

“Cabinet Meeting with Saddam Hussein and the Atomic Energy Committee”



Document Date: Undated

CRRC Record Number: SH-SHTP-A-001-492

Key: UM = Unidentified Male Speaker.

Translator comments, clarifications, and additions are italicized in brackets.

[The audio begins with Saddam Hussein in mid-sentence]

Saddam Hussein: ... therefore, such person will not lose his benefits because of the ones that will be transferred from the Atomic Energy [*Committee*] to the uh...

Dr. Humam [*Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research and Head of Iraq's Atomic Energy Committee*]: The [*Military Industrialization*] Commission.

Saddam: To the [*Military Industrialization*] Commission or to the Petrochemical [*Project*] will not. .. The, uh ... or is it to the [*Military Industrialization*] Commission?

Humam: No, Sir, just the [*Military Industrialization*] Commission.

Saddam: Theoretically, they should not lose their benefits. That is all. But, as for the new hires, why should they be hired at the same level of... the same benefits as the ones offered to the [*staff members of the*] Atomic Energy [*Committee*]. Thus, if we want to transfer them from a planning position to any other position within the Military Industrialization Commission, we will find an operation ... we will find it difficult to transfer them. Because, they will either end up losing their benefits or we will have to come up with exceptions to the rules.

Humam: Sir, this is already the case. Sir, if only we could -- [*Interrupted*]

Saddam: I just have to listen to what you have to say.

Humam: We are faced with two tasks. First, there is the Engineering Design Center. The Engineering Design Center used to be part of the Atomic Energy [*Committee*] but was transferred to the Military Industrialization Commission. We called it the Engineering Design Center and all of its new staff members enjoyed the same old benefits. The new cadres that joined the Engineering Design Center resumed the basic functions of the Military Industrialization Commission.

Saddam: Do you mean now?

Humam: Yes, all of them. Lieutenant General 'Amir, if you recall, this has resulted in so many problems for us.

Lt. Gen. 'Amir Hamudi [*Saddam's Scientific Advisor*]: So many problems. That is true.

Humam: The problem being that you have two employees... two engineers working side by side, but one receives 1,500 or 3,000 dinars while the other receives 700 dinars. One would say they are doing the same work but one is coming from the Atomic Energy [*Committee*] while the other was appointed or was transferred from one of the establishments within the Military Industrialization Commission to the Engineering Design Center. This is what we have with

regard to the Engineering Design Center.

The third—the second aspect is Petrochemical Project No. 3. Petrochemical Project No.3 is the law that regulates atomic energy itself but was separated from it. Its activities were integrated with the Office of Planning, but it was never assimilated with the Military Industrialization Commission. It was integrated into the commission only and with the endorsement of the director of the commission. Sir, this remained according to the old system [*of benefits*].

Saddam: That of the Atomic Energy [*Committee*].

Humam: That of the Atomic Energy [*Committee*]. The new situation is that the new project was put on hold. What will happen to it? It is no longer active. Besides, the [*Engineering*] Design Center and the factories located in al-Jazirah plant were hit, and since we have Dijlah and we have uh...

Saddam: Al-Rabi'.

Humam: Al-Rabi'... So, in order to benefit from their structure, we wanted to dissolve these establishments within the Military Industrialization Commission but we did not want the individuals to be dispersed. Instead, we wanted to have them as a single plant that we call the al-Rabi' plant. It will have a system [*of benefits*] that is the same as the old system [*of benefits*].

Saddam: And the new one will be renewed as well; it will be according to the old one?

Humam: And the new one... I do not know, Sir. Sir, the remark that was made by Lieutenant General uh ... by Dr. Ja'far, I do not—I mean, I do not—I mean, I do not think the new hires should have the same system [*of benefits*] as that of the Military Industrialization Commission. But, the ones that are coming from the Atomic Energy [*Committee*] should keep their new system [*of benefits*]... the previous ones, I mean.

Saddam: What did you recommend, Dr. Ja'far [*Ja'far Diya' Ja'far, Director of Iraq's Nuclear Program*]?

Humam: This is the recommendation.

Ja'far: Sir, with regard to the new ones [*the new hires*]?

Saddam: Yes.

Ja'far: It is possible to appoint them using the system [*of benefits*] of the Atomic Energy [*Committee*].

Saddam: Why?

Humam: [*Inaudible*].

Ja'far: I mean, we could leave it as an option, I mean so that we do not have problems with that.

Saddam: What option? It will be manipulated by those who have connections.

Ja'far: Yes.

Saddam: When there is no criterion to determine why this person gets paid this much and that person gets paid that much, as a result, this company will end up being isolated from the Military Industrialization [*Commission*] because of its benefits system. Thus, there will sometimes be more people associated with its activities than what it actually needs. It will cause you problems. The fair thing to do is that the people who used to enjoy the older benefits should keep those benefits.

Humam: And the new ones.

Saddam: And the new people would enjoy the same benefits that are offered to the majority given that these benefits are partially the same as those benefits.

Humam: Sir, it is possible that we articulate it in this manner to the public.

Saddam: Yes, yes. We can do so for both scenarios, whether for the uh...

Humam: The Engineering Design Center or -- [*Interrupted*]

Saddam: The Engineering Design Center or for this situation.

Humam: Sir, the Engineering Design Center has a system [*of benefits*] that is currently working.

Saddam: What?

Humam: The Engineering Design Center is part of the [*Military Industrialization*] Commission but its employees who were transferred from the Atomic Energy [*Committee*] have kept their benefits.

Saddam: All of the employees of the Atomic Energy [*Committee*] should keep their benefits.

Humam: Yes.

Saddam: All of the newly appointed or transferees beyond the number of employees whose names are listed as having been transferred from the Atomic Energy [*Committee*] should keep the same benefits offered by the Military Industrialization Commission.

'Amir Hamudi: Excuse me, Sir.

Saddam: Yes, Doctor!

