation: 2° East

Third the Air Defense

A mixed regiment (Missiles, 23mm, and 35 mm)

G- Al-Talqani Base in Esfahan  Base Number 8

First the Aircraft

F-14A Fighter 81st Squadron  25 aircraft
F-14A Fighter 82nd Squadron  25 aircraft
Limited number of rescue helicopters
Unknown number of [aircraft] shelters
Second the Location

(1) The Base

The coordinates: 3245.1 North and 5151.7 East
The runway’s dimensions: The right main one is 4400 meters long and 45 meters wide.
   The left main one is 4400 meters long and 45 meters wide.
The elevation of the base above sea level: 5072 feet
The magnetic deviation: 3° East

(2) The Airport (Esfahan Civil Airport)

The coordinates: 32.37 North and 51.40 East
The runway’s dimensions: It is 3500 meters long and 45 meters wide
The elevation of the base above sea level: 5242 feet
The magnetic deviation: 3° East
About 500 helicopters belong to the Army Aviation

H- Bandar `Abbas Base
Base Number 9

First the Aircraft

F-4E Fighter 91st Squadron
P-3F Orion navy Squadron (6 aircraft)
Limited number of rescue helicopters
Thirty-one arch shaped aircraft shelters
The possibility of moving a squadron from Hurr Al-Riyah base to this base

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Third the Air Defense

A mixed regiment (Missiles and artillery)

I- Jah Bahar Base  
First  Good for operation  
Second  Not used at present

J- Al-Amidiyah Base  
First  Almost good for operation  
Second  Not used at present

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16- The Air defense Sectors

The First Sector:  Babil Sar at the Caspian Sea
The Second Sector:  Hamadan (Subashi)
The Third Sector:  Shiraz
The Fourth Sector:  Bandar `Abbas
There is an anti-aircraft regiment in each sector

17- Number of Surface-to-Air Units

19 artillery regiments working with the ground forces and their combat systems as follows:

Four armored divisions x (57mm self-propelled anti-aircraft regiments consisting of 24 artillery)
Self-propelled anti-aircraft 23mm Shilka = 8 regiments
Five infantry divisions x 1  = 5 regiments
Five artillery groups  = 6 regiments
11 Mixed regiments (Rapier - or Tiger Cat 35 or 23mm)
4 Independent artillery regiments
10 Hawk regiments
44 Units

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18- Opening Areas of Surface-to-Air Units

A- Mahrabad Base

Hawk missiles regiment
Mixed regiment

B- Tabriz Base

Mixed regiment

C- Hurr Al-Riyah Base

Rapier missiles regiment
23 mm anti-aircraft artillery regiment
A mixed regiment may exist

D- Mussadaq Base

Hawk missiles regiment
Rapier missiles regiment (unconfirmed)
Anti-aircraft Artillery regiment

E- Bushehr Base

(2 - 3 Hawk Batteries
Mixed regiment

F- Abdanan

Anti-aircraft artillery regiment

G- Kankan

Hawk missiles unit

H- Ra’s Al-Mataf
Hawk missiles unit

I- Kharg
Hawk missiles unit
Mixed regiment (Anti-aircraft missiles and artillery)

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The Naval Force

19- The Navy Units

A- It has been confirmed that there were nine Komptant missile boats originating from a package deal for 12 boats that had already been contracted with France during the Shah’s rule. The French authorities refused to deliver the remaining three boats because the Iranians are declining to pay the 8 million dollars remaining from its price.

B- The surface-to-air missile systems’ armament mounted on the frigates was switched from Sea-Cat to Sea-Wolf, which is considered the most up-to-date. This action took place just before the fall of the Shah.

20- The concentration of the important units

A- Three destroyers (Babir, Balink, and Artimiz) at Bandar `Abbas base.
B- Four frigates (Rustum, Framirz, Sam, and Zal) that are supplied with surface-to-air missiles at Bandar `Abbas base.
C- Four frigates (Bayndur, Milanyan, Naqdi, and Khammu’am) that are not supplied with surface-to-air missiles at Al-Muhammarah base.
D- Nine Komptant missile boats at Bushehr base. They may be organized under the name of L-7 missiles.

