

“Meeting between Saddam Hussein and the Revolutionary Council Regarding the Sanctions Placed on Iraq and Tariq Aziz’s Trip to the UN Security Council”



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Key: UM = Unidentified Male Speaker.

Translator comments, clarifications, and additions are italicized in brackets.

Tariq Aziz: *[Audio begins with Tariq Aziz in mid-sentence]*...and agreeing on ousting it.

[The conversation was already in progress before Saddam arrived]

Saddam Hussein: Peace be upon you.

All: Peace, mercy, and blessings of God be upon you.

Saddam: Let us hear from Comrade Tariq about his trip.

Tariq Aziz: Sir, the meetings that I held had a time sequence but with different topics, because the first one with the Australian side is related to the topic of Resolution 986. There are two issues; Resolution 986 that is related to Ekeus and the French were included, I mean the talks included bilateral relations; Resolution 986 and the relation with the Security Council and Ekeus. First, if Your Excellency allows me to talk about the relation with the Council, in general --
[Interrupted]

Saddam: *[Inaudible]*.

Tariq Aziz: Yes, with the Council, in general, and the relation with Ekeus as a chapter and then discuss the second chapter.

Saddam: Open the window so that we can get fresh air.

Tariq Aziz: In New York I met with the Security Council's members with whom I usually meet, except for some bad members and those who left the Council.

Saddam: Rokan.

Rokan: Yes, Sir.

Saddam: *[Inaudible]*. Yes, comrade.

Tariq Aziz: Yes.

Saddam: Get me a cigar.

Rokan: Yes, Sir.

Tariq Aziz: At the Security Council, I met with the members with whom I usually meet, except for those who will leave. I met with the good members, such as Nigeria, thanked him for their position and encouraged him to continue communicating with us, and thanked him for their efforts within the framework of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Non-Aligned

Movement. However, I purposely did not want to meet with the German [*representative*], I mean I did not see him, and I did not see the Czech and Argentinean sides either, meaning I excluded them. I met with the rest, and the new members who will arrive in a few days, which are Egypt, Poland, South Korea, Chile and Guinea-Bissau. The events of August and the new information, doubt, and strange stories that followed were not suitable for the atmosphere. We can say they placed a heavy burden on the Security Council. But it is clear that this was [*inaudible*], I mean, it is not like the way it was last September and October, when Comrade the Minister of Foreign Affairs was [*inaudible*] but did not end. That is why we focused, in our meetings with the Security Council's members, on the fact that what happened in August did not change the essential facts regarding Iraq's commitment to Resolution 687, and that the key issues of a part of Resolution 687, which is the destruction and inspection, were achieved. Regardless of how long it will take Ekeus to verify it and confirm it, the result will be as we previously said and announced that this matter was achieved. Because this took place with our knowledge and under our control, and there was no cheating or lack of clarity of any type for the Command. [*Time Stamp: 05:23*]

The other story that is neither very good nor very bad is related to the previous programs, how they were set, who came and who left, and what did we buy. These are, of course, issues that the Command does not review their details and is not supposed to learn about their details; just people related to the matter know the details. If they cooperated in honesty and clarity with the Command we will know. But if they don't and [*inaudible*], and lied, this will create problems like what happened after August. In fact, Sir, regarding impartial people who know us they were ahead of this explanation, ahead and understanding. However, they said, "You know the situation, Ekeus must submit a report, because the situation for the Security Council has changed, as the position of Ekeus and his influence on the Council has become stronger than before." We also told them, "We made a serious and quick effort to close the files and fill in the gaps that resulted afterward." The delegation that accompanied us, 'Amir al-Sa'di and Hussam Amin, also helped us doing so. 'Amir was a little bit late due to a visa issue. He had meetings with a good number of delegations, such as the Russians and others. He explained to them in details some of the points on which they followed up, Sir, they followed up thoroughly. He believes that, in that regard, I cannot say that we have achieved crucial progress, but we relatively alleviated the suspicious atmosphere that existed in the past. We gave them our assessment that we will be able in a short period of time, a matter of a few months, to close the files. This was important because the prevailing feeling within the Security Council was that these thousands and hundreds of thousands of pages, and the biological, chemical, and missiles issues give the impression that this issue is going to take a long time and drag out over a very long period of time. The French delegation told Samir al-Naana', "Our assessment is that this is going to take 12-18 months for this issue to be settled." When we told them with confidence, "No, this is not how it looks and it is not going to take this long, because we have achieved a lot." They paid attention [*inaudible*] for such a possibility. Of course, this matter will depend on our effort later on. Like we explained to Your Excellency at the Council of Ministers' meeting, among the disturbing issues that were included in the review that we presented at the opening of [*inaudible*] was the incident that took place in Amman, which is the discovery of equipment that was supposed to enter Iraq. This caused us embarrassment, but we strongly established that we had nothing to do with that.

