TELEGRAM FROM USSR FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO TO SOVIET MISSION IN NEW YORK, FOR A.I. MIKOYANCITATION SHARE DOWNLOAD
get citationGromyko instructs Mikoyan to tell U Thant, McCloy and others that the dismantled weapons will leave Cuba by the seventh or eighth and to emphasize the speedy lifting of the blockade."Telegram from USSR Foreign Minister Gromyko to Soviet Mission in New York, for A.I. Mikoyan" November 01, 1962, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112651
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1 November 1962
Comrade N.S. Khrushchev has entrusted me with the task of relaying the following to you:
1. We have specified here that our installations now being dismantled can be shipped out of Cuba by 7 or 8 or at the latest 10 November. This must be your point of departure in your talks with U Thant, McCloy, and our Cuban friends. Of course this is only on the condition that our ships will be granted safe passage into Cuban ports.
2. In the talks with Fidel Castro, depending on how these talks unfold, you should make use of the following points in your argumentation:
Emphasize that it is the necessity of a speedy lifting of the so-called quarantine that, in our opinion, our Cuban friends are most interested in. They know better than anyone else whether Cuba needs the shipments of goods presently on Soviet ships on the open sea. These cargoes cannot remain on the open sea for long. Among them are perishable cargoes. Moreover, it must be taken into account that there is also an economic aspect to this issue: we are suffering great expenses because the vessels are being detained on their courses. A further detainment will only increase these financial losses. Cuba is not concealing these losses from us. Of course it may be that Cuba is ready to bear the burden of these doubled expenses, in which case it is a different story. We see that you and we have different approaches to how this issue must be resolved.
If our Cuban friends are for some reason not willing to facilitate the resolution of this issue, we will be placed in a situation in which we will have to recall the ships. For at present we are suffering unjustified expenses.
It is impossible not to take into account the damages being inflicted on our prestige because of the present situation in which our vessels remain immobilized on the open sea. This cannot continue endlessly.
We believe that the missiles have achieved their effect, and achieved it well. You say that you do not believe the Americans. We too do not believe them. But we are operating on the assumption that the socialist states should take the necessary steps to ensure their security, and to coexist with the USA. It is possible that I am simply repeating here what I was saying to you before your trip, but I think that these concerns should be borne in mind when you are presenting our case to Castro. This does not mean, of course, that they should be expressed literally and explicitly. But you must make him clearly understand that we are worried by the unreasonable position that our Cuban comrades have been forced to take.
1.XI.62 A. GROMYKO
[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]