‘Amir Hamudi: If you would allow me, Sir, I would like to discuss the issue from a different angle. I mean, if you allow me, I would like to postpone the legal and administrative aspect of the issue to keep the benefits that are offered to the organizational units. I would also like to start talking about the other topic, which deals with the fact that founding two companies may seem to be having negative consequences, but in reality, all of these issues are part of the same issue. Dr. Ja'far described this in the beginning of his statement as a refinement of Petrochemical Project No.3. When we want to refine Petrochemical Project No. 3, it is common knowledge that these are the two companies whose engineering and planning services we seek. Besides, there is another proposal concerning al-Rabi', Dijlah, and al-Jazirah. [*Time Stamp: 5:00*]

Since I do not have access to such information myself, I swear I believe that I heard that there are other proposals that will follow and that will seek to distribute the organizational units of Petrochemical Project No. 3 according to its specifications and across other facilities within the uh... within the Military Industrialization [*Commission*]. This means that the loss of the expertise of executing nuclear projects that had accumulated over a decade included such projects as Petrochemical Project No. 3 and the [*Engineering*] Design Center. The [*Engineering*] Design Center is the work of Dr. Mahdi. The [*Engineering*] Design Center and Petrochemical Project No. 3 represent Iraq's expertise in executing nuclear projects. So, this proposal means that this...

Saddam: [*Clears his throat*].

‘Amir Hamudi: What was proposed is that this expertise be distributed across new arenas that benefit the country and serve it in a new way. So, this is a topic that is... I mean, I consider it to be a major topic that must be discussed within the framework of this vision.

The other aspect, which concerns obtaining benefits, is uh... honestly, Sir... Is a topic that can be discussed, I think. But, as the comrade mentioned, I believe that it will become a secondary issue if a decision is not made about the first issue. We visited these two companies this morning and following an order from Your Excellency, I looked at the previous proposal by Dr. Ja'far about al-Rabi', Dijlah, and uh...

Ja'far: Al-Jazirah.

‘Amir Hamudi: ...and al-Jazirah, and which deals with transferring these establishments over to the Military Industrialization Commission. I gave a different opinion than Ja'far's about the issue. I do not know if Your Excellency had a chance to see it. I believe that you have seen it, Your Excellency. It can be summarized in that it is part of an idea. It is not just about al-Rabi' and Dijlah. I mean, we will now take over al-Rabi' and Dijlah and we will actually see the same happen to the engineering and planning services, which form two separate organizational units. So, there are five organizational units. We directed this one over here, we distributed this one over there, and this one is beneficial for generating electricity, etc. Therefore, all of the expertise that was accumulated translates into Petrochemical Project No. 3 and is combined into one organizational unit, Sir.

There is only one authority in the country that is capable of absorbing an idea from a given idea, translating it into a study, isolating the obstacles and unclear peculiarities of that study,

transferring those obstacles and unclear peculiarities to the labs, removing the ambiguity around them, presenting them as palatable information that can be examined, and then transferring the study to all sorts of designs, such as structural designs and operations designs, etc. From there, the study moves to the construction stage and then up to the stage of obtaining the [door] key, which is called... which is typically called the final [stage of the] project. The only authority that is truly capable of dealing with this issue in the whole country is Petrochemical Project No. 3. Furthermore, it has already dealt with the most complex manufacturing projects, which are referred to by some as the [inaudible] industries, and that means the nuclear industry. Because of that, it gained extensive experience that enables it to show such expertise very clearly during the reconstruction period and because of the [inaudible].

Saddam: [Clears his throat].

‘Amir Hamudi: Sir, I believe that when we approach this topic now, we need to approach it in a comprehensive manner. I mean, and not in isolated parts by looking at al-Jazirah here and looking at the engineering services there, etc. If we want to rebuild a nuclear program in the future and not leave the generation that will come after us at the mercy of the nuclear program of these Americans, then the only program that is most qualified in the country to rebuild it is Petrochemical Project No. 3, to which we add the Engineering Design Center. I need to add that the latter is part of the same program but it is because of security reasons for the most part that these organizational conditions took place and not because of [internal] organizational circumstances. So, if we want to say that we will have a future program... I mean, a future nuclear program, then that is the only generation that could have it. This program must be put into effect according to its priorities and its circumstances, which are determined by the leadership and Your Excellency.

Saddam: [Clears his throat].

‘Amir Hamudi: I believe that if we did not seize the opportunity of this program...

Saddam: Yes?

‘Amir Hamudi: It will be difficult for us to rebuild it anew in the future because the secret behind its strength lies in its unity. So, if we do not take both ends of this "chain," then we would lose our grip on the chain altogether [Time Stamp: 10:00]. But, the project is capable of making a big effort in favor of [generating] electricity and in favor of military industrial projects. For example, the program is offering a huge and indispensable effort now. I am not exaggerating when I say that Bab al-'Assad could not have been achieved without it [Petrochemical Project No.3]. Comrade 'Amir [Rashid] can correct me if I am wrong.

‘Amir Rashid: No, that is correct. It is called Bab al-Rabi' and what is the name of the other one, Sir? Is it Bab al-Qa'ida?

‘Amir Hamudi: Bab al-Qa'ida.

Saddam: Yes.

‘Amir Rashid: But, this one has a much longer duration [*it still has a long ways to go*].

‘Amir Hamudi: It is a project that is capable of bringing about strategic projects other than these nuclear projects. But, dissolving the contract in this manner and redistributing the project into various units here and there. I mean, we would kill the secret of its strength. For that reason, the proposal that I presented to you, Your Excellency, is such that we, uh... we can make this project into a major engineering company that assumes the responsibility of administering the strategic projects and at the top of those projects are the nuclear projects. Why? Because there is no other way of running nuclear projects.

Saddam: For peaceful purposes?

‘Amir Hamudi: Yes, for peaceful purposes. I told you before, Your Excellency, that the company—let us call it "the nuclear company"—that executed whatever it could execute in targeting the enemy is capable of executing nuclear projects for peaceful purposes with greater ease and could do so much quicker. Such projects could include reactors, accelerators, and other projects, if the leadership decides to resume a nuclear program that agrees with our new directions.

Saddam: [*Clears his throat*].

‘Amir Hamudi: But, of course, this is what I requested from you, Your Excellency, I mean... but, if this means that we are going to lose this opportunity, then I do not support this proposal. I am in favor of keeping Petrochemical Project No.3 as an intact unit and in support of adding to it the Engineering Design Center on the condition that it keeps operating in the same manner and based upon the principles that it was built. This unity is what helped it earn its romanticized status among the brothers in the Military Industrialization [*Commission*], mainly when they talk about Petrochemical Project No. 3 and what it does. And you saw, Your Excellency, Petrochemical Project No. 3 did not speak about itself, but *they* did. That is it. The secret about its strength lies in its unity. But, I believe that dissolving it in this manner, I mean, would lead to its weakening, and if later on ... in two or three years we want to bring it back to where it was before, I believe, I mean, if I do not want to say it would be impossible, then it would be [*at least*] very difficult to bring it back to the level which it is operating now in order for it to be able to execute projects of this type.

