October 25, 1962
Telegram from the Soviet representative to the United Nations, Valerian Zorin, to the USSR MFA
Top Secret
Making Copies Prohibited
Copy No. 1
Ciphered telegram
On 25 October in the Security Council, Stevenson, speaking first, read out Kennedy's answer to U Thant's appeal, in which Kennedy welcomes U Thant's initiative and directs Stevenson quickly to consider with U Thant the issue of conducting negotiations towards a settlement to the situation which has been created in the Caribbean Sea region /the text of Kennedy's response was transmitted via teletype/.
From our side we made public Comr. N.S. Khrushchev's response to U Thant on his appeal, which was transmitted to U Thant before the opening of the session.
During the meeting and after it, representatives of many African and Asian countries approached us, noting the exceedingly important significance for the preservation of peace in the Caribbean Sea region and in the whole world of the message from the head of the Soviet government.
Stevenson's speech at today's session, regardless of his attempts to assert once again that Cuba has at its disposal an offensive weapon, and that this creates a danger for the Western hemisphere, had in essence a defensive character. He made a declaration as if the USA had not sought a pretext to raise the Cuban issue, that the USA did not object to deliveries to Cuba of a defensive weapon, and that everything which they are trying so hard to do is to implement "limited" actions. Being in no position to disprove our accusations of a violation by the USA of the UN Charter, Stevenson declared that the USA could not slow down implementation of the planned measures in expectation of a Soviet veto in the Security Council. He said further that the USA had come to the Security Council even before the Organization of the American States had started to work and had given its approval for the "quarantine" measures. Stevenson tried to present the matter as if he was talking not about unilateral measures of the USA, but about the agreed actions of the Organization of American States.
In our speech we showed the lack of foundation of all of these assertions by Stevenson, stressing that, as the discussion in the Security Council had confirmed, the USA had no sort of justifications for the aggressive actions which it had undertaken, which had created a threat of thermonuclear war. We pointed out that the aggressive path down which the USA had set had met a rebuff from the side of the peoples and the majority of UN members. Precisely this has now prompted the USA to give its agreement to enter into negotiations. We ridiculed the maneuver which Stevenson had made at the session in showing the photographs which had been fabricated by American intelligence which had been assigned the role of "irrefutable" evidence of the presence in Cuba of nuclear-missile arms. We classified this maneuver as an attempt to deflect the Security Council away from the essence of the case, particularly from the aggressive actions of the USA, which had violated the UN Charter and which had created a threat to peace.
In response to Stevenson's attempts to pose to us questions about whether we are placing nuclear weapons in Cuba we referred to the corresponding situation in the TASS announcement of 11 September /the texts of our speeches were transmitted by teletype/.
The attempts of the USA representative to turn the Council into a tribune for base propaganda met no support from other members of the Council.
The representative of the UAR, [Gen. Mahmoud] Riad, and the representative of Ghana, [Alex] Quaison-Sackey, noted the important significance of U Thant's appeal and the responses of Comrade N.S. Khrushchev and Kennedy, stressing that as a result of that exchange of messages a new situation had been created in the Council. Riad and Quaison-Sackey proposed suspending the session so as to allow all the interested sides, with the participation of U Thant, to conduct the necessary negotiations, having in mind that the Council sessions will be resumed depending on the result and process of the negotiations.
That proposal was supported by the Chilean representative, [Daniel] Schweitzer.
The proposal of the UAR and Ghana was accepted without objections by the Security Council. When the adopted decision was announced, I, as the Chairman of the Council, stressed that the Security Council could be convened by the Chairman of the Council depending on the course of the negotiations. In this way, no votes were taken on any of the proposed resolutions /ours, the American proposal, and the neutral one/, and they remained in the Security Council file.
We received your x/ [word deleted--ed.] after it had already basically been decided that in relation to the start of negotiations between the interested sides consideration of the issue in the Security Council is not ending, and that the issue remains on the Security Council agenda, moreover, the Council sessions may be resume at any time depending on the course of the negotiations between the interested sides. At the present time, as we understand it, it would be premature to raise the issue at the XVIIth session of the General Assembly, insofar as the issue as before is on the Security Council agenda and we will always have the possibility to demand that it be raised in the Assembly if the possible new consideration by the Security Council will end without result.
After the session U Thant informed us that he intends to begin negotiations with us, the Cubans, and the Americans tomorrow, 26 October. He will meet with each delegation individually. We will report our thoughts about this meeting in supplementary fashion.
25.X.62 V. ZORIN
----------------
x/ Having in mind "Your telegram"
[Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy of NSA; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.]