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E- Four medium minesweepers (Shahrakh, Karkas, Riyadi, and Harisji) at Al-Muhammarah base.
F- Eighteen hovercrafts at Khosro Abad and Khark base.

The Revolutionary Guards
On May 26, 1979, an official statement about forming the Revolutionary Guards was issued. Nevertheless, its actual formation started on June 16, 1979, where this day was considered a holiday for the Guards. The statement specified their duties as follows:

A- The protection of the Iranian Islamic revolution and expanding it worldwide, according to the original Islamic ideology.
B- Assistance in the fields of preserving security and order, confronting the elements that are hostile to the revolution, and pursuing and arresting them.
C- The armed struggle against armed actions and armed operations that are against the Islamic revolution.
D- Confronting the armed operations and attacking foreign forces and their agents inside the country.
E- Cooperation and solidarity with the armed forces of the Islamic Republic, according to the authorized systems.
F- Educating the associates and members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards in the fields of politics, military, ideology, and moral education.
G- The assistance in the execution of the judgments of the Islamic revolutionary courts, and the Ministry of Justice of the Islamic Republic.
H- Supporting the legal liberation movements of the weak in the world under the guidance of the Iranian revolution’s leader and government.
I- Offering services by the members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards in the field of disasters and emergencies, and contributing in the execution of the development projects.

22- The Organizational Structure
23- The Training and Equipping

The training of Revolutionary Guards members is carried out by the regular armed forces. Moreover, Palestinian military elements from Fatah supervised the training. Their training is centered on personal training and on the intellectual and educational subjects. They are armed and supplied from the regular forces depots, and they also have an annual budget of 200 million riyals, which is equivalent to 10 million dinars, according to the original value of the Iranian riyal, and to four million dinars in its current value.
24- According to plans, it is assumed that, in the long run, the number of the guards is to be 4% of the total population. At present, there are more than 1000 people in the center of each governorate and there is no age limit for the volunteers.

25- The Relationship between the Guards and the Armed Forces

The relationship between the Guards and the Armed Forces is full of tension. The members of the Guards feel that they are the real power behind Khomeini. They behaved improperly with the members of the armed forces and degraded them. This has built grudges and hatred towards them. The statements of Bani Sadr and the commanders of the Guards show the extent of the exploitation, the chaos that has spread between their flanks, and the differences between their commanders. Moreover, the Army feels that the Guards will replace it in the future.

26- Their Most Noticeable Activities

The Guards undertook active roles in preserving the ruling regime (despite its negativity). It managed to capture 5000 agents of the SAVAK [the Shah’s security forces]. It also managed to arrest the organization of Al-Furqan, which assassinated a number of the members of the Revolutionary Council and clergymen, and which was considered the most dangerous, secret organization facing the new regime.

In addition, [the Guards played an] active role in striking the Arab Ahwaz uprising, as well as the Kurdish, Azerbaijani, Baluchistan and Turcoman movements at a time when the armed forces were completely absent from the scene. Because of this, Khomeini had absolute interest in them and depended on them. He personally chose their commanders and rejected the calls for the dismantling of the Guards.

The Army of the Twenty Million of the Resistance

27- The Idea of Formation

The idea of forming this organization emerged after the occupation of the American Embassy in Tehran and Khomeini’s desire to give a continuous boost to his movement.

28- The Organizational Activities

The initial activities of the popular mobilization office cover all the sectors of the civil and military society. This office aims at participating in the various social, political, cultural, and military roles, and all the affairs that play an important role in recruiting people. The military
section is considered the only section in this office that has started its activities so far.

29- The Civil Activities

The popular mobilization office has not started its political, cultural and economic activities yet. It has been decided that each ministry should have a prominent role in carrying out the mentioned affairs and those related to that ministry.

