1893-1976
Eastern Europe
(372) documents
North America
Central America and Caribbean
South America
South Asia
1911- 1991
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October 10, 1963
The CIA director reports that the Agency is in control of Liang Sicheng’s brother in the US and is using him to arrange a meeting between the two men in Mexico City, in which Liang Sicheng's defection would be raised as a real possibility.
October 12, 1963
A cable sent from CIA headquarters to an agency officer in Mexico City concerning Liang Sicheng and whether or not he could be persuaded to defect to the United States. Though Liang's name was not disclosed during the declassification process, the identifying details match Liang's biography.
November 1963
An "information report" from a CIA officer in Mexico City concerning the possible opening of an Chinese Communist industrial trade fair.
October 21, 1991
Kohl and Aylwin discuss Honecker's release from the Chilean embassy in Moscow. Kohl recollects his personal meetings with Honecker, in particular the latter's 1987 visit in Bonn. Moreover, Kohl reflects on his inner-German trade policy and its impact for the GDR's demise, especially the billion DM loan for the GDR in 1983.
July 4, 1991
Kohl and Perez de Cuellar discuss Germany's international role, European integration, the Yugoslavia War, the Middle East and the end of Perez de Cuellar's tenure as UN Secretary General.
April 19, 1968
The memorandum explains the directions that the Mexican president gave to the Mexican delegation. The president’s instructions were to modify the text of the NPT in order to increase support for the treaty, act as a bridge among dissenting opinions in Latin America, and prevent disruptions to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.
May 31, 1968
This memorandum is a compendium of comments about the Treaty of Tlatelolco made by different delegations at the UN. It includes statements by the delegates from the United States, Brazil, Ireland, Ethiopia, Austria, Italy, Pakistan, El Salvador, Mauritania, Iraq, Greece, Spain, Tanzania, Zambia, the Netherlands, Argentina, Venezuela, Sierra Leone, Canada, Jordan, Ecuador, Guyana, Colombia, Malta, Panama, Bolivia, Costa Rica, and Peru, in that order.
May 16, 1968
Alfonso Garcia Robles explained Mexico’s position toward the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Mexican delegation’s position toward the NPT draft, and a comparison between the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the NPT draft. He explained that the Mexican delegation favored the NPT draft but wanted to make minor language modifications and include an explicit reference to the UN Charter’s articles on the use of force, especially Articles 2 (IV) and 26. Garcia Robles also explained why he thought the Treaty of Tlatelolco was “superior” to the NPT draft as a response to nuclear risks. He argued that the regional treaty better addressed nuclear threats than the NPT draft because it included more constraints on nuclear powers, a more precise definition of a nuclear weapon, and a more institutionalized system of controls.
June 14, 1968
Alfonso Garcia Robles explained how the Mexican delegation tried to gather the support of the Latin American countries for the NPT draft. These countries prepared and presented modifications to the NPT text, and the United States and the Soviet Union accepted some of these proposals. Garcia Robles reported that the Argentinian and Brazilian representatives said they recognized the value of the NPT but would not support it if it kept its clause prohibiting peaceful nuclear explosions. The Ambassador also reported the Soviet positive reactions toward the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Garcia Robles recounted the skepticism of some delegations toward the NPT. He recommended not to sign the NPT in 1968 unless the Soviet Union signed Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which includes negative security assurances.
October 11, 1967
Alfonso Garcia Robles announced the success of the negotiations drafting the Treaty of Tlatelolco and its opening for signatures. He recounted the expressions of support and admiration for the treaty from different authorities, especially from U Thant, the UN Secretary-General, who hoped the Treaty of Tlatelolco would serve as an example and an impetus for similar efforts. He also explained that the Treaty of Tlatelolco managed to balance two fundamental goals: preventing the proliferation of nuclear arsenals and guaranteeing access to peaceful uses of nuclear technologies.