I had previously said in the proposal that, I mean, it is not important with which organization we couple this company administratively [*Petrochemical Project No. 3*]. It could be integrated into, I mean, I gave a proposal to Lieutenant General Husayn when he was in the Ministry of Defense. Alternatively, it could be integrated so it is under [*the supervision of*] Mr. Minister of Defense or it could be integrated into the Ministry of Industry, but the main thing is for it to remain intact. I mean, the organization with which it is integrated is not important but we should not flush it away in this manner because... I mean, we would flush away the hard work of a lifetime. Honestly, this is what they want. The best thing for the Americans and the Security Council is to dissolve Petrochemical Project No. 3

Saddam: [*Clears his throat*].

‘Amir Hamudi: Because they said, because they admitted that the secret of its success lies in its work approach and its integrality that appears to be in the manner I just described to you, Your Excellency.

Now, and after consulting with Your Excellency during the past few meetings because we have a certain inclination and a determination in the leadership that we resume and not abandon the nuclear program simply because this is a field that they want us to abandon.

Saddam: The one for peaceful purposes.

‘Amir Hamudi: Yes, the one for peaceful purposes, certainly, yes Sir. [*We resume the nuclear program*] according to what agrees with our new commitments even if they are unjust. Now, I say that my proposal is uh... your "company" [*Petrochemical Project No.3*] is part of the organizational structure of the Atomic Energy [*Committee*] for the following reasons, and which I will list for you, Your Excellency.

1. First, Petrochemical Project No. 3 and the Engineering Design Center came out of the Atomic Energy [*Committee*]. For that reason, they should be part of the organizational structure of the Atomic Energy [*Committee*] and not as parts taken from other ministries and integrated into the Atomic Energy [*Committee*]. So, it is natural for it to have this type of structure.
2. Second, if this company is to execute an open nuclear program—what I mean by "open" is, according to our new commitments, which means it will undergo a more thorough inspection than the previous one, there will be more visits, and other types of follow-up from the rest of the world—then, it is better for the company that executes this program to be a nuclear company, of course. I mean, it should be part of the International Atomic Energy Agency and should be subject to, I mean, to visits, inspections, and so on. This is in addition to this company's readiness to engage in other projects, of course. [*Time Stamp: 14:52*]
3. The third point is that I believe that it is a good reason to make this company be part of the organizational structure of the Atomic Energy [*Committee*] because its chances for maneuvering will be much better with regard to the scientific effort and mainly in relation to the high-ranking cadres when a need arises for such maneuvers. Besides, this is a huge opportunity because it will change the nuclear program to a producing institution and not merely a consuming one. That is because the nuclear program has been a consuming institution from its first day. It has been taking [*resources*] away from the country without offering the country anything in return.

Therefore, I believe that launching such a company with this type of program represents a huge opportunity because that will change the nuclear program to a producing institution and not a consuming one. Having this company involved with the Atomic Energy [*Committee*] gives it a better chance to be able to stay current and abreast of the latest nuclear technological developments across the world because nuclear energy is the window [*ticket*] to guaranteeing exposure to nuclear technologies and nuclear technological developments for a nation and its

scientists.

Finally, Sir, I believe that in addition to the Military Industrialization [*Commission*], this is going to be one of our largest and dearest experiences in the country. So, we need to have a second experience in the country to translate the scientific research approach into practical results. I mean, we are not going to transfer everything to the Military Industrialization [*Commission*]. This is a company that we managed to create because of the Military Industrialization [*Commission*] and everything we did was because of the Military Industrialization [*Commission*]. This is an experience that is already in place, so why do we not recreate another such experience? All we do is compete for some of the things that Your Excellency orders us to do. I mean, this is going to be an opportunity that will lead to creating new opportunities so that we have another experience in the country besides the Military Industrialization Commission to exemplify translating the principle of scientific research into practical results. The effects of that on universities are significant because, up to this date, our universities still lack any connection with the practical [*nuclear*] reality of the country with the exception of a very few universities. It is because of these reasons that I believe that this company should be part of the organizational structure of the

Organization, I mean, it does not have to be as such, but it would be better if it were part of that organizational structure. But, it could be part of any other organizational structure like the Ministry of Industry and uh... like what the National Petroleum Company did in the past. I mean, as a large and independent company in charge of the [*country's*] strategic projects. I mean, it could do so with its current organizational structure but I believe that preserving Petrochemical Project No. 3 is truly a very important matter and that we must preserve it. Thank you, Your Excellency.

Saddam: Yes! Yes, Lieutenant General Husayn [*Kamil*]!

Husayn: Thank you, Sir. Sir, the uh -- [*Interrupted*]

Saddam: Before we begin our discussion, I want to ask a few specific questions. The first question is how are we going to benefit from the operation of dividing this activity? Also, what Dr. Humam mentioned about unified activity does not offer us the same benefits. I mean, this is the first remark. The second thing is whether this unified company can perform any activity, including in the field of nuclear energy manufacturing for peaceful purposes, and could it do so according to this, to these unjust resolutions of the Security Council? Are we capable of doing other activities in addition to this activity?

'Amir Hamudi: Yes, I can answer your second question, if you would allow me, Your Excellency.

Saddam: Yes.

'Amir Hamudi: Yes, I believe so. I mean, we are capable of launching a project similar to this one and we are capable of giving support -- [*Interrupted*]

Saddam: In a way that utilizes the whole spectrum of competency, its capabilities, and including

its separate components?

‘Amir Hamudi: If we are to take any program, Sir, and if the leadership puts us in charge of rebuilding the nuclear program in a timeframe, I mean -- *[Interrupted]*

Saddam: I mean, this *[topic]* was being postponed ... I mean, this topic was being postponed because we have not discussed it in detail up until now.

‘Amir Hamudi: Yes.

Saddam: I mean, and *[we did not discuss]* what it means for us. I mean, even launching a nuclear program for peaceful purposes, what does it mean for us given our current situation. I mean, we did not discuss it. But, can this program and given its known capability, can it set off... let us go back to the term "economy"... *[Time Stamp: 20:00]* Can it set off the economy while still being intact and in this manner? What are we going to lose if we do not divide it up *[across other institutions]*? And what are we going to win if we do not divide it up? I mean, these are the aspects I need to have answered.