30- The Organization

A- The resistance team is considered the main unit of the Army of the twenty million. This team consists of 22 people and this number could be 20-25 people. The number 22 has been chosen as a good omen for 22 of Bahman [Bahman is the 11th month of the Iranian civil calendar], the day the Shah fell. There is no limit imposed, either high or low, for the ages of people. Therefore, a boy or an old man could be recruited. The resistance team is divided into a combat unit that consists of ten people subdivided into teams A and B. Another ten people forming the protection unit are subdivided into teams A and B, too. One of the remaining two people leads the team, and the other person will be his assistant. The leader of the team leads the combat unit, while the assistant leads the protection unit.

B- The reason for subdividing the units into teams A and B is to facilitate the management and to accelerate the operation of transportation from one place to another. On this basis, every three or four adjacent houses can form a self-sufficient team.

C- The combat unit participates in the battle operations, while the protection unit secures the supply materials. As an example, the grocer of the district ensures the supply of the non-military materials. If this responsibility were placed upon his shoulders, he would have to think of the food materials that could be stored to be utilized when necessary.

D- The women participate in training on the necessary works and first aid.

E- The protection unit must get arms training too.

F- The resistance teams will rise so that the teams of one district form a larger resistance unit whose headquarters will be in the mosque of the district. It is managed by a defense committee.
that is composed of many persons. Thus, this organization grows to a degree where it forms the bases of resistance in the cities. The total of these bases will form (the army of twenty-million soldiers for the resistance). This army will work as a team for the resistance, relying on self-sufficiency and providing what the team needs from the people. It has no authority on the administrative and executive institutions.

The Commander
The Deputy

Protection Unit
Combat Unit

Team A
Team B
Team A
Team B

31- The Duties

Its duties are defined as follows:
A- Participating in the Cold War.
B- Fighting the 5th Column.
C- Fighting sabotage of the infiltrators.
D- Protecting the operations of the military forces through:

First Supporting the regular forces with personnel (replacing the losses)
Second Fighting the 5th Column

E- Reducing the losses resulting from air bombardment.
F- Joining in the war of attrition by carrying out surprise attacks.
32- According to what has been mentioned, it seems that this organization is overwhelmed with propaganda. It is not to be expected to perform any effective practical activities.

The Gendarmerie Forces
32- The gendarmerie system mentioned in the gendarmerie pamphlet, issued by our department in 1978, is to be cancelled. The general organizational structure will be as follows:

A- Gendarmerie district is at the center of the governorate.
B- The district is composed of three regiments on average.
C- Each regiment consists of a number of companies (four companies on average).
D- The companies’ forces are distributed into many control posts.
C- There is a striking force regiment at the headquarters of each district.

33- A modified pamphlet will be issued later.

Miscellaneous

34- It has been decided to increase the period of compulsory service to 18 months, instead of 14 months. This includes those enlisted after July 12, 1979. It is known that the service was 24 months during the Shah’s era, then it was reduced to 12 months after his fall, and then it was increased to 14 months after the appearance of the armed national movements.

35- At present, members of what is called (The Islamic Resistance - the military wing of the Islamic Labor Organization) are being trained in the city of Shiraz. They are occupying one of the civil courts as their headquarters. The training is on the operations of sabotage, assassination, and rumor-spreading, in courses fluctuating between 2-3 months. Kurdish members, and others from the agents of the Iranian regime who are not Kurds, are joining these courses.

36- There are a number of foreign pilot and technician officers in the Hurr Al-Riyah base and within the group of the army aviation at Kermanshah. They are subjected to severe protection procedures, and communications were forbidden with them (under follow-up).
37- A new security and intelligence apparatus was created under the name (SAWAMA), which means, The Security and Intelligence Apparatus of the Islamic Nation. Lieutenant General Husayn Fardost was appointed as its director, and ‘Ali Muhammad Kawah as a deputy. The following is the information available about them:

A- Lieutenant General Husayn Fardost

First He has been one of the Shah’s friends since childhood. They finished high school together and graduated from the Special Royal Military School in Switzerland, and then from the War College in Tehran.

Second He was appointed as the escort for the Shah when he was the crown prince.

Third He worked as an administrative officer in the SAVAK organization under the command of Lieutenant General Bakhtiyar (who was killed in 1970 in Iraq). He was promoted to the position of the Deputy Director of SAVAK during the time of Lieutenant General Nasiri.

