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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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Vietnam War

 Documents on the Vietnam War. These telegrams, minutes, and discussion notes range from the mid-1950s to the end of the 1970s, and most come from Chinese and Albanian archives. There are many documents from Albania archives on Vietnam-Albanian relations. The collection also includes several Chinese telegrams and memorandums on foreign and economic relations with Indochina, as well as discussions with Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong. See also the Indochinese War and the 1954 Geneva Conference. (Image, American POW, 1973, US Department of Defense, DDST9904270)

  • August 01, 1957

    Journal of Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK A.M. Puzanov for 1 August 1957

    Kim Il Sung and Puzanov discuss aid to North Vietnam and the merger of several DPRK ministries.

  • August 07, 1957

    Journal of Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK A.M. Puzanov for 7 August 1957

    Puzanov and a KWP CC official discuss aid to Vietnam, the DPRK's efforts to overfulfill the targets of the economic plan, North Korea's nonferrous metal industry, and the DPRK's enhanced technical capabilities.

  • June 23, 1958

    Excerpt from ''Ordnance: Chronology of Historical Events, Volume 1''

    Excerpt from an internal Vietnamese army history which describes a 1958 shipment of weapons to Algeria to help the Algerian rebels fighting against the French.

  • October 02, 1959

    Discussion between N.S. Khrushchev and Mao Zedong

    Khrushchev and Mao discuss current political situations in Tibet, India, Indochina and Taiwan.

  • August 15, 1961

    Telegram from the Enver Hoxha to Ho Chi Minh via Gac Mazi, the Albanian Ambassador to Moscow

    This is a telegram from the 1st Secretary of the Party of Labor of Albania Enver Hoxha to President Ho Chi Minh delivered via the Albanian Ambassador to Moscow Gac Mazi. This telegram discusses the possible visit of Ho Chi Minh to Tirana. Hoxha orders Mazi to contact Ho Chi Minh urgently and deliver a copy of the telegram to him. Enver Hoxha believes that the disputes between the various leaders of the socialist countries in Europe and the Party of Labor in Albania are serious and cannot be resolved simply or immediately. He assigns the blame for these disputes to the leaders of the other socialist countries. Hoxha asks Ho Chi Minh to talk to these leaders about these disputes before coming to Tirana. The reason for this is that other European communist leaders have begun denigrating the Party of Labor of Albania, the Albanian government, and the Albanian people. Hoxha writes that the Albanian leadership is still carefully analyzing the causes of the disputes. Lastly, he informs Ho Chi Minh that he will be ready to discuss the Tirana trip further in the second half of November of 1961.

  • October 30, 1961

    Telegram from the Foreign Affairs Minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam Ung Van Khiem to the Albanian Foreign Affairs Minister Behar Shtylla

    This document is a telegram from the Foreign Affairs Minister of North Vietnam Ung Van Khiem to the Albanian Foreign Affairs Minister Behar Shtylla. Van Khiem describes to Shtylla the history of American-Vietnamese relations from the 1954 Geneva Convention until 1961. Van Khiem stresses that the situation in South Vietnam has worsened after President Kennedy took office. During May 1961, Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson came to Saigon and discussed with the President of the Republic of Vietnam Ngo Dinh Diem the prospect of enlarging American presence in South Vietnam. Since that time the South Vietnamese government, with American support, organized internment camps and a cordon sanitaire in the area of the South Vietnamese borders with Laos and Cambodia. Van Khiem sees these actions as menacing to peace in Indochina, and Southeast Asia more generally. The North Vietnamese government, abiding by the Geneva Convention on Indochina, proposed organizing a conference with the South Vietnamese authorities in order to discuss free elections throughout the country and the reunification of Vietnam. The government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam denounced the American plans to enlarge the scope of aggressive actions in Vietnam and, especially, the plan to deploy the U.S. Army in South Vietnam.

  • December 02, 1961

    Telegram from Behar Shtylla to Ung Van Khiem

    This document is a telegram from Albanian Foreign Affairs Minister Behar Shtylla to the Foreign Affairs Minister of North Vietnam, Ung Van Khiem. Shtylla shares the same indignation as the Vietnamese minister towards the dangerous situation arising in Vietnam. According to Shtylla, Kennedy is trying to transform South Vietnam into a base of operations for aggression directed against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Taking into account other actions towards Laos and Cambodia, he believes Kennedy is attempting to convert Indochina into an American base. Shtylla states that the American policy in Vietnam violates the general international conventions of conduct, as well as the Vietnamese people’s sovereignty. Shtylla expresses full solidarity with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and supports its request that the chairmen of the Geneva Conference take measures against the American inference in South Vietnam.

  • May 02, 1962

    Report on Reiz Malile’s Ambassadorial Credentials Sent to the DRV and his Discussions with the DRV Leaders

    The new ambassador to China and to the DRV, Reiz Malile, reports on his meetings with Vietnamese leaders during his visit to Vietnam on 14 – 28 of April 1962. Malile states that he met DRV President Ho Chi Minh, the Prime Minister of the DRV, Fam Van Dong, Minister of Foreign Affairs for the DRV, Ung Van Khiem, and 1st Secretary of the Central Committee of the Working Party of Vietnam, Le Duan. In his discussions, they support the Albanian government's stance on Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership in general. Meanwhile, the Vietnamese leaders avoid discussions targeted against the Soviet Union and, instead, propose the need for unity in the international communist movement. They also ask to stop the polemic in the media in order for the other bloc not to profit from the internal disputes of the communist camp. According to Malile, among the Vietnamese leadership there is a strong spirit not to cause a break with the Soviet Union. Malile claims that the Vietnamese communists are not fully informed on Albanian-Soviet disputes, which they view as simple disagreements between brothers. According to Malile, there is a great deal of Chinese and Soviet propaganda concerning the political international situation that presents differing points of view.