Saddam: What equipment?

Tariq Aziz: Sir, what is happening is there is a Jordanian by the name of Bassam Abu-Gharbiyya or Bassam Gharbiyya who has had a connection with the Military Industrialization Commission since the time of Husayn Kamil. He used to come to the Military Industrialization installations to see what they needed. *[Inaudible]* to them gyroscopes, gyroscopes in particular. Your Excellency has an idea about gyroscopes?

Saddam: Yes.

Tariq Aziz: He told them, "I can get gyroscopes from Russia." So there are two types of behaviors; a general director -- *[Interrupted]*

[Time Stamp: 10:03]

Saddam: A gyroscope for the 150 range missile?

Tariq Aziz: Yes. At the beginning -- *[Interrupted]*

Saddam: What is the range?

Tariq Aziz: Sir, he told them from the beginning, "I will get you gyroscopes for a lesser range than 150." The issue was not directly presented, I mean, it was not addressed to the head or the director of the commission, *[inaudible]* and so on. It was presented to the Director of the Commission at Husayn's time. 'Amir Rashid says he does not know about the issue, meaning he did not know this was the proposal of this man to start with. When 'Amir Rashid found out, he *[inaudible]*, put him in a car, and took him to the Jordanian border. This is according to his story. However, at the same time, the installation's general director, his name is Tahir and I do not know him personally, asked him for a quantity of 10-15 gyroscopes with some equipment. He did not tell them. All of this happened before August. When the events of August took place, Lieutenant General 'Amir held a symposium for them to see if they had anything hidden and *[if they]* knew how to dispose of it. So they told him, "We have small electronic items that Abu-Gharbiyya brought us; should we report them to Ekeus or not?" and he said to them, "Tell him." I mean *[inaudible]* to tell him about the electronics so that nothing will be left out. It turns out that they did not tell the Special Committee. When we used to have delegations from the Special Committee, well they did not tell these delegations what we had or did not have. After that, when they found out there were central instructions to have transparency and disclose everything without obscurity as this may hurt us, they took the gyroscopes and threw them in the Tigris' tributary.

Saddam: In the Tigris' tributary?

Tariq Aziz: In the Tigris' tributary. *[The sound of stirring sugar in tea cups]* And they still did not tell the Commission's director about the gyroscopes thrown in the Tigris' tributary. They continued with this man who kept going back and forth -- *[Interrupted]*

Saddam: Was the [*inaudible*] in the Tigris' tributary?

UM1: [*Inaudible*].

Saddam: I mean, how can they throw the electronics in the Tigris' tributary if they need them. And then, once they threw them in the Tigris' tributary, they cut all ties with the source of the items they wanted to get rid of by throwing them in the Tigris' tributary.

Tariq Aziz: Yes, this is what happened, such an illogical act.

Saddam: What?

Tariq Aziz: It has no logic.

UM1: [*Inaudible*].

Tariq Aziz: This man went and brought -- [*Interrupted*]

Saddam: [*Inaudible*].

UM1: [*Inaudible*].

Tariq Aziz: He went and brought another quantity [*of gyroscopes*] for the long-range missiles and left them in Amman. When the news spread about the Jordanian authorities in Baghdad, so on Thursday... Friday... on Saturday I left. On Saturday or Friday, Lieutenant General 'Amir Rashid called me, I was at the farm, he said, "There is this issue now, have you heard about it?" I asked Mr. Hamid and told him, "Find out about this news for me." It was Friday and I was not in my office. I wanted to know how we should handle the matter. So Comrade Hamid read me the details of the news that spread. Lieutenant General 'Amir called and said, "We want to issue a statement and give an explanation of the issue." Then Hussam Amin brought the statement and I redacted it and sent it. I asked 'Amir, "Who is this person?" He said, "He is the one who used to deal with the Commission and travel." Later on, I learned that he is in Baghdad. So I called Comrade 'Abd and said, "You know, this man is in Baghdad. Brother, [*inaudible*], you may want to give the Intelligence an order to [*inaudible*] him." He said, "Who is he working for and who sent him to us?" So the man has been disassociated since that time. According to what he told me at the meeting of the Council of Ministers [*Cabinet*] – I have not checked yet or know what happened after the investigation – the man told them, "Hey people, why are you locking me up, I had an agreement with the General Director and here is the contract! The contract's cover is non-prohibited electronic materials, but don't you want to see how high the prices are?" For example, the cost of this pen is one dirham and he charges five dinars and you know how the prices of that contract are. So he made it five dinars this means we are not going to get a pen but something else. "You told me you wanted this one."