Forth He was appointed as a liaison officer between the Shah and the SAVAK, and then to the position of general inspector. He remained in this position until the Shah’s departure.

Fifth When General Hizer came to Tehran, just before the Shah’s departure, he was his guest for 40 days without the Shah’s knowledge.

Sixth He had a relationship with Khomeini, therefore he undertook the role of coordinating mass resistance against the Shah and the American Central Intelligence Agency.

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B- Lieutenant General ‘Ali Muhammad Kawah

He advanced gradually within the SAVAK since his graduation until the fall of the Shah. He took the position of the director of the seventh directorate. He was also in charge of the official coordination between the SAVAK and the European and American intelligence.

38- The Main Changes in the High Command

A- Both Major General Muhammad Hadi Shadmahr, the Chief of Staff of the Joint Forces (Chief of the General Staff), and Major General Amir Bahman Baqiri, the Commander in Chief of the Air Force, resigned on June 20, 1980. The following were appointed:

First Major General Waliallah Falahi, the previous commander of the land forces, as the Chief of Staff of the Joint Forces. A summary of information that is available about him is: born in 1935, infantry officer, occupied training positions. The most important training positions are the commander of the military college and the
commander of the main training center in Shiraz. Well qualified.

Second  Brigadier General Qasim ‘Ali Zahir Nazar, the previous commander of the Gendarmerie forces, as the commander of the land forces. A summary of the information that is available about him is: A well-qualified infantry officer. He was promoted to the rank of Brigadier General in September 1979 (one rank) when he was the commander of the 64th Infantry Division for his successful role in striking the armed Kurds.

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Third  Colonel Jawad Fakuri — An unknown person

B- On June 1, 1980, Lieutenant Colonel and engineer Bahram Afdali was appointed as the Commander of the Navy. A summary of the information that is available about him is: He was born in Qom in 1940 into a religious family, a graduate of the Italian naval college, very active, his commanding ability is weak, and his knowledge within his new field of responsibility is limited.

C- Brigadier General Qarukh Adhra was appointed as the commander of the 1st Corps in Kermanshah. A summary of available information about him is: a well-qualified officer. A graduate of the Iranian staff college, and he joined in other special courses in commandership and general staff. He occupied the position of a commander of a regiment, an infantry brigade, and an airborne brigade.

39- The Tactical Situation

A- On April 8, 1980, the Iranian forces entered an alert of grade C. It is known that the alert scales are divided into three grades. They are:

Grade A. One third of the total is on the alert

Grade B. One-half of the total is on the alert

Grade C. The entirety is on the alert

B- The Iranian forces are distributed in the following directions:

First  The Kurdish area: the 28th Infantry Division, 64th Infantry Division, 1st Brigade 16th Armored Division, 2nd Brigade 81st Armored Division, 2nd Brigade 2nd Infantry Division, 105th Mechanized Infantry Division, 283rd Reconnaissance Battalion from the 92nd Armored Division, and the 55th incomplete Paratroop
Brigade. Moreover, the army aviation group in Kermanshah and the air base in Tabriz and Kambudar Ahnak were assigned to support the operations. It is likely that a need for other troops would increase later.

Second Toward Iraq: The 92nd Armored Division is less than two regiments and the 81st Armored Division less than one brigade, in addition to the Gendarmerie units present at the border posts and a strike force regiment in the center of every governorate adjacent to the country [Iraq]. Their number is four.

Third The rest of the forces are distributed in the areas of other ethnicities and minorities for security reasons.

C- It is obvious, from what has been stated, that about 40% of the total Iranian forces are operating in the Iranian Kurdish region at present.

D- The Iranian forces were inflicted with the following losses due to the clashes that took place with our forces, from May 27, 1980 through June 26, 1980:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel Losses</th>
<th>Materials and Equipment Losses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 46 dead</td>
<td>1. Four 155mm artilleries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 93 injured</td>
<td>2. Five 120mm mortar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. One 106mm anti-tank artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. One armored personnel carrier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Three rocket launchers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. One artillery ammunition pile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. Striking many posts with direct damage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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E- Because of the escalation of the situation, the residents of the following areas moved to towns away from the border. We confirmed that the work was not organized, but it was due to the fear and powerlessness that the citizens felt.