‘Amir Hamudi: Sir, I believe that the answer to this question—I mean, it depends greatly on—I mean, on the goal that might come from the leadership about reinstating the nuclear program. Your Excellency, if such a goal has not been decided upon, then at that point, I mean, the proposals that are being presented are—I mean, they are proposals—I mean, they are as if this was an experience and it ended. I mean, like Dr. Ja'far just said, this was a program that did what it was supposed to do and that was it. Its scope did not achieve the sought after results and now it is ready to be directed according to the new goals. But, if there is no goal for it now, then, I mean, how could these proposals be fruitful? But, if there is a goal, then the nuclear program will be—even if that is not going to happen for a while -- *[Interrupted]*

Saddam: So that we regroup. So, with this organized distribution—let us call it that because it is not a typical distribution but a distribution based on specialty—is it possible for the program to fulfill its duties, the ones that Dr. Humam was talking about, at any time and despite the fact that it is divided up in this manner?

‘Amir Hamudi: Yes, Sir.

Saddam: Yes.

Ja'far: Sir, allow me to answer that.

Saddam: Yes, yes. This is it.

Ja'far: Sir, you know that when the Petrochemical Project was created, it was of a specific size, honestly. The two years—I am calling them the two years from 1989 to 1990 and we should not include 1991 because we initiated it at the beginning of the year and with the war and uh... I mean, during these two years, the project changed from about 3,000 members to about 7,500 members, Sir. The huge increase in the project and in its capabilities was part of the Military

Industrialization [*Commission*]. Sir, the project itself would not have achieved the capabilities it was able to achieve without being empowered in its work by the capabilities of the Military Industrialization [*Commission*]. I mean, Sir, the public establishment of 'Uqbah Ibn Nafi', which is a specialized establishment, spent an effort. I mean, it manufactured the bulk of the heavy equipment that was part of the project. This was in addition to the General Institution for Engineering Design of Heavy Industries and many other establishments like Nasr, Badr, and others that contributed to the execution of the manufacturing responsibilities required for the function of the program of the project. Sir, in addition, these establishments supported the program of the Engineering Design Center simultaneously. The Engineering Design Center relied completely on the capabilities of the establishments of the Military Industrialization [*Commission*] because it did not have an independent manufacturing activity to fulfill its duties.

Therefore, Sir, the project does not work as a standalone unit. Besides, its structures were designed—we designed them and they have general responsibilities that are specific and that could serve any similar manufacturing activity, whether it is within the Atomic Energy [*Committee*] or outside the Atomic Energy [*Committee*]. I mean, as part of the activities of the Atomic Energy [*Committee*], the [*Department of*] Electricity, or any other manufacturing activity with these same requirements: research, development, manufacturing, experimentation or experimenting, and then production. Sir, with regard to how we can benefit from uh, uh... the question about the future... Sir, the future... if we were to determine the type of activity or the type of program that needs to be executed in the future and whether it be reactors or centrifuge tubes for example, then every activity will -- [*Interrupted*]

Saddam: Or nuclear power generated electricity.

Ja'far: What, Sir?

Saddam: Or nuclear power generated electricity.

Ja'far: Or nuclear power generated electricity. So, for every activity, we are going to need the, uh, uh... we are going to need the, uh, uh... the effort that will make the basic design and the detailed design only. This effort is required for the new activity, but the other efforts are general efforts that we may be able to assign them to any of the manufacturing establishments and they will be able to create- it will be able to produce what is needed according-according to what we can call the umbrella of the main engineers and whom we can call the nuclear cadre of specialists, and according to the effort needed for the detailed designs. [*Time Stamp: 00:25:00*]

Sir, this entire effort—which we will call the specialized effort—does not exceed 200 to 300 individuals at the most. We call it the specialized effort and it is the heart that uh, uh, creates the core... it is the one we call the nuclear core. The rest is all traditional manufacturing. Sir, the people in the establishment of 'Uqbah Ibn Nafi' does not have anyone who is a nuclear activity specialist. And we do not have anyone in the al-Rabi' plant. Besides, there is not a single nuclear specialist in the Dijlah plant. Nuclear specialty is very rare, Sir. We call a nuclear specialist someone who lays down the basic ideas, the basic visions, and the basic designs. These are very rare specialists with regard to the efforts of the current project, I mean, [*in the areas of*] mechanical engineering and electrical engineering. If we were to ask them if anyone is a nuclear

specialist, we will find that the answer is none or almost none. I mean, out of 300, there are no individuals who have a specialty we call nuclear specialty or who know the chronology of the nuclear events that are taking place. I believe that the number is zero. But, if a person is a mechanical engineer, then yes. When he receives certain engineering challenges, he builds up his expertise and is exposed to the engineering challenges that he faces to be able to build a design. Thus, if we were to ask how many people specialize in the nuclear field out of the 7,500 members of Petro [*Chemical Project*] No.3, out of the thousands of members of Sanda, and out of the current activity of the Military Industrialization Commission, we would find that the number does not exceed 20 to 30 people.

Saddam: Out of the 7,000?

Ja'far: Yes, Sir. Specialty in the nuclear field... the aspect that we benefited from is the nuclear aspect.

Saddam: Yes, Lieutenant General Husayn!

Husayn: Sir, in response to Dr. Humam's question and to clarify Your Excellency's reply, the number that the Engineering Design Center transferred from the Atomic Energy [*Committee*] and starting from -- [*Interrupted*]

Saddam: Well, matters have become clear to me now. So, when you say that the Engineering Design Center -- [*Interrupted*]

Humam: Mahdi's group, Sir.

Saddam: It became, yes, Mahdi's group... it has become clear now.

Husayn: Sir, the number of those who were removed -- [*Interrupted*]

Saddam: I mean, the ideas that you mentioned about these new appointees.

Humam: Yes.

Saddam: I mean we should stop there because the topic has been changed.

Humam: Yes.

Saddam: Yes!

Husayn: I believe the number of those who left the Atomic Energy [*Committee*] was 11 or 12 individuals at first, including the mechanical engineers and uh -- [*Interrupted*]

Ja'far: Sir, these were nuclear specialists.

Husayn: No. That was the total number.

Ja'far: No, Sir. There were more than those.

