“Letter of General Military Intelligence Directorate about Iranian Use of Chemical Weapons on Iraqi Troops”

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In the Name of God, most Gracious, most Merciful

Presidency of the Republic
Secretary
General Military Intelligence Directorate

No: Directorate 5/Section 13/8343
Date: 14 April, 1987

Top Secret and Personal

To: The Armed Forces General Command
RE: The Enemy's Use of Chemical Munitions

1. From 1900-2200 hours on 9 April 87, the enemy carried out a chemical strike on the 5th Mechanized Division, 11th Infantry Division, and 19th Infantry Division positioned east of Basra. The chemical detection report stated the following:

A. The munitions used were one of the choking agents, most likely the Phosgene agent. The following are its main characteristics:

   First: An unstable toxic agent;
   Second: Leads to air contamination only, so the use of a mask is considered sufficient;
   Third: Symptoms appear within 4-5 hours;
   Fourth: Easily manufactured;
   Fifth: Leaves an odor similar to rotten eggs (as reported by victims).

B. Caused injury to 156 persons including 12 martyrs. The following symptoms were recorded:

   First: The filling of the lungs with fluids as a result of the illness;
   Second: Pain in the chest and trachea, as well as dyspnea [shortness of breath].
   Third: A sharp cough with secretions from the nose and mouth.
2. At 2330 hours on 12 April 87, the enemy fired six chemical bombs, believed to be Mustard gas, on the headquarters of the 28th Infantry Division. At 0100 hours on 13 April 87, the enemy fired three (CS) bombs near Al-Ta'limi Bridge.

3. **Opinion of the Directorate**
   a. At 0730 hours on 11 April 87 (meaning 36 hours after the first use), Radio Tehran broadcast the following news:

   “An Iranian patrol was able yesterday morning during a surprise attack to destroy one Iraqi column that attempted to carry out chemical attacks in the Karbala'-8 area of operations. Reports say that the air in the area where Iraqi forces are located got contaminated as a result of destroying the enemy's chemical cargo and a large number of the enemy were killed and wounded because of leakage of the chemical gases.”

B. The latest information that we submitted on 8 December 86 comprised the following:

First: The enemy does not possess an effective "locally" produced "chemical" weapon;
Second: The enemy has chemical bombs/shells that contain (CS) agent;
Third: It is expected that they produce small amounts of Mustard agent;
Fourth: The enemy is trying by various means to reach an advanced stage of chemical agent production;
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Fifth: The enemy's possession of an effective chemical strike power is going to push him to use it in case our forces use this [chemical] weapon, or in case his attack fails or when they face strong defense on a crucial approach even without our use of chemical weapons;

Sixth: In order to prevent unexpected cases, and avoid the possibility of [them] obtaining this weapon pre-manufactured, even in very small quantities, we suggest intensifying preventive measures for our troops, especially in the main strike corridors.

C. We received information from a source skilled in obtaining information, indicating that Iran obtained raw chemical material for the production of Mustard gas and Tabun [a nerve agent], from North Korea. They were manufactured with the help of experts from North Korea. These experts are running tests in Mashhad and Iranshahr, but the quantity they are producing is very small.

Please review and we will provide you with any new developments.

Regards,

[Signature]
Staff Major General
General Military Intelligence Director
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Cc:

Presidency of the Republic – Secretary
Ministry of Defense Council
Special Security Apparatus Division
Army Chief of Staff

{ Please review, with [our] appreciation

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