First The villages between Khosro Aawi (opposite to Al-Mundhiriyah) and Bara `Aziz (opposite to Majid Qader Agha village, in Quratu area)
Second About 60% of the residents of Qasr-e-Shirin
Third Some of the residents of Mehran city and the villages surrounding it

F- 48 Iranian air penetrations into our air space took place from April 11, 1980 through June 30, 1980, and with different depths. The purpose of more than 30 penetrations were for reconnaissance, while the rest were due to an error or maneuvering requirements in the Kurdish areas.

G- The border posts are being strengthened with a force of the Guards and a limited number of tanks and carriers for limited times during the clashes. Under normal conditions, one post force includes between 15-20 persons of the gendarmerie and Jariks (the Jariks are considered similar to cavalry). Moreover, works of digging and reinforcement along the border, carried out by the gendarmerie, were spotted.

H- Information was received from many sources that Syrian forces exist in Iran. Also, wireless communications of the equipment of the Iranian armored troops were intercepted in the Bawisah region (opposite of Midan) and in Jalat (opposite of `Ali Al-Gharbi) in the Syrian dialect. The information revealed that a force, estimated to be 500-800 persons, exists in Shushtar, near Dezful, and in Tehran.

The summary of the assessment is that the Syrian regime sent a force of the mentioned size from the Special Forces and the technical personnel. During analysis, the possibility was considered that the wiretapped conversations belonged to elements of the Amal Movement, from some wings of the Palestinian organizations, or from some deportees from Iraq who had Iranian origins.

I- The Mobilization Situation of the Iranian Forces - Appendix H
40- **General**
The Iranian forces are still generally split, despite the fact that they succeeded in reorganizing some of the units. All the sources, in addition to what is available from many foreign intelligence organizations, agreed on the decline of the Iranian military situation.

41- **The Land Forces**

A- **The Command Level**
   Generally inefficient (what has been mentioned about the efficiency of the Chief of Staff and the 1st Corps Commander is stemming from the evaluation of the previous level they were at, Brigade Commander).

B- **The Completed Proportion**
   50-60% in the best case

C- **Discipline and Morale**

   They are below standards for the following reasons:

   First  The units are driven by committees consisting of three people who are mostly clergymen. This has left a bad effect on the psychological state of the commanders and leaders.

   Second The military personnel, especially the officers, feel that they would be pensioned off or expelled from the service some day.

   Third  The movements in the Kurdish area, and in the regions of the other ethnic nationals, are under unsuitable conditions.

   Forth  **Training**
   No tactical exercises were spotted, except for some units of the 16th Armored Division.

   Fifth  **Efficiency of Weapons and Equipment**
   They are in a state of decline because of the lack of maintenance and spare parts.

D- **State of the Formations**

   First  **1st Infantry Division**
   (1) It was formed recently from the remnants of the Imperial Guards. It is experiencing a great shortage of personnel and equipment, and incompleteness of the formation.
   (2) It has not conducted any exercises.
Second 2\textsuperscript{nd} Infantry Division
(1) It is experiencing a great shortage of personnel and equipment.
(2) It has not conducted any exercises since the fall of the Shah.

Third 28\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Division
(1) It has sustained heavy losses during the events that took place in Kurdish areas where the 1\textsuperscript{st} Infantry Brigade and the division headquarters were subjected to losses and a siege that lasted many weeks. Its commander was killed.
(2) The 2\textsuperscript{nd} Brigade in Saqaz was subjected to a siege and heavy losses of personnel.
(3) Its personnel availability does not exceed 50%.
(4) It has not conducted any exercises since the fall of the Shah.

Forth 64\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Division
(1) It has suffered heavy losses in the latest fights with the Kurds.
(2) The armed Kurds overtook the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Brigade camp in Mahabad within a few weeks after the fall of the Shah. They managed to seize all of its supplies and to kill a great number of its personnel while the survivors escaped.