Husayn: That was afterward. A number of them were added afterward and there was additional activity. Where did this additional activity come from? All of it was from the establishments of the Military Industrialization Commission... from the commission and from its activities. The activities of the Engineering Design Center have not gone to seek the support of Petrochemical Project No.3 up to this day except on very rare occasions in the past few days and because of some things we needed urgently. Everything else relied on the commission, on the establishments that belong to the Military Industrialization [*Commission*]. Sir, what the Doctor was saying about resuming the nuclear activity, if, Your Excellency orders that we resume the nuclear activity now, then Petrochemical Project No. 3 with all its capabilities would not be able to resume its activity and would not be able to execute the same previous program. Dr. Ja'far is present [*he can attest to that*] and so are Lieutenant General 'Amir and Dr. Humam. Sir, the manufacturing base in the Military Industrialization [*Commission*] is the one that sustains the programs of the three establishments of al-Rabi', al-Jazirah, and the uh... what is the third one?

Ja'far: Dijlah.

Husayn: And Dijlah. First, al-Jazirah was hit and is now gone.

Saddam: It seems you borrowed the names [*of the plants*] from nature.

Husayn: [*Chuckles*].

Saddam: I mean, uh... [*Chuckles*] Okay.

Husayn: So, Sir... [*Chuckles*] The mechanical [*engineering*] base found in Petrochemical Project No.3 ... there is an equivalent to it in the Military Industrialization [*Commission*]. But, we have added machines to it. I mean, whatever can be done by al-Rabi' does not mean that it cannot also be done by the Military Industrialization [*Commission*]; but whatever can be done by the Military Industrialization [*Commission*] cannot be done by al-Rabi'. Whatever was achieved by Project 400, Project 600, and the old 'Uqbah [*Ibn Nafi' Project*] cannot be done by al-Rabi' or Dijlah. Thus, and to get to this point, the capabilities of Petrochemical Project No. 3 have now become much greater than the work requirements and Petrochemical Project No. 3 has become isolated. Now, our country needs us to gather all of our capabilities, employ them, and utilize them in directions that are in demand.

So, if we put the whole base of Petrochemical Project No.3, which used to be a huge program, and if we took the best experts and the design experts and placed them in the [*Ministry of*] Industry and the [*Ministry of*] Oil, Sir, all of these [*experts*] would come from within the country... anytime there is a good expert, we take him and place him in the Engineering Design [*Center*], and anytime there is a good expert, we take him and place him in the industrial base. Now things are such that returning to the civilian project—the nuclear project for peaceful purposes—Petrochemical Project No. 3 will be employed for certain areas and frozen in other areas. [*Time Stamp: 00:30:00*] If we took all of the experts, the best experts—if Comrade 'Amir

recalls, we said that we need to take the first-class experts, but where do we have first-class experts? We have them in the establishment of Saddam or the establishment of Nasr. So, we transfer them to 'Uqbah or to another place because the level of the position there is much higher and requires good expertise. Where did 'Uqbah come from? [*It came*] from Badr. We divided Badr into two [*establishments*] and brought about 'Uqbah. So, 'Uqbah worked fully on Petrochemical Project No.3, which was basically part of the Military Industrialization [*Commission*] and remained connected to the Military Industrialization [*Commission*] but its base was broadened.

So, in order for us to achieve the things we want to achieve now, we have to benefit from the many elements of Petrochemical Project No. 3 and put the project to use in the manufacturing base, expand it, and develop it. Sir, this aspect will not add to the capabilities of Petrochemical Project No. 3, never. It will strengthen the manufacturing base in the country. Whenever something happens and it [*Petrochemical Project No. 3*] resumes its activity, whether the level of activity from before or the more recent level, you will certainly find it easier to transfer the [*expert*] members, do so in a timely manner, and in a much better way, Sir. But now, what we are doing is we are dividing up Petrochemical Project No.3 and saying it will work in the end, but its work will not be of the same level as if it were integrated into the Military Industrialization Commission. Why? Is the plumbing system in place in Petrochemical Project No.3? No. It is not. And including all types of steel, including all types—including the low-grade types... [*Audio is cut off from 31:26-32:18*]

Petrochemical Project No. 3 is a small plant. It is a small plant and has a small space. There are lathes that are found in the mechanical industry but which Petrochemical Project No. 3 does not have. I mean, these are regular lathes. Sir, dividing the activity means that we will be able to do work. The Doctor said that Bab al-'Assad will not come about if uh... No, it will come about. It will come about and it will do so very easily without even having to integrate it at all into Petrochemical Project No.3. But, it will take a slightly longer period of time for it to come about. What it takes is for us to take it to a certain location now, let it have a scope and let it function in this location. It does not mean that this location has to be Petrochemical Project No. 3 as an absolute specialized location. No, never. It is not possible for Petrochemical Project No. 3 to reinvent its previous activity or any similar activity if it does not rely primarily on the Military Industrialization Commission, on the new and old capabilities of 'Uqbah, on the capabilities of Nasr, on the capabilities of the establishment of Saddam, and on other capabilities that I do not recall, including mechanical capabilities in many areas and also the uh... the [*inaudible*] of the General [*inaudible*] said that includes -- [*Interrupted*]

'Amir Hamudi: The heavy engineering equipment.

Husayn: The heavy engineering equipment.

'Amir Hamudi: Yes.

Husayn: Sir, because of all of this, we truly need to pay very close attention to this aspect now. We should not waste our capabilities. So, when we divide these capabilities... Dr. 'Amir once requested that we integrate a few factories into the civilian manufacturing sector. So, I feared

that in the past thinking that when we divide these capabilities, we might end up breaking them apart. Right now, we must group these capabilities. To the contrary, Sir, this period is a period of bringing together our capabilities until God saves us, has mercy on us, and empowers us so that our energy capabilities become able to compete and so that the civilian manufacturing sector gets brought up to the same level [*as the military manufacturing sector*] this is true. But to suggest that we divide our capabilities now means that we will weaken people and freeze them completely Sir. Besides, we will discover that these people are aging. I mean, and with regard to the capabilities, if a person does not practice an activity, that activity will cease to continue. What will one practice when it comes to atomic energy? So, even if we say to a person let us go ahead today and execute the nuclear program, we will find that the available capabilities are more than what the person needs even while the program is halted. So, merging these capabilities and gathering them in one place is the reality that must be administered by the central authority. We will not be able to recreate the oil capabilities of the Dura refinery because 22 companies—22 different multinational companies were involved with the Dura refinery. Sir, for that reason, the Iraqis took gas and they did not believe they could do so in no time. Your Excellency, you are very well aware of the anarchism activities. So, gathering all the capabilities is the ideal situation.

