TELEGRAM FROM MAO ZEDONG TO I.V. STALIN, CONVEYING THE 19 JANUARY 1951 TELEGRAM FROM PENG DEHUAI TO MAO ZEDONG REGARDING MEETINGS WITH KIM IL SUNGCITATION SHARE DOWNLOAD
get citationThe telegram from Peng Dehuai discusses the results of a meeting with Kim Il Sung, including Kim Il Sung’s belief that the Korean People’s Army cannot defeat the Americans alone, the defense of the Korea's coast, the re-staffing of five corps, and preparations for soldiers to carry out work in the newly liberated areas."Telegram from Mao Zedong to I.V. Stalin, Conveying the 19 January 1951 Telegram from Peng Dehuai to Mao Zedong regarding Meetings with Kim Il Sung" January 27, 1951, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 337, ll. 37-40. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110020
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SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY
Copies: Stalin (2)
From BEIJING Received 19 hours 35 minutes 27.1.1951
EXTREMELY URGENT T
To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]
I send you a copy of the telegram from Comrade Peng Dehuai to me of 19 January 1951.
I ask you to familiarize yourself with it.
"To Comrade MAO ZEDONG.
Copy: To Comrade GAO GANG.
I arrived at Premier Comrade KIM IL SUNG's in the evening on 16 January 1951 and returned on the evening of 18 January 1951.
I report about the results of our meeting:
1. Comrade KIM IL SUNG and his comrades think that it is not possible to pursue the retreating American and puppet [South Korea] troops with the forces of the Korean People's Army alone. This would also take on an adventuristic character.
They stated that the Politburo regards as correct the proposal made from my side about the necessity of conducting rest and reformation for two months in order to make a forward advance cautiously, without hurrying. Although Comrade PAK HEON-YEONG [Pak Hon Yong] had his own opinion, after the second elucidation I made on 17 January, about the positive and negative sides of a risky forward advance without carrying out preparation and a cautious forward advance with advance preparation, he was satisfied.
The Soviet adviser also agreed that the next operation is decisive, therefore with the approval of the Politburo of the Korean Workers' party, it will be conducted better.
2. The question of the defense of the sea coast.
Premier KIM IL SUNG and Comrade RAZUVAEV put forth the following opinions: 26 brigade will be based in TSINNAMPO, 23 brigade in KAISIU, 24 brigade in GENZAN, 63 brigade in BUGTKHENG, 69 brigade in KORIO. These brigades will occupy by battalion, portions of the defense along the western and eastern sea coast, where they will serve as sentries. Each brigade to have an average of 3,000 men, and moreover their combat capability is not high.
In addition to this, three newly organized corps (6th, 7th and 8th) will control the following regions: 6th corps - ANSIU, 7th corps - KOKUZAN, 8th corps - KANKO. No decision was made about which units to leave in SEOUL and CHEMUL'PO. They also ask to leave one army of Chinese Volunteers, as a skeleton. We gave agreement to leave one army, which will be located in TET-SUGEN.
1000 sea mines and 200,000 anti-tank and other mines have been received from the USSR. So far a decision was made to use 100,000 mines for defense of the sea coast and to place the sea mines in the most important ports. The task of defending the sea coast to the south of the SUIGEN-SANSIOKU line was assigned to the forward units. Defense of the port RIUGANPO, which is located in the area of SINGISIU, they asked to assign to troops VO of northeast CHINA (one regiment is sufficient for this). In the main I agreed with the aforementioned plan for the defense of the sea coast.
I ask you to review.
3. The question of restaffing five corps.
It was decided that each corps must be composed of three divisions. At present, all five corps, with the exception of 1st corps, have 4-5 divisions. However, these divisions are not fully manned, there are 3,000-4,000-5,000 men. It is proposed that each corps fill out three divisions using the fourth division of the corps. In this way each division can be brought to an average of 7,000 men. I introduced a proposal to apportion 20,000 men per five armies from among the South Korean prisoners, but they did not agree with me.
With regard to my proposal to fill out the existing corps with the newly organized three corps, they did not agree with this. Although such a proposal was advanced by me, I considered it awkward to defend it further. They are planning the participation in the next operations of three of their corps.
4. A sufficient number of cadres were not prepared for carrying out work in the newly liberated regions.
SEOUL earlier had a population of 1,500,000 persons, at the present time it probably still has around 1,000,000 persons. There are great difficulties with food and fuel. No assistance is being given to refugees and the unemployed. There is only just enough food for the Korean People's Army and the Chinese Volunteer troops. In the regions to the west of KAIDZIO and to the south of SIARIN there are large gangs, which have even seized some locations. We agreed to send one regiment and four battalions from the People's Army to destroy these gangs. In addition it was decided to send one division from the 39th corps to the region to the west of the RINSINKO river to assist. Thus, with the destruction of these gangs we will be able to receive several dozen tons of food.
Agreement in principle was obtained from our side in the discussion of such questions as: fortifying the areas under control; demoralization of the enemy--for example preparation for the spring planting in Northern KOREA; assistance to refugees; partial restoration of production in several factories; developing a political offensive in the areas temporarily occupied by the American and puppet [South Korean] troops; creation of armed detachments which will include party and administrative workers and leaders of mass organizations which will penetrate the enemy's rear, where under the cover of armed units of the detachment they will carry out organizational work in the locality; the combination of legal and illegal forms of struggle; striking a blow at the most reactionary elements; assistance to the progressive elements; attracting to their side the intermediate elements; and also all methods of carrying out these measures. However, in the future it will be clearer how to begin the organization of the implementation of these measures resolutely and with the correct placement of cadres.
PENG DEHUAI 12:00 19.1.51."
With bolshevik greetings!