Making Copies Prohibited
Copy No. 1
Ciphered telegram
On 25 October in the Security Council, Stevenson, speaking first, read out Kennedy's answer to U Thant's appeal, in which Kennedy welcomes U Thant's initiative and directs Stevenson quickly to consider with U Thant the issue of conducting negotiations towards a settlement to the situation which has been created in the Caribbean Sea region /the text of Kennedy's response was transmitted via teletype/.
From our side we made public Comr. N.S. Khrushchev's response to U Thant on his appeal, which was transmitted to U Thant before the opening of the session.
During the meeting and after it, representatives of many African and Asian countries approached us, noting the exceedingly important significance for the preservation of peace in the Caribbean Sea region and in the whole world of the message from the head of the Soviet government.
Stevenson's speech at today's session, regardless of his attempts to assert once again that Cuba has at its disposal an offensive weapon, and that this creates a danger for the Western hemisphere, had in essence a defensive character. He made a declaration as if the USA had not sought a pretext to raise the Cuban issue, that the USA did not object to deliveries to Cuba of a defensive weapon, and that everything which they are trying so hard to do is to implement "limited" actions. Being in no position to disprove our accusations of a violation by the USA of the UN Charter, Stevenson declared that the USA could not slow down implementation of the planned measures in expectation of a Soviet veto in the Security Council. He said further that the USA had come to the Security Council even before the Organization of the American States had started to work and had given its approval for the "quarantine" measures. Stevenson tried to present the matter as if he was talking not about unilateral measures of the USA, but about the agreed actions of the Organization of American States.
In our speech we showed the lack of foundation of all of these assertions by Stevenson, stressing that, as the discussion in the Security Council had confirmed, the USA had no sort of justifications for the aggressive actions which it had undertaken, which had created a threat of thermonuclear war. We pointed out that the aggressive path down which the USA had set had met a rebuff from the side of the peoples and the majority of UN members. Precisely this has now prompted the USA to give its agreement to enter into negotiations. We ridiculed the maneuver which Stevenson had made at the session in showing the photographs which had been fabricated by American intelligence which had been assigned the role of "irrefutable" evidence of the presence in Cuba of nuclear-missile arms. We classified this maneuver as an attempt to deflect the Security Council away from the essence of the case, particularly from the aggressive actions of the USA, which had violated the UN Charter and which had created a threat to peace.
In response to Stevenson's attempts to pose to us questions about whether we are placing nuclear weapons in Cuba we referred to the corresponding situation in the TASS announcement of 11 September /the texts of our speeches were transmitted by teletype/.
The attempts of the USA representative to turn the Council into a tribune for base propaganda met no support from other members of the Council.
The representative of the UAR, [Gen. Mahmoud] Riad, and the representative of Ghana, [Alex] Quaison-Sackey, noted the important significance of U Thant's appeal and the responses of Comrade N.S. Khrushchev and Kennedy, stressing that as a result of that exchange of messages a new situation had been created in the Council. Riad and Quaison-Sackey proposed suspending the session so as to allow all the interested sides, with the participation of U Thant, to conduct the necessary negotiations, having in mind that the Council sessions will be resumed depending on the result and process of the negotiations.
That proposal was supported by the Chilean representative, [Daniel] Schweitzer.
The proposal of the UAR and Ghana was accepted without objections by the Security Council. When the adopted decision was announced, I, as the Chairman of the Council, stressed that the Security Council could be convened by the Chairman of the Council depending on the course of the negotiations. In this way, no votes were taken on any of the proposed resolutions /ours, the American proposal, and the neutral one/, and they remained in the Security Council file.
We received your x/ [word deleted--ed.] after it had already basically been decided that in relation to the start of negotiations between the interested sides consideration of the issue in the Security Council is not ending, and that the issue remains on the Security Council agenda, moreover, the Council sessions may be resume at any time depending on the course of the negotiations between the interested sides. At the present time, as we understand it, it would be premature to raise the issue at the XVIIth session of the General Assembly, insofar as the issue as before is on the Security Council agenda and we will always have the possibility to demand that it be raised in the Assembly if the possible new consideration by the Security Council will end without result.
After the session U Thant informed us that he intends to begin negotiations with us, the Cubans, and the Americans tomorrow, 26 October. He will meet with each delegation individually. We will report our thoughts about this meeting in supplementary fashion.
25.X.62 V. ZORIN
----------------
x/ Having in mind "Your telegram"
[Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy of NSA; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.]
Zorin reports on a meeting of the UN Security Council.
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AVP RF, copy courtesy of NSA; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff
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