[*Time Stamp: 15:23*]

UM1: General Director of what?

Tariq Aziz: General Director of the Commission, General Director of the Missile Development Center.

UM1: Yes, who has the *[inaudible]*?

Tariq Aziz: He is still being investigated; I have not reviewed the investigation results yet. He told me it was Mr. President and that there was an investigation. There is the Commission's technical investigation and the Intelligence investigation. I do not know *[inaudible]*.

UM1: *[Inaudible]*.

Saddam: *[Inaudible]*?

UM2: No, Sir, I do not know *[inaudible]*.

Tariq Aziz: We need to see, Sir, because this is degradation, a practical degradation.

Saddam: *[Inaudible]* how long has it been for them, for the last 100 years?

Tariq Aziz: Two weeks.

Saddam: They *[inaudible]*, so that if we know about it *[inaudible]*.

UM1: *[Inaudible]* for the future. Once the sanctions are lifted in the future, *[inaudible]*.

Saddam: Civilian and military people deal with prohibited items every day.

Tariq Aziz: Every day they deal with it, but this issue...

Saddam: That is why I asked Comrade Tariq whether it is for the missiles that have a longer range than 150, because we are allowed to have the ones for 150.

Tariq Aziz: Yes, but we are not allowed to import equipment, Sir.

Saddam: If this is what they are saying, we are not allowed to import equipment, they will come to the mill and say, "You just imported this one recently." They come to the factory and say, "You just imported this one recently."

UM1: And there is nothing allowed.

Saddam: They will say the same about the octane of the oil or gasoline and this is a sanction violation. No country in the world would tell him who is sanctioned, "Why are you *[inaudible]* to import allowed items for your daily life. But it is a different story regarding non-allowed items.

Tariq Aziz: Sir, there are two types regarding this aspect, so that the picture will be clear to Your Excellency and the comrades. This sector is subject to monitoring, I mean the military sector is subject to monitoring.

Saddam: So that they can make sure that work is taking place according to the restrictions.

Tariq Aziz: Yes. So they come and see that we have produced 120 kilometer [*range*] missiles, and they are allowed. We can produce items made of locally [*produced*] components, but if they know that we have imported the components, then they will say this is a violation. But how will they know if a mill or a factory that is not subject to monitoring does not have restrictions? Now you see the difference, Sir? When this sector is subject to monitoring, then we must be sensitive and meticulous. When we bring an item, we have to make this item in a way to show that we have made it or it was already in our warehouses and report it to the Special Committee. We say that we have made 10,000 rifles or missiles, depending on the *categories* that are subject to monitoring. There is no monitoring in civilian issues, unless a country sent a shipment that is not approved by the Embargo Committee, they will confiscate it like they did in the case of... there were small ships that used to sail in the Gulf carrying oil, dates, and I do not know what else.

[*Time Stamp: 20:05*]

Saddam: [*Inaudible*].

Tariq Aziz: But these are different; they have to be included in the report of Ekeus. This is the problem; they have to be included in Ekeus' report and [*indicate*] that Iraq is not fulfilling its commitments. This is Albright's politics and we say, "Yes, this is a lie it is not ours. There is a chance for [*inaudible*]." These topics have some very sensitive points. [*Inaudible*] the issue, it was possible for us, Sir, to give guidance in this direction at the time of Husayn. The point that -- [*Interrupted*]

Saddam: Had they suggested the second point to me and said they were going to import gyroscopes within the approved range I would have told them to go ahead and import them.

Tariq Aziz: Yes, but they should have told us, Sir, I mean they were supposed -- [*Interrupted*]

Saddam: we are complying with the range they have specified for us.

UM1: But you have guidance about all that [*inaudible*].

Saddam: No, no, even at the end in my last meeting with them. What I mean there is a difference between partial and total violation.

UM1: Yes.

Saddam: The total violation is going beyond what is prohibited, meaning instead of 150 we go up to 300 or 500.

Tariq Aziz: Sir, as far as cheating we are cheating and we continue to cheat. But when cheating it is not [*inaudible*].

Saddam: We need to know how to cheat.

Tariq Aziz: Meaning one should go to the administrative and political official so that they can find a way for him and tell him to do it this way and not that way.

UM1: Or to tell him to go and throw it on the street.

Tariq Aziz: Or [*inaudible*].

UM1: True.