Do the current designs show that Petrochemical Project No. 3 is fulfilling the design duties the way it used to do? The answer is no. It is for that reason that, Your Excellency approved the creation of three design centers in the Military Industrialization Commission. The first one is mechanical, the second is chemical, and the third is electronic. All of these efforts are aimed at the fact that we must start thinking about producing some means of production and start thinking about producing the raw material. [*Time Stamp: 35:00*]

If not, you will see that all of our plants will be shut down as they are today. They are not shut down because someone shut them down, but because there are no raw materials for them to operate with and because there are no means of production. So, when we reach a point where we see the need for a certain machine, then the minds that we have should tell the designer the specifics and the designer studies those specifications, draws a chart, and then one can take that chart right away and make something out of it. Isolating—to the contrary, Sir, I believe that we must discuss the current nuclear power activity right away. Seriously, we have to redistribute it in order for it to see some benefits. So, when we reactivate it again, we can reactivate it very easily and we can leave small gaps that we can return to at any point because the benefits are huge, the numbers and the cadres are numerous, and the production is very minimal.

Honestly Sir, this issue must be studied and we ought to distribute it. When oil is needed, then the civilian manufacturing sector would need it from the military manufacturing sector. This is the foundation that we must aspire to and do so very rigidly. But, if we waste it, then we would reach a position where we would... where there are two competitors... competition... if it is scattered here and there. But we should not split our resources so we say that there is competition. The Military Industrialization Commission did not offer them [*industries in the civilian sector*] anything in the past. How could it bring them anything? They would bring [*resources*] to the market but they do not have anything on the market.

Ja'far: [*Inaudible*].

Husayn: [*Chuckles*] Excuse me for just one more minute! Sir, this is the truth about the complementary relation and the interconnectedness within the industrial sector as being in a stage we need now more than ever. It must be administered very precisely and so must be the approach of gathering all the capabilities and holding on to those capabilities very tightly. If we lose those capabilities, then we would see ourselves withdraw noticeably. Thank you, Sir.

Ja'far: [*Whispers something; inaudible.*]

Saddam: Lieutenant General 'Amir!

'Amir Hamudi: Sir, we can benefit from our past experiences. I mean, we have vivid examples of how the work of the industrial and private sectors was being handled and what has become of it now. The work of the heavy engineering equipment used to be part of the Ministry of Oil as a unit with average productivity and even oil...

Saddam: ...was not being produced.

'Amir Hamudi: It was not being produced and [*we*] were not benefiting at all.

Husayn: [*Inaudible*].

'Amir Hamudi: So, we provoked them so that they give us another option.

Ja'far: They proposed that option.

'Amir Hamudi: With this vision and at a time when, I mean, the importance [*of the heavy engineering equipment industry*] lies in the fact that it serves the [*Ministry of*] Oil and serves all the other industries because it is capable. It was originally designed to serve the chemical industries, the petrochemical industries, and the [*oil*] refining industries. It is also capable of making steam pipelines for electrical grids. What is the reason I mean, I noticed that there is a thick shell [*a strong lobby*] in the [*Ministry*] of Oil and even in the [*Department of*] Electricity. They are exclusive, they do not accept anyone, and they do not interact with anyone from the outside. What the Military Industrialization Commission did is break up this shell. I mean, no one used to be able to intermingle with the people from the [*Department of*] Electricity, no one used to be able to blend with them, and no one used to be able to interact with them or even assist them. For that reason, I mean, their opinion used to be final and their way of conducting business used to be the only method. Now, if you speak with them, they have a different opinion. They will tell you, "We are capable." I mean, they convinced themselves by themselves that being open to others and interacting with others might help them, and not only foreign companies. The situation changed completely.

Another situation, for example, the establishments that used to be part of the [*Ministry of*] Industry and were then integrated into the Military Industrialization [*Commission*] grew to be productive in terms of civilian and military productivity. I mean, the Nasr [*plant*] used to be—I mean, the ones who used to operate the machines and the equipment used to -- [*Interrupted*]

Saddam: I believe they used to work at 20% capacity [*of the plant*].

‘Amir Hamudi: Yes, 20%.

Husayn: [*Inaudible*].

‘Amir Hamudi: And this 20% is not an Iraqi effort, Sir. They are not Iraqis.

Husayn: [*Inaudible*].

‘Amir Hamudi: They are people from Thailand, the Philippines, etc. They did not bring any Iraqis. I mean, the ones whom they brought were the ones who worked in this facility and they learned our secrets while we watched them do it. They [*the lobby in the Department of Electricity*] remained a thick shell and no one was able to break through it and enter it. I mean, Lieutenant General Husayn brought up the subject of how the Military Industrialization Commission has new work procedures. Solid steel is diminishing because of the war with Iran. I mean, they consider themselves [*inaudible*] and some rockets are being dropped on them and they [*inaudible*] and being idle. So, the Military Industrialization Commission put them to work and produced results even during the war and the cadres learned that they would start being hit at about 11 and they leave [*inaudible*] in the shelters. Half an hour later, two groups manage to control [*inaudible*] and they respond to them so that work goes back to normal. One of the other establishments that was transferred from the [*Department of*] Electricity was Petrochemical Project No. 2, which used to be part of what used to be called the [*Ministry of*] Industry and Minerals. They executed programs with foreign companies under the pretext that those programs were ready—project types that could not be shared with the Military Industrialization Commission. [*Time Stamp: 40:00*]

But now, these programs are being shared, and Petrochemical Project No. 2 is assisting even with repairing [*oil*] refineries and is contributing greatly by serving the Ministry of Oil and the Ministry of Industry. Al-Wasat Refinery was also integrated into Petrochemical Project No. 2 and because of specializing in oil, I mean, because it too has work agendas and because it had interests with foreign companies [*inaudible*]. So, we... I mean, with this method of abolishing procedures, openness [*to foreign companies*], and working, performing work in a serious manner [*inaudible*] the agenda and the wealth that we were able to achieve. Regardless of what connections they are able to make, I personally do not think that any of these establishments will be able to perform their work or be able to go back to a level of any previous program. Your Excellency, if you ordered that a worker should return [*to work*], then it is possible for him to return. He can return to resume his functions right from where he left off.

