



**November 07, 1978**  
**'US Demarche on Pakistani Reprocessing Plant,' US  
Embassy Sweden cable 4456 to State Department**

**Citation:**

"'US Demarche on Pakistani Reprocessing Plant,' US Embassy Sweden cable 4456 to State Department," November 07, 1978, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Mandatory Declassification Review request. Obtained and contributed by William Burr and included in NPIHP Research Update #3.

<http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112901>

**Summary:**

Swedish response to U.S. demarche on Pakistani nuclear development, agreeing to cooperate fully.

**Credits:**

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**Original Language:**

English

**Contents:**

- Scan of Original Document

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E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: MNUC, TECH, PK, SW  
SUBJ: US DEMARCHE ON PAKISTANI REPROCESSING PLANT

REF: STATE 281962

1. AMBASSADOR MADE DEMARCHE CALLED FOR IN REFTEL AND PRESENTED  
PRESCRIBED NON-PAPER TO MFA SECGEN LEIF LEIFLAND AND MFA  
SPECIALIST ON NUCLEAR AFFAIRS JOHAN LIND. MFA OFFICIALS  
EXPRESSED GDS WISH TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH US ON THIS MATTER.  
NON-PROLIFERATION REMAINS A CARDINAL ELEMENT IN CONDUCT OF  
SWEDISH FOREIGN POLICY AND SWEDISH INSISTANCE THAT THEY WOULD  
NOT WANT TO CONTRIBUTE TO ANY COUNTRY'S NUCLEAR ARMS CAPABILITY  
IS UNARGUABLE FACT, THEY SAID. TO THAT END, SWEDES MAINTAIN  
TIGHT CONTROL OVER ALL TRIGGER-LIST ITEMS. FURTHERMORE,  
GDS IS CURRENTLY LOOKING INTO QUESTION OF ADDING ADDITIONAL  
ITEMS TO TRIGGER-LIST, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF RECENT BRITISH  
DEMARCHE. MFA OFFICIALS RECOGNIZE THAT NON-TRIGGER LIST ITEMS  
WHICH PRIVATE SWEDISH COMPANIES SELL ABROAD COULD CONCEIVABLY  
BE ADAPTED TO NUCLEAR ENDS. THIS IS OF CONCERN TO GDS OFFICIALS  
BUT OBVIOUSLY FAR MORE DIFFICULT TO CONTROL.

2. MFA PROMISED TO SHARE WITH US ANY INFORMATION THEY UNCOVER  
RE PAKISTANI INTENTIONS OR ATTEMPTS TO PROCURE ITEMS IN  
SWEDEN.

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT O HOMME  
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PAGE 02

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