Tariq Aziz: So one has done this and [*inaudible*] on us.

Saddam: For what?

Tariq Aziz: Not all [*inaudible*] know that we -- [*Interrupted*]

Saddam: [*Inaudible*] God damn them, they come out with something against us every day, [*they are*] the biggest liars!

UM1: Yes.

Saddam: They talk about the Tigris and that we threw things in it and so on. They are not even [*inaudible*] except at the Council of Ministers. [*Inaudible*] what is this story, is it true, where and when.

Tariq Aziz: Sir, you know we are not going to report everything we have to the Special Committee for this inspection, not everything. We will study it instead and see if we can [*inaudible*], do we have an explanation for it, discuss it and say this is challenging.

Saddam: Take into account the [*inaudible*] and interest.

Tariq Aziz: The other thing that we can [*inaudible*] and it is harmless, we can explain if it gets discovered and find a way out of it, we say do not talk about it, we are working on it. Well, [*inaudible*], go to ‘Amir Rashid and your superior -- [*Interrupted*]

Saddam: And talk with him.

Tariq Aziz: And tell him, “Well, this is” -- [*Interrupted*]

Saddam: [*Inaudible*] ‘Amir Rashid -- [*Interrupted*]

UM1: [*Inaudible*] ‘Amir.

Tariq Aziz: Give me one reason why we wouldn't tell 'Amir Rashid?

Saddam: [*Inaudible*].

Tariq Aziz: Tell me why, ha? Why wouldn't he come to Your Excellency and say, "Sir, I am" -- [*Interrupted*]

Saddam: You have to look at it this way. This is among the changes and, as long as it is that way, it is not going to cause something big.

Tariq Aziz: No, by God, he knows it; he knows very well that this is -- [*Interrupted*]

Saddam: As far as I know, anything we tell them they [*inaudible*] and immediately report it to the Special Committee, everything even if it is related to a small weapon development.

Tariq Aziz: I don't know, and Your Excellency knows that we have not dealt with the Commission before and we do not know all of the details, who is honest and who is lying among them except for those with whom we are associated. This is the picture I have. Of course, this has casted its shadow [*inaudible*], has casted its shadow on the situation but we stood firm against the threat position. I mean we have nothing to do with it, or at least as a political leadership we did not know about it and are not required [*to know*]...if there is a mistake we will investigate it and see what is going to happen. This is regarding our relation with the Security Council and Ekeus. The second line is the French and our relation with them. When I met with the French ambassador in New York before I left for Paris, I noticed he is being very conservative. This is a new and very conservative ambassador that replaced the previous one. I talked with him and told him the same thing that we are working, trying to fill the gaps, answer the questions, we are capable of handling the issue, and that this pessimistic atmosphere surrounding the closing of the files is being exaggerated and untrue. [*Time Stamp: 25:05*]

He said, "Everything comes through Ekeus." I said, "Fine, we are going to have a delegation with us, and every time our technicians used to discuss the details with your delegation." He said, "Let us leave this until you finish your visit to Paris." I noticed he was cold with us. So when I went to Paris, I expected to face this cold atmosphere. I arrived on Sunday and our appointment was on Wednesday. First, I met with Serge [*inaudible last name*], who was the former Secretary General of Foreign Affairs and our friend and he continues to follow-up on our file in a prompt and honest manner, with him was Nicola [*inaudible last name*]. These two were always our connecting link with the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I had dinner with them and they said, "After the events of August, there is a kind of coldness and retraction especially on the part of the French [*Ministry of*] Foreign Affairs, and you must try to change this atmosphere during this visit." So I thought if I go directly to the Minister of Foreign Affairs—I do not know this man and have no relationship with [*him*]—I may not totally achieve my goal. I insisted on Maugein [*Patrick Maugein, non-Executive Chairman of SOCO International PLC, who was involved in the Oil-for-Food program scandal*] who used to come here, as Your Excellency recalls, to take things to Jacques Chirac in the 80's. I have to be honest with Your Excellency that following the aggression I mean in 1992 or 1993 when I contacted him again he

started bringing me news from Jacques Chirac, I have no guarantee that he was really meeting with Jacques Chirac to get us news. This man used to represent Chirac in the past in a proper and documented way, but I have not seen Jacques Chirac now to tell me that Patrick and Philippe [*Patrick's brother*] represent him. [*Inaudible*], but my visit following the visit of Bush, as Your Excellency remembers, when he puts this condition saying the visit will not take place unless Resolution 986 is implemented. He [*probably Maugein*] called me and said, "I was by the president's side and he cannot manage this person. If you think you will be able to manage this person then come." I said, "How?"