Fifth 77\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Division
It has sustained less damage than the other divisions.

Sixth 16\textsuperscript{th} Armored Division
The 1\textsuperscript{st} Brigade sustained heavy losses at Baneh Road during the fight against the armed Kurds last May, where 580 of its people were captured.

Seventh 81\textsuperscript{st} Armored Division
Some of its units sustained many losses in personnel in the Kurdish region, especially the armored 123\textsuperscript{rd} Infantry Regiment. Its position became extremely bad.
Eighth  88th Armored Division

This division started to be formed in 1975-1976. Nevertheless, that was delayed and then resumed in autumn of 1978. The division suffers a shortage in the areas of organization, supplies, and training.

Ninth  92nd Armored Division

(1) Basically, it is considered the best of the Iranian formations
(2) It suffers a shortage of personnel
(3) No exercises have been observed

Tenth  55th Paratrooper Brigade — 23rd Special Forces Brigade

They suffer a shortage of personnel due to the reduction that was applied to them.

Eleventh  65th Paratrooper Brigade

Incomplete.

Twelfth  84th Independent Infantry Brigade — 37th Independent Armored Brigade

Similar to the other formations.

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42- The Air Force

A- The situation of the Air Force is bad in comparison with what it was, due to the shortage of spare parts. Each airplane is repaired with materials of another airplane (for some parts). The technical experience level is low due to the departure of foreign experts and the escape and expulsion of many of the technicians, in addition to the reasons mentioned in our report in 1979.

B- Because of the reliance of the Air Force on the Western bloc countries, its general situation will get worse as long as the relations stay the same.

C- The percentage of the serviceability of the fighters is within 30-40% and of the helicopters is about 50% at best, according to the information available to us.

43- The Naval Force
A- The Iranian naval force suffered least from political events for two reasons. It stayed away from participating in striking the forces opposing the Shah, and the guards of Ahmad Madani, who was appointed as its commander, persisted in protecting its capabilities.

B- At the beginning of 1979, the force personnel total was 28,000 according to the official statistics. The deserters are estimated to be between 3000 — 4000 persons, after the fall of the Shah.

C- The Iranian naval force is affiliated with the United States of America in many ways. This could amount to 60% in some fields and 80% in other fields.

Despite that, the Navy has large quantities of spare parts. It started, however, thinking seriously, since one month after the Shah’s fall, to search for replacements for the material sources. It sent delegates to European countries like France, Britain, and Germany for that. Nevertheless, it did not succeed in its effort. Now, the material problem started to appear in an abnormal manner.

D- The American evaluations indicated that the Iranian Navy would need 2829 experts in 1979. Thirteen hundred American experts were expelled after one month of the Shah’s fall. Though the Iranians managed to fill part of the vacuum, they still lost a basic part of technical expertise. Moreover, they were deprived of the expertise of management and leadership that the Navy commanders of CENTO [Central Treaty Organization] used to offer.

E- For a year and a half, the Navy has not carried out any drills, except one in September-October 1979. All resources confirmed that it did not accomplish the expected goals and it was a big failure. Also, it carried out another drill at the beginning of April 1980, and another in the period of May 19-21, 1980. It was, as many sources confirmed, like a naval parade or procession. The official Pentagon spokesman stated that the May drill exaggerated what was declared.

F- Generally, the fighting qualification can be evaluated average/below average.
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General Expectations and Conclusions

44- After the Islamic Republican Party’s winning the majority of the Al-Shura council, it was confirmed that contradictions and disagreements between the Beheshti and Bani Sadr blocs would rise to levels of increased friction. Beheshti would try to increase the strength of his position by attracting other groups of clergymen to his side. Bani Sadr would be in a very critical position and would find himself forced to go to groups that were more liberal and to make alliances with them (especially the National Front). If he did that, he would be supporting the stance of the Beheshti bloc that says that one of the reasons for its disagreements with him is because of his Western tendencies. Then he would have no choice except to continue with a strong and clear opposition to Beheshti’s bloc, which is a matter that he has no power over, or to resign. This would be the most likely probability.