Going back to the topic of [*the cadres*] being secluded and speaking about operating without being open to some of the uh... I mean, some of the companies because certain priorities are often defeated because everyone is offering his program as an excuse to be exempt from doing any other work [*inaudible*]. It is for this reason that I suggested to Lieutenant General Husayn to reinstate some of the activities to the [*Ministry of*] Industry and Minerals and not to, I mean, not because I want to see the [*Ministry of*] Industry and Minerals become more intact but because

these are projects that are half-done. I mean, the solid steel project with all its expansions is bigger than these projects. It has an Italian company working on it and a loan-and foreign loans. So if [*inaudible*] in the Military Industrialization [*Commission*], then it is possible for it to resume work locally if the embargo is lifted. So, if we sign contracts with them [*foreign companies*] and spend half an hour [*inaudible*] with them and say hello and good morning ... so if it remains part of the Military Industrialization [*Commission*] and call it defense, then it is possible that they may not come... they may not come to resume the activity. This is truly my goal and not because I am confident that the [*Ministry of*] Industry and Minerals—I am now its minister—is more capable of administering these projects. But, I mean, we now believe that some degree of coordination can remain but it is necessary to have another party supervise the work in a way. And as a supervising minister, I mean, these parties were truly excellent and all of these parties are able to work...

Saddam: And cooperate with one another.

'Amir Hamudi: I mean, we were successful for the most part and this is presented as an intermediary solution. I mean, the ideal solution lies in returning to the previous context of being within the [*Ministry of*] Industry and not Military Industrialization because we used to function in an excellent manner and [*inaudible*]. But, with regard to [*companies from*] abroad, I mean, it appears that there is an issue, that this is the reason. Thank you, Sir.

Saddam: Yes, Lieutenant General 'Amir Rashid [*Minister of Oil and Head of Iraq's Secret Missile Programs*]!

'Amir Rashid: Sir, I would like to clarify a few things. I mean, before I share my opinion. Sir, with regard to the relation of Petrochemical Project No.3 with the Military Industrialization [*Commission*], there are two aspects: there is a practical aspect, if one can use the expression, and there is a structural aspect. I mean, in the past, Petrochemical Project No. 3 used to be fully engaged with the Military Industrialization [*Commission*] on a practical level and in terms of industrial operations. It used to be run and supervised by His Excellency, the Minister, and was supported greatly by the Military Industrialization [*Commission*]. But, with regard to its organizational structure, it was entirely separate from the Military Industrialization [*Commission*]. I mean, there was not any segment within the organizational structure of the Military Industrialization [*Commission*] that was specific to Petrochemical Project No. 3. Sir, if you would allow me, I consider this to be important. The proposal that is being presented now calls for making Petrochemical Project No.3 as part of the organizational structure of the Military Industrialization Commission. I mean, honestly, there is a very big difference between the previous state and the current state in terms of the organizational structure.

Your Excellency, if you would allow me. For instance, I would like to make a comment regarding the proposal that is being presented to Your Excellency and that was put together by brother, Dr. Ja'far. The commissions that are found in Petrochemical Project No. 3—in addition to the Services Commission and the Executive Commission—are the Safety Commission, the Industrial Cooperation Commission, the Informatics Center, the Accounting Department, al-'Athir Center, al-Safa' plant, al-Fajr plant, al-'Asil plant, Dijlah plant, and al-Rabi' plant, of course and so on. I mean, Sir, there is a considerable number of establishments and units

affiliated with Petrochemical Project No. 3 whose organizational structures fall under the umbrella of the special system of Petrochemical Project No. 3 and which are an Atomic Energy project. Sir, there are no connections with the Military Industrialization [*Commission*] in terms of organizational structure. [*Time Stamp: 45:00*]

There are absolutely no connections. But, thanks to the leadership of the Honorable Minister, or even when His Excellency used to be the Minister of Industry—and Military Industrialization before that— there was an interaction [*between those ministries*] on the organizational level with Petrochemical Project No.3, which was separate from the Military Industrialization [*Commission*]. Besides, the Military Industrialization [*Commission*] was employed whenever Petrochemical Project No. 3 needed support. So, 'Uqbah Ibn Nafi', Project 400, and Project 600, whose names were listed as basic projects that supported Petrochemical Project No. 3, are projects and organizational units that fall within the structure of the Military Industrialization [*Commission*] with all of its specifications, its systems, and its financial base; but there is no organizational domination and no—I mean, at least not administratively—by Petrochemical Project No. 3 on these projects. Instead, the latter was able to benefit from them. Sir, this proposal is completely different from this reality.

Honestly, I mean, I see that... if Lieutenant General Husayn would allow me. I mean, it is necessary that we scrutinize the matter very closely. I mean, the issue does not mean that we should go back to the structure of Petrochemical Project No.3 as part of the Military Industrialization [*Commission*]. Although Petrochemical Project No.3 was originally part of the Military Industrialization [*Commission*], have it serve the Military Industrialization [*Commission*] instead. Sir, this form is honestly uh... I talk about this issue on a daily basis because this is a controversial subject for the Military Industrialization [*Commission*] and His Honorable Minister has certainly voiced his opinion about it. Sir, the environment of the Military Industrialization [*Commission*] is different from the environment of Petrochemical Project No. 3. Allow me to say this, Sir. And for that reason, this is exactly what I am requesting. I mean, brother, Dr. Ja'far was correct in what he said about [*inaudible*] responsibility and [*inaudible*]. There is a different way of thinking as a result of gaining experiences, as a result of expertise, and as a result of many things. So, if we dissolve Petrochemical Project No. 3 within Military Industrialization [*Commission*] structurally—please note that this is not in terms of aid or in terms of practice but in terms of structure, just structurally, and as is being proposed—then I personally think that we might be faced with a problem that we are unable to visualize at the moment. And there will be... Sir, it [*the project*] will be defeated. There will be some psychological issues involved, and a psychological, mental response. I mean, deeply rooted ones. I mean, the Military Industrialization [*Commission*] is proud of itself and proud of its expertise, I mean... this is an uncomfortable situation... if one mentions Lieutenant General Husayn, his way of thinking, and his approach, then all of those things are engraved in his blood. Of course, while being respectful of Petrochemical Project No. 3, Sir, Petrochemical Project No. 3 started with a study. I mean, those were researchers who came together and developed it toward industrialization through research, development, and [*making*] designs just as was noted by Dr. Ja'far or Dr. 'Amir.