UM1: [*Inaudible*].

Tariq Aziz: Yes. I asked how and he said, "Submit a request [*inaudible*] that you are coming on such a date without conditions." I did indeed; I sent a telegram to the branch director, Ahmad al-'Azzawi, and told him, "Go to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and tell them that I would like to come either on the 18th or 19th after I return from New York and without preconditions." The visit took place. I called him from New York and said, "I will finish on Saturday and you got me this appointment for Wednesday. I wonder if you can meet before Wednesday as I am free for four or five days. So go ask him if he minds me coming on Sunday, so that I can rest for two or three days and meet with people before my official appointment." He called and then said, "No, do as you please and go at any time you want." So I came. Also, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not say no or anything. I said, "Look brother, I need you to get me an appointment with the president, try in any way you can." He said, "Well, it is hard. The president said he will not see Tariq during this visit, but he will meet with him during the next visit." I said, "Fine, talk to him on the phone now, I mean let us talk to him on the phone." He said, "I will try." Well, he went -- [*Interrupted*]

Saddam: Gorbachev, like Gorbachev for 50 dollars [*inaudible; laughing*].

Tariq Aziz: The next day, he called me in the afternoon and said, "My brother is coming, he just told me that on the phone. Free yourself so that you can talk with him." Indeed, his brother Philippe came to me at the hotel; I had some appointments that I postponed. He called Jacques Chirac for me on a mobile phone. This phone is now common and hard to intercept by equipment.

UM1: Okay, all this fear of America, president [*inaudible*].

Tariq Aziz: No, he told me [*the audio is blank from 29:47-30:22*] "... This is between you and me [*inaudible*]. I am staying here; I will go to New York and then to Paris. After that, I will talk to Mr. President and report to him a summary of what you have [*inaudible*]. If the Command and Mr. President agrees to open [*inaudible*] I will send you another one in a special way to Cairo." He said, "We should not talk about this issue to the press." I said, "You must not talk about [*Resolution*] 986 now." Well, neither one of us brought up the 986 issue with the press at the hotel. They were staying at the same hotel. We went to New York. The most important meeting that took place in New York was with the British. He opened the subject, I mean the British opened the subject, and said, "Why didn't you accept Resolution 986, this was a historic opportunity that you missed." I asked, "How did we miss it?" This ambassador is new and the

other person with him was present in my meeting with his predecessor. I told him, "I argued with him and said why did you bring up the Turkish pipe issue and force us to export -- *[Interrupted]*"

UMI: What does this have to do with the issue?

Tariq Aziz: "What does the Turkish pipe have to do... what do our relations with Turkey have to do with the issue? All resolutions issued for us were also issued for Kuwait. Why did you involve Turkey here?" This was his answer, "We do not want to give a political advantage to retaliate at Turkey or get even with Turkey; *to punish Turkey.*" I said to him, "Isn't the other person mentioned in the minutes?" he nodded. "How do you expect me to accept this then," I asked, and he did not *[inaudible]*. I told David, "You know, you British know Iraq. We can distribute in the northern region but with special machinery, I mean it is not the same machinery that we use to distribute to Basra, 'Amara, and Baghdad. We have their names and lists, and their representatives are present. Sulaymaniya people come to Kirkuk to receive their materials and leave. Irbil and Dohuk people come to Mosul. The distance is no more than 100 kilometers from Sulaymaniya and Kirkuk, 90 kilometers between Irbil and Mosul, and only 40 kilometers for Dohuk. Your agencies will check whether the food went to the locals or to the gangs. We do not *[inaudible]*." He said, "I have documented this in the minutes." He also added, "We do not want to give you a political advantage *[inaudible]*." I replied, "This means it is our *[inaudible]*, it is our money, and the food is ours or of the Iraqi state and not one day did our people know that this food was brought to them from Baghdad. This means you want to encourage the separationist situation of the north, instead of you theoretically recognizing that this is part of the sovereignty of Iraq, which is the normal thing to do, and instead of encouraging people to go back to their country and nation. So how do expect us to accept?"

Saddam: For them, the sovereignty of Iraq is not for this regime.

Tariq Aziz: Yes.

Saddam: The unity of Iraq is not for this regime, but on this regime they applied *[inaudible]*.

Tariq Aziz: Yes. So how -- *[Interrupted]*

Saddam: And King Hussein has the same intention.