  • January 21, 1963

    Galbraith’s Journal Entry Account of the Conversation with Rapacki and Michałowski in New Delhi

    Record of conversation between John Kenneth Galbraith and Polish officials Jerzy Michałowski and Adam Rapacki. The Polish officials note that the American campaign is encouraging the North Vietnamese to look to the Chinese for help. Galbraith calls for a six month ceasefire as a sign of good faith.

  • January 31, 1963

    Secret Telegram from Rapacki (Warsaw) to Jaszczuk (Moscow)

    Cable from Adam Rapacki to the Polish representative in Moscow informing him of Jerzy Michałowski’s coming arrival in Moscow, in light of recent Soviet-US and Polish-US talks on South Vietnam.

  • February, 1963

    Soviet Memorandum on the Polish Peace Initiative on Vietnam

    Soviet memorandum on the meeting between US Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith and Polish officials Michalowski and Rapacki. Describes the meeting as a sign of US weariness of involvement in Southeast Asia. Asserts that a neutralized Vietnam could be useful to the socialist countries as well.

  • February 13, 1963

    Secret Telegram from Jaszczuk (Moscow) to Rapacki (Warsaw) [Ciphergram No. 2004]

    Cable sent from a Polish representative in Moscow to Adam Rapacki in Warsaw about a meeting with Andrei Gromyko. He believes that the United States wishes to remove itself from the situation in Vietnam and concludes that a way to end the issue is getting closer.

  • February 13, 1963

    Secret Telegram from Jaszczuk (Moscow) to Rapacki (Warsaw) [Ciphergram No. 2019]

    Memorandum of a conversation with Yuri Andropov. He and Boleslaw Jaszczuk discuss Chinese influence military and economic influence in Vietnam, as well as Vietnam's opinion on the Cuban Missile Crisis. Finally he notes the poor communications technology in place in Southeast Asia.

  • February 15, 1963

    Secret Telegram from Rapacki (Warsaw) to Jaszczuk (Moscow)

    Cable from Adam Rapacki to Boleslaw Jaszczuk in Moscow describing to him a conversation between Polish and the North Vietnamese officials in Warsaw.

  • March 04, 1963

    Secret Telegram from Ogrodziński (New Delhi) to Michałowski (Warsaw) [Ciphergram No. 2793]

    Cable from a Polish official in India to Jerzy Michalowski, asking if there are any issues that need to be discusses with Indian Foreign Minister Desai at dinner.

  • March 11, 1963

    Secret Telegram from Maneli (Hanoi) to Spasowski-Morski (Warsaw) [Ciphergram No. 3175]

    Cable from Polish Ambassador in Hanoi Maneli to Warsaw, describing a conversation he had with Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong and Soviet Ambassador Tovmassian. They discuss the idea of neutralization in Vietnam, and the possibility of the United States pulling forces out. Tovmassian adds that the PRC pressured the DRV to start incidents in the demilitarized zone.

  • March 15, 1963

    Secret Telegram from Ogrodziński (New Delhi) to Wierna (Warsaw) [Ciphergram No. 3359]

    Polish cable from Ogrodzinski in India to Wierna in Warsaw, noting that the Americans would like to replace Ngo Dinh Diem, but do not have a replacement. Notes that Nehru would be willing to pull out of Vietnam. Concludes that neither Diem nor the Americans can independently seek ceasefire without cost to the other.

  • April 04, 1963

    Secret Telegram from Michałowski (Warsaw) to Jaszczuk (Moscow)

    Cable from Jerzy Michalowski in Warsaw to Boleslaw Jaszczuk in Moscow, informing him of information from the DRV ambassador to Poland. The ambassador relayed that the VWP does not think that the situation in South Vietnam is not yet favorable, but that once it is they will seek a solution to hostilities at an international peace conference. They state that they will continue to ascertain the true intentions of the United States, particularly the provision for a ceasefire.

  • April 24, 1963

    Secret Telegram from Maneli (Saigon) to Spasowski (Warsaw) [Ciphergram No. 5295]

    Report from Maneli, a Polish official in Saigon, to Warsaw, on the Indian opinion of the situation in Vietnam. According to him, the Indians believe the NLF to be finished and Diem's position to be strong, while they see Diem as the one lobbying for American withdrawal.

  • May 29, 1963

    Secret Telegram from Maneli (Saigon) to Spasowski (Warsaw) [Ciphergram No. 7237]

    Cable from a Polish official in Saigan, Maneli, to Warsaw. detailing talks with Vietnamese officials and the Soviet ambassador. They discuss the investigations of the ICC, and the importance of probes into the Vietnamese situation. The Soviet ambassador notes that Soviet-Vietnamese relations have shifted.