November 08, 1978
'US Demarche on Pakistani Reprocessing Plant,' US Embassy West Germany cable 20685 to State Department

Citation:

Summary:
West German response to U.S. demarche on Pakistani nuclear development, agreeing to cooperate and expressing surprise that Pakistan was attempting to complete the reprocessing plant.

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English

Contents:
- Scan of Original Document
We made demarche requested in ref tel to assistant secretary lautenschlager, highest policy level official in DOD with responsibilities in this field immediately available to us. We made points para 2 ref tel and left non-paper.

2. Lautenschlager said at outset that he would make certain that USG request was reported immediately to Chancellor's office, economics ministry and possibly science ministry, at a level and in a fashion that would respect confidentiality of information. He made point and repeated it later that it could do serious damage to west's relations with Pakistan, were news of USG approach to leak. Headline "US and FRG in nuclear boycott of Pakistan" was last thing he wanted to see at this juncture in relations with Pakistan and its neighbors. We heartily concurred.

3. Lautenschlager went on to express some surprise at secret...
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Department of State

SECRET

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USG CONVICTION THAT PAKISTAN SEEKING TO MOVE TOWARDS COMPLETION OF REPROCESSING FACILITY. HE STATED, AND ROUGET (FONOFF) CONFIRMED, THAT MOST RECENT REPORTING FROM F RG EMBASSY IN PAKISTAN TENDED TO DISCOUNT THIS POSSIBILITY.

4. NONETHELESS, IN A PRELIMINARY WAY, HE COULD ASSURE US THAT F RG WOULD TAKE OUR APPROACH FULLY INTO ACCOUNT SHOULD THERE BE ANY ATTEMPT BY PAKISTAN TO ACQUIRE REPROCESSING TECHNOLOGY, OR EQUIPMENT IN F RG. IN THIS CONNECTION HE RECALLED F RG'S OWN PLEDGE IN JUNE, 1977, NOT TO PERMIT FURTHER EXPORT OF SUCH SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY OR EQUIPMENT. THIS, ALONG WITH IAEA AND SUPPLIER'S CLUB RULES, AND US APPROACH, WOULD BE PRINCIPAL CRITERIA AGAINST WHICH ANY PAKISTAN REQUEST FOR EXPORT LICENSE WOULD BE JUDGED.

5. AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, HE BELIEVED THAT F RG HAD MORE THAN ADEQUATE CONTROL OVER EXPORTS. HE STATED AND ROUGET CONFIRMED THAT F RG EXPORT CONTROL LIST COVERED ALL NUCLEAR SENSITIVE ITEMS. ANY APPLICATION FOR SUCH EQUIPMENT REQUIRED SPECIFIC LICENSE FROM ECONOMICS MINISTRY. ALL SUCH LICENSES WERE COPIED TO FOREIGN MINISTRY WHICH SCREENED THEM PRIOR TO LICENSE ISSUANCE. HE, THEREFORE, DOUBTED IF IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR SUCH AN ITEM TO BE LICENSED INADVERTENTLY.

6. ROUGET ASKED FOR LATEST US READOUT ON HOW MUCH IN WAY OF REPROCESSING TECHNOLOGY FRENCH MAY HAVE ALREADY SUPPLIED PAKISTAN