45- It seems that Khomeini’s decision to interfere in this struggle between Beheshti and Bani Sadr has become clearer recently. On the one hand, he shows some affection to Bani Sadr and he sees that, in addition to keeping him away from his position (and that is his privilege according to the constitution if it contradicts the Al-Shura council), it would be considered as ignoring his voters. On the other hand, he is not able to strike Beheshti, Khamenei, Sadiq Khalkhali and the rest of the opposition to Bani Sadr, who are considered the strongest and closest allies. Therefore, he might be compelled to:

A- Advise the involved parties to resolve the disagreements. If he managed that, it would be for a short time only. Or to:
B- Limit the authorities of Bani Sadr, making him the puppet of the media with regard to constitutional issues.
C- To accept his resignation, or to urge him to submit one. This probability looks very low at the present time.

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46- Khomeini’s interference in political matters has declined noticeably since the beginning of this year. This has occurred due to his deteriorating health. He was admitted to a cardiovascular hospital and stayed 43 days there. It seems that his health, despite getting much better, could not help him to intervene in everything, as in the past. The actual questioning and choosing of who would succeed him, in case of his departure from the stage for any reason, has started. According to our evaluation and following of the events, Ayatollah Husayn ’Ali Muntazeri will principally be the most acceptable religious scholar by many of the factions after limiting the role of Shari’at
Madari and the rest of the Ayatollahs who have a great weight (like Al-Mar’ashi Al-Najafi and Kalbaykani). If he failed to get the direct leadership, then it is probable that he would form a command council that constitutes five members where he would be one of them and certainly the most influential.

This is what we expect under the normal circumstances, but we believe the departure of Khomeini in 1-2 years would mean dangerous national and political secessions and divisions.

47- Following up with the economic situation, it can be concluded that Iran would be facing dangerous economic situations if the Western embargo and the deteriorating internal conditions continued. It would be forced to retreat in front of the Western bloc countries. Nevertheless, it is not expected to resolve the situation before 2-4 months, unless basic changes take place.

48- It is probable that the relationship between the two organizations of Mujahidi Al-Sha’ab and Fida’i Al-Sha’ab on the one side, and the present government on the other side, will get worse. However, we do not expect broad clashes to happen between Mujahidi Al-Sa’ab and the government in the short term.

49- We expect more deterioration of the general situation of Iran’s fighting capability. It is probable it will send other troops to the Kurdish region to confront the armed Kurds. Moreover, the shortage of spare parts and the continuation of the disunity and general contradiction will lead to a greater decline of combat capability.

50- Having mentioned that, and observing the mobilization situation of the forces, it is clear that, at present, Iran has no power to launch wide offensive operations against Iraq, or to defend itself on a large scale. However, it is necessary to pay attention to taking protective measures, because it cannot be guaranteed that the Iranian enemy could not launch a special operation of a dangerous nature. For instance, it could execute an air strike at the front line of our airbases with a few Phantom airplanes, if their troops or interests encountered effective losses due to our activities, or when the operation of weakening the Khomeini regime reaches a more intensive stage.

Appendixes

a. The Kurdish parties and coalitions
b. The layout of organizing the administrative support command in the field
c. The layout of the permanent residence of the Iranian forces
d. The layout of the distribution of airplanes and surface-to-air means
e. The mobilization situation of the Iranian forces
Appendix (a) issued with the Intelligence report about Iran

The Kurdish parties and coalitions

1. The Democratic Iranian Kurdistan Party headed by `Abd-al-Rahman Qasimlu. On June 20, 1980 it suffered a separation of six of its members of the central committee for their support of Khomeini’s project of autonomy.

2. Fida’iyyi Al-Sha’ab organization (Kurdistan branch).

3. Al-Komalah, which is formed from the poor of Kurdistan and the group of ’Iz-al-Din Al-Husayni, and it is called the Kurdistan revolutionary movement.

4. Tudeh Party (Kurdistan branch), and it pretends that it supports Khomeini.

5. Razkari Party (the group of Madih Al-Khomeini), which opposes Khomeini.


The parties and the three coalitions are considered the truly effective power in the Kurdish area of Iran.