Tariq Aziz: So how do you expect us to accept this resolution? For them and for Turkey, he told me, "You can reach an agreement with Turkey and then send a letter to the Secretary General without mentioning the resolution itself; meaning you should resolve the issue on your own and then inform the Secretary General that you have reached an agreement with Turkey." As for the distribution to the northern region, the text states that, "Diplomatic creativity can find a solution for this." What I sensed, and so did the comrades who were with me, is that he did not repeat the same logic as his predecessor.

[Time Stamp: 35:05]

Tariq Aziz: The others talked to us about this issue and we expressed the same objections to them. The Russians said, “It is up to you; if you want our help, should you engage in negotiations with the Secretary General, we are willing to help. But if you don’t...” We were reserved when we answered the others. The British opened the subject and when he gave me this answer I did not comment on it or say this is such a nice talk. I did not give any comment. We moved to another subject and he got into an argument with Riyadh al-Qaysi.

Saddam: [*Inaudible*]?

Tariq Aziz: About the [*inaudible*] issue.

Saddam: About line 132, did you talk about it with the British?

Tariq Aziz: No, by God, Sir I did not talk because the British are an opponent.

Saddam: Britain started looking at things from a different perspective.

Tariq Aziz: Yes. Well, I did not talk maybe out of negligence, yes. We went to the French. After we talked about the bilateral relations, the issue of Ekeus with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Security Council, and the balance between [*inaudible*]. I mean I had a lengthy talk with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and gave him a long introduction about the resolutions, how they are implemented, and there is an unjust implementation and another one balanced and there is [*inaudible*] in this regard, after we settled this issue he opened the issue of Resolution 986. He said, “We are asking you to please accept this resolution. You know that we do not have a biased objective toward Iraq and I explained to you our position toward Iraq. We consider Iraq an important and key country, and it must go back and play its role in the region, etcetera. So we do not have a bad intention when we advise you to implement Resolution 986.” I talked to him and said, “Your Excellency the Minister, how can you ask me to accept Resolution 986? This is how this resolution is. I explained it to him and asked him, “Would you agree that a country like Iraq has a text that links Iraq’s economic relations with Turkey to a resolution according to Chapter Six? We fought and our people fought against the Ottoman occupation and against the British occupation. And now you want to take us back to the Ottoman days? Is Turkey superior to Iraq? How can this be, this is unacceptable!” I also explained the issue of the Kurds to him in detail. He said, “We totally understand your objections and we are with the unity and national sovereignty of Iraq, but there is no way we can accept. You have to find a way; find a way.” He did not have specific ideas. What he meant by finding a way is for us to engage in negotiations with the Secretary General. I said, “I will not engage in negotiations with the Secretary General, unless there is something tangible before us that gives an indication that these two bad components of the resolution will be eliminated and that they will not be implemented in a way that threatens our sovereignty and national unity.” After that, I said, “I would like to ask you a question. I mean, I have the right to ask you this question. This resolution, how do you interpret it from the perspective of paragraph 22?” I said, “There is another aspect I have not discussed with you. When the resolution was issued in April, the Command seriously feared that this resolution is a temporization of paragraph 22, meaning an alternative; a humanitarian problem that was resolved and paragraph 22 applies.” He told me, “No, we are committed to Resolution 687 and paragraph 22 is part of Resolution 987. When the terms are met, that is it. We believe

that your implementation of Resolution 986 will make an easy transition to Resolution 687. It is like a deposit. First, you will remove all of the views, talk, and propaganda about you out of your way, and you will benefit financially once there is a political opening to the international community, as they said, there will be a political opening. As for our position, this is our position and you know it; I already explained it to you. We are against the American biased objectives, our interpretation is legal, and we are for the complete return of Iraq to the international community.” [Time Stamp: 40:15]

He told me, “I need you to talk positively when we go out to the media.” I said, “What do you mean by this? I am a minister and so are you. I need a couple of days to contact Mr. President and convey to him what I heard from you and from others so that he can give me directives, while you can call your president on the phone now; so please. I am not going to talk negatively; I will give a balanced statement with no yes or no.” He said that he was afraid I would stand out there and say that we refuse and I don’t know what. I said, “Shame on you.” So we agreed based on this. I went out, and when they [*the media*] asked me I replied, “We heard ideas and suggestions, but there is no need to evaluate them too hastily. I closed the subject. This is the situation summary, Sir; the French Secretary General and other people are with us [*inaudible*].

Saddam: Comrade Taha Ma’ruf.

Taha Ma’ruf: Mr. President, upon my return I submitted a report to Your Excellency. I met with Boutros Ghali when I was in New York. Prior to that, I carefully read Resolution 986 that gives considerable authority to the Secretary General to change the wording of the implementation procedures. I mean he has such authority. Among the points he brought up was that, during the implementation and after accepting the resolution, it is possible to change the terms and provide terms that guarantee the national sovereignty of Iraq. This is what he pointed out. The other thing he mentioned was that this resolution was accepted and it will not prevent or affect the implementation of paragraph 22. On the contrary, this might make it easier.

What I sensed is that the issue of implementing paragraph 22 is no longer a technical or legal issue for the circles that I noticed. It became rather a mere political issue, subject to the procedures and maneuvers of America in the next year. No matter how much we offer and cooperate and committees that come and go those people keep coming back. This is what I sensed. They say something different every time or come up with a new way and so on. That is why they... while the implementation of this one, if he had said acceptance first and then negotiating the implementation of terms, I mean the Secretary General. I even mentioned that he said, “I have a visit to Kuwait and so on.” I said, “Why don’t you stop by Iraq also so that you can learn yourself about the views and so on.” He said, “No, if I don’t see you taking a positive step toward the [*implementation of the*] resolution I will not be able to come to Baghdad.” This is what I sensed. So the general direction of what he mentioned was that if it was an issue on which they agree, then we will engage in negotiations regarding it like we negotiated regarding other issue resolutions, such as 706 and 712; there were negotiations. Therefore, it is possible for us to engage in negotiations in a way that they will provide us with what we need, and also please the groups and our friends who will be a factor for pressure to implement or expedite the implementation of paragraph 22 and lift the sanctions completely. [Time Stamp: 44:58]

In my opinion, this is normal because the economic issue and the conspiracies plotted against Iraq require, in fact, a step so that we can achieve the results that will improve the economic situation. Any move, even the issue of negotiations related to the resolution, will lead and encourage the companies and countries to help Iraq improve the economic situation. In his statement regarding Turkey, the Secretary General said, "About this resolution, the Turkish line will need six months to open up. So in the meanwhile, you need to find another outlet for the quantity, and the quantity is small because even if the quantity became two million barrels a day for the Turkish line, which is the case for Iraq, it is possible that one million of it goes through the Turkish line while the other million goes through any other outlet in the Gulf." This was his opinion regard this issue. Therefore, Mr. President, I believe that if it is a matter of negotiations and engaging in negotiations it would be helpful to us from the psychological aspect, at least, and we can silence France or others or friendly countries and provide a security atmosphere for our people and country if this was the right helpful way. Thank you.

Saddam: Comrade Taha [*Taha Yassin Ramadan*].

Taha Yassin Ramadan: Mr. President, the visit of Comrade Tariq that came after four months of clashes and mixing papers was certainly useful. I do not want to delve into all of its results, but two important outcomes are that the majority of the Security Council members now have a better picture or more accurate understanding than before. The second outcome is a reorganization of the relations with France at any level, and as long as the communication channels are open and there is a parliament reaction I believe this will have an impact. This is in brief. As for the follow-up on the issue of Resolution 986 and current proposals, briefly in my opinion, any negotiation without the other party announcing that they have – this resolution is issued but they are willing to modify or change or organize or [*inaudible*], meaning the opinion of Iraq will be considered positively. In this case, once we engage in negotiations and even if we do not reach an agreement, there will not be negative results. But they emphasize there will be no change in the wording of the resolution, so how do we explain that even if it will be good for our morale if we negotiate. How could that be? We mobilized the entire world and explained the main articles of the resolution. So aren't people going to question us if we go back to negotiations? What will we tell them in this case? Should we say Boutros Ghali said, "Just come [*to the negotiation table*]?" Well, I might trust the Americans a little bit if they say something like this and Boutros Ghali [*inaudible*]! I repeat this once again and I can say this man does not have the least amount of precaution or consideration to what the contrary or negative results will be on Iraq. He does not take this into consideration; one million, Turkey, six months, and paying Turkish [*inaudible*]. The resolution, the resolution itself gives Turkey the right. [*Time Stamp: 50:10*]

How can we negotiate with Turkey? A weak [*inaudible*]. If we negotiate with them and we disagree, they have an acquired right that exists mainly in the resolution text. So to agree to the dialogue without having any justification, we must answer now because we said we are willing to discuss the matters of interest to the Iraqi side. When people ask why we did negotiate while they refused, we say, "[*Inaudible*] with this as dialogue is the only channel to face this issue. We will see if there will be any results, then fine and if not it is over, [*inaudible*]. It has been confirmed there is no change in the resolution, and when we accept the negotiations without having an answer for people and if they lead to negative results, meaning if a class of society

started having hopes through this issue and interpreting that maybe there is something but the Command does not want to say and nothing comes out, the situation will not be to our advantage at all then. The other justification, Mr. President, is that we are certain that in the political atmosphere now, America, and the elections, paragraph 22 cannot be imposed. Therefore, we have to find a solution and that solution is Resolution 986. This means if one can do nothing, should he put himself in peril? This cannot happen. I can say that this path not only will not lead us to paragraph 22, but it will lead us to the worst scenario of the so-called lifting the sanctions, meaning the American way, which is achieving the hostile objectives of dominating Iraq, controlling it, and interfering in all its principles and national considerations, and it is not easy after that to disengage at all. I mean in my opinion it is hard, because it is easier to fight outside the borders [*country*] but when it takes place on your own land where people have interests and interference, we will lose a lot of our people and become weak. And now, the political power of Iraq and all those, even the ones who do not admit it but are convinced of it, might be stemming from – I mean there is no interference at which they aim openly. Because truly if they [*inaudible*] Boutros Ghali [*inaudible*], that this will facilitates Resolution 922. In this case, why don't they implement paragraph 22 or why... because part of it has specific wording. The same paragraph 22, which is general with no limits on our exports, they can use the same mechanism of paragraph 22 and say, "We can use it to determine a ceiling [*quota*]. [*Inaudible*] because according to paragraph 22 we can export. This export is subject to deductions and this and that. In this case, let them include the two millions or half a million or four million barrels in Resolution 22 [986] as a step on the path of... this resolution is [*inaudible*] and has nothing to do with paragraph 22, and it is not a bridge leading to it or has anything to do with it. How could it be [*inaudible*]?" As Comrade Tariq said, they are with the unity of people and they want to make sure that the rise in prices reaches the self-government zone. They want to nominate the current agents or those who want to appoint destroyers in place of agents and assign them to receive the materials. [*Time Stamp: 55:17*]

These agents will come to Mosul and Kirkuk and receive the materials and then distribute them. This time, if those also [*inaudible*] the Iraqi government does not deliver it, they will come [*inaudible*] knocking on the doors. The intention is clear; it is not mistrust and peace of mind. We want to give these materials to the Kurds in the self-government zone, to those they nominate as their agents. [*Inaudible*] between Kurdish people and them. They launch demonstrations and [*inaudible*] among each other. No need to get into this. We want to say we send people from the central government with the agents to make sure how those people are distributing the goods. They know it came from Ta'mim and Ninawa, they received it from the Ministry of Trade, and [*inaudible*] the ration card that will be distributed throughout Iraq. And when it is time to be released, let half the quantity be released [*inaudible*]. But to deduct an amount whether it is 10 dollars or 130 million or the 100 they mentioned. They go and buy [*inaudible*]. I mean it is not right [*there is something wrong*]. They come and say, "It is a fact. They are going to bring people and give them and you have nothing to do with this." It is a fact, fine, but it is not a fact to enact a law and... if it is a fact, who said to remove paragraph 22? Paragraph 22 is going to be [*inaudible*]. If we agreed with what Comrade Tariq said and [*inaudible*] Iraq to [*inaudible*], we should submit a proposal to Boutros Ghali in the form of a written letter, explaining our vision of the implementation mechanism, that it should be strong and clear, and have nothing to do with Resolution 986 except for the paragraphs that have not been opposed. In this case, it will be exposed that Iraq has sent a letter and we will admit sending

this letter. [Inaudible] if we admit this action. However, we ask ourselves why doesn't he come forward and send a program to implement Resolution 986? Why doesn't Boutros Ghali send it? He is going to set up the program after we say, "We approve Resolution 986." He will set up the work curriculum, we will reject it, which will create a problem between people and us, and those outside who understand us and who don't. He was supposed to issue the resolution two weeks after he set up the curriculum. Because the text of the resolution states that the curriculum is a key part of the resolution. I mean it is not something usual [*common*], he has become the curator of every paragraph of the resolution. Why does he not want to announce his program? Why is he acting like Ekeus wanting to play a role? Because of technical reasons and others Ekeus could not interfere, but this one is going to interfere in our citizen's [*internal*] affairs. The most we can do is that if we decide to send something we should send something that we believe if they accept it will not harm us and will be processed. If they reject it we will say [*inaudible*] and we are willing to accept something written from him and then we will say either yes or no. But the justifications for true resolution still exist. On the other hand, I do not want to be pessimistic but [*inaudible*] the elections. I say with this dialogue and in this manner related to all backgrounds, Iraq will not [*inaudible*], sanctions will not be lifted, and paragraph 22 will not be implemented. What is this, did they think after six months or two months? Without any changes or development... [*Audio is cut off at 01:00:03*]

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