The Military Industrialization Commission did not start in this fashion. It started in a different fashion. It wants to be integrated and it wants to expand the base of manufacturing according to

the new way of thinking of the Military Industrialization [*Commission*]. It also wants to seek new horizons and seek to support new partners. Sir, when we discuss it with them, even during meetings, they are never lenient and they often take a different approach. They are seeking the same goal, and they form groups; but when you say to one of them let the Military Industrialization [*Commission*] support Petrochemical Project No.3, he declares a war, considers this [*request*] unreal, and shoots it down. Just like when you would say to them that the Military Industrialization [*Commission*] has to support the [*Ministry of*] Agriculture, Sir, or support the [*Ministry of*] Transportation, or support the [*Ministry of*] Information. But, the environment of the Military Industrialization [*Commission*] is completely different philosophically and in terms of its way of thinking, its cadres, its approach, and its work method. All of these are completely different in this regard.

Honestly, I explained this to the secretary on multiple occasions. I mean, I explained to him that I felt like we are operating in [*different*] worlds. I mean, I have been involved with the Military Industrialization Commission for the past three years, and I feel that the people of Petrochemical Project No.3 seem to be in a different world because of the way they think administratively and in terms of organizational structure. Sir, if there is, I mean, if there is an intention of integrating the Military Industrialization [*Commission*] and going back to the way things used to be, then I feel that the issue of the organizational structure would create many problems for us that we might... I mean, with an order from the leadership and from Your Excellency so that they... I mean they would commit to it and give it a chance to succeed. But, there is something within them and in their work methods that would lead to many problems that we do not need during this sensitive [*transition*] period, Sir. This is the truth. I am telling you this as an official and based on actual experience. I fear this might collapse because of a certain individual. So, I mean, Sir, we are aware and feel that they are operating in a different world, of course. Sir, as a result of this -- [*Interrupted*]

Saddam: No, to the contrary. This does not seem to have a negative impact because it is... I mean, this is uh... their integration expands your empire. But, it seems you have an opposite view, I mean.

'Amir Rashid: Yes, Sir.

Saddam: Is it not so?

'Amir Rashid: Sir, there is the issue of Petrochemical Project No.3; but, who are its members? I mean, in addition to the organizational units that I mentioned, its members are specialists and they are scientists. I mean, they are a cadre of scientists which means that it [*Petrochemical Project No.3*] has manufacturers... it has a manufacturing capability and has an operational cadre. I mean, it has three types of members: 1) It has a cadre of scientists consisting of 200 to 300 members, as was stated by brother Dr. Ja'far; 2) It has a cadre of manufacturers like Dijlah plant, al-Rabi' plant, other activities, a few [*cadres*] in al-'Athir Center, and a few [*cadres*] in al-Jazirah; and 3) It has an operational cadre and as was said, I mean, we are not concerned with these and they are not aware of the organizational structure issue. [*Time Stamp: 50:00*]

I would imagine that the topic being proposed for discussion and which is very fundamental, Sir

is the cadre of scientists because we could release the operational cadre as soon as today and we could bring another operational cadre in two to three years if we want to resume the activity then. There will not be any issues with that and we would not even notice that these [*individuals*] have even left because the operational cadre is being brought on board by the thousands and laid off by the thousands. Therefore, this is not an issue. The manufacturing capabilities, the manufacturing capabilities in my opinion are preferable and not necessary. Preferably, the manufacturing capabilities should be part of the Military Industrialization [*Commission*], Sir. I will [*inaudible*] and these [*manufacturing capabilities*] are Dijlah plant, al-Rabi' plant in particular, and possibly al-'Athir Center. Dijlah plant is a preferred plant but it is not, just as His Excellency, the Honorable Minister [*said*], I mean, when responding to Dr. Humam. I mean, if we are able to [*inaudible*] Bab al-'Assad plant and Dijlah plant but al-Rabi' plant is the one where things are turned topsy-turvy because of it. Still, it is one with elements of basic support and has had a valuable role in these matters. It was very valuable but we can do without it. If the Dijlah and al-Rabi' plants were to be brought [*into the Military Industrialization Commission*], then that will honestly result in the Military Industrialization Commission being coherent [*a coherent solution*]. I mean, because in reality, they do not have any relation to nuclear activity. I mean, one of them is a mechanical plant and the other is an electric plant. They do not have any relation to the nuclear issue. Therefore, we are able to take [*integrate*] these two plants. People cannot [*inaudible*] distribution.

Sir, the scientific cadre, I feel that if the existing scientific cadre were to be split between us and the Military Industrialization Commission then we would honestly lose the integrality of the scientific base that exists in Petrochemical Project No.3. I mean, honestly, a distribution in the suggested manner—I mean, I speak about the suggested manner [*of integration*] that was presented—we can go ahead and read the suggested manner [*of integration*]. For instance, I will read a portion of it to you, Your Excellency. The Safety Commission has to be integrated into the Technical Department in the Military Industrialization Commission. The Industrial Cooperation Commission has to be integrated into the Technical Department. The Informatics Center has to be integrated into the Internal Operations Center. The al-Jazirah plant has to be integrated into [*inaudible*]. I mean, there is an honest integrality and an intertwining that shows there is a very good phenomenon going on. But the integrality of Petrochemical Project No. 3 will be lost and will bring two environments that are not entirely contradictory, but each has its own philosophy and that could be the source of problems.

To sum up my opinion, Sir, I feel that it is wrong to incorporate organizational units whose... I mean, to dissolve their organizational structures as part of the Military Industrialization Commission. I do not mind them being the same way they used to be before but not according to a new structure. If this is inevitable, then it is prudent to bring in the Dijlah and al-Rabi' plants. Besides, honestly, the scientific cadre must be kept intact because it is in fact intact at the nuclear level and not on the operational level. I mean, this is because out of these 7,000 members, there are about 300, 400, or 500—at the most—that should be part of an institution that belongs to the Military Industrialization [*Commission*]. I mean, there is no objection but they should come as an intact unit, be a unit that is separate in its structure, be governed by its rules, and have certain privileges. However, it may be better if they were part of the Atomic Energy Committee or if they were independent as part of a company or any other agency. Thank you, Sir.

Saddam: I mean we need to entertain a new idea. Okay, let us take a 10-minute break and come back.

[Inaudible; background noise of people collecting and shuffling papers and walking away from the area where the meeting was held. Participants continue dialogue too far from the microphone to be heard from 00:52:57-01:03:33]

[Audio is blank from 01:03:33 to 01:05:00]

End of Recording