November 06, 1978
'IAEA Safeguards in Pakistan,' US Embassy Austria cable 10102 to State Department

Citation:


Summary:

Summary of conversation with IAEA official Davi Fischer. Fischer stated that Director Eklund had not yet written to the Pakistani atomic energy commission. He also reported a number of "troubling bits of information" on the situation in Pakistan.

Credits:

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USIAEA

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PARM, TECH, IAEA, PK, PINS
SUBJECT: IAEA SAFEGUARDS IN PAKISTAN

REFERENCE: STATE 279373

1. SUMMARY: WHEN I CONVEYED SUBSTANCE OF REFTEL TO
ASSISTANT DG FISCHER, HE SAID THAT IAEA WAS SOMEWHAT
CONCERNED BY SEVERAL RECENT PIECES OF INFORMATION RELATING
TO PAKISTANI NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES, THAT TO BEST OF HIS
KNOWLEDGE EKLUND HAD NOT RPT NOT YET WRITTEN TO MUNIR
KHAN, BUT THAT EKLUND HAD SIGNED LETTER TO PAKISTANI
REP IN VIENNA RECALLING PAKISTANI OBLIGATION TO INFORM
IAEA OF DESIGN, CONSTRUCTION OR OPERATION OF ANY
REPROCESSING PLANT SINCE JUNE 1976. DEPARTMENT MAY WISH
DISCUSS THIS MATTER FURTHER WITH DG EKLUND DURING HIS
WASHINGTON VISIT NOVEMBER 8-9. END SUMMARY.

2. FISCHER LISTED THE FOLLOWING "TROUBLING BITS OF
INFORMATION":

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT O HOMME
DATE/CASE ID: 28 DEC 2010 201000057

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A. THE BHUITU STATEMENT;

B. AN OCTOBER 14 AFP REPORT STATING THAT PAKISTANI MINISTER OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ASAD CHAUDRY HAD SAID THAT PAKISTAN "TAKES FIRST PLACE IN THE LIST OF THOSE COUNTRIES THAT ARE IN A POSITION TO MAKE A BOMB;" AND C. PRESS REPORTS OF UK ACTION TO BLOCK EXPORT OF INVERTERS.

3. FISCHER ALSO PASSED ON THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION, ASKING THAT IT BE HANDLED WITH GREATEST DISCRETION, AS IT COULD EASILY BE TRACED TO A SINGLE AGENCY SOURCE. A PAKISTANI SCIENTIST HAD SPENT TWELVE MONTHS AT TRANSURANIUM AT KARLSRUHE, SIX MONTHS AT IUREX IN ITALY AND TWO WEEKS AT WAK IN GERMANY OVER COURSE OF LAST TWO YEARS. THE SAME SOURCE REPORTED THAT AN FRG MISSION WHICH WENT TO PAKISTAN (PRESUMABLY LAST YEAR) TO TALK ABOUT REPROCESSING MATTERS WAS DENIED ACCESS TO CERTAIN AREAS OF THE PINSTECH PLANT. THIS GAVE THE FRG MISSION SOME CONCERN AND THEY REPORTED IT TO BONN. THE SAME MISSION ALSO SAW LABORATORIES EQUIPPED WITH HEAVY SHIELDING AND REMOTE CONTROL APPARATUS THAT WOULD PERMIT HANDLING UP TO PLUTONIUM OXIDE. THE MISSION FELT THIS WAS PROBABLY ST. GUBIN EQUIPMENT. FINALLY, THIS SOURCE REPORTED THAT THE PAKISTANIS HAVE ATTEMPTED TO MAKE SOME CONTACT WITH THE MASCHINE FABRIK IN AUGSBURG, THE GERMAN REPROCESSING EQUIPMENT PRODUCER.

4. FISCHER ALSO SAID, HOWEVER, THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED THE PAKISTANI SITUATION WITH BERANEK, "AN ABLE CZECH" WHO HAD LONG BEEN THE IAEA INSPECTOR FOR PAKISTAN BUT WHO HAD SINCE LEFT THE AGENCY. BERANEK SAID THERE HAD BEEN A BREAKDOWN IN THE MONITORING EQUIPMENT (A SECRET..."

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TELEVISION CAMERA, AS FISCHER RECALLED) AT KANUPP, HE DID NOT RPT NOT THINK, HOWEVER, THAT THE PAKISTANIS HAD CAUSED THE BREAKDOWN OR, INDEED, THAT THEY WERE EVEN AWARE OF IT. HERANEK'S OPINION WAS THAT THE PAKISTANIS' LEVEL OF TECHNOLOGICAL PROFICIENCY WAS NOT RPT NOT SUFFICIENT TO ACCOMPLISH SIGNIFICANT DIVERSION.

5. FISCHER SAID THAT THESE REPORTS HAD GIVEN THE AGENCY CONSIDERABLE CONCERN AND THAT THEIR INSPECTORS IN PAKISTAN WERE ASKED TO BE PARTICULARLY ALERT. HE DID NOT RPT NOT KNOW OF ANY EKLUND LETTER TO MUNIR KHAN, BUT SAID EKLUND WOULD NORMALLY WAIT UNTIL HIS RETURN TO VIENNA BEFORE TAKING ACTION ON SUCH A MATTER. FISCHER NOTED THAT EKLUND ON OCTOBER 20 HAD SENT A LETTER TO THE PAKISTANI RESREP TO THE IAEA RECALLING THAT UNDER THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT OF MARCH 1976 BETWEEN FRANCE, PAKISTAN AND THE IAEA ANY REPROCESSING FACILITY WHICH USES THE SOLVENT EXTRACTION PROCESS (UN SPECIFIED EQUIPMENT FOR REPROCESSING) WHICH IS DESIGNED, CONSTRUCTED OR OPERATED IN PAKISTAN AFTER A GIVEN DATE (DETERMINED TO BE JUNE 21, 1976) IS SUBJECT TO AGENCY SAFEGUARDS. THE LETTER THEREFORE REQUESTS THAT THE AGENCY BE INFORMED WHETHER ANY SUCH REPROCESSING PLANT OR EQUIPMENT IS UNDER CONSTRUCTION OR IN OPERATION AT THIS TIME.
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A COPY OF THIS LETTER WAS SENT TO THE FRENCH MEMBER OF THE IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNORS. NO RPT NO REPLY HAS YET BEEN RECEIVED. FISCHER CALLED PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT THE AGREEMENT WITH PAKISTAN, UNLIKE MANY OTHERS, PROVIDES THAT ALL REPROCESSING PLANTS IN OPERA-
TION AFTER THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE AGREEMENT--NOT RPT NOT JUST THOSE DESIGNED OR CONSTRUCTED AFTERTHAT DATE--ARE COVERED BY IT.

6. FISCHER WILL KEEP US INFORMED OF ANY FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS. KIRK

NOTE: NOT PASSED ISLAMABAD, OR WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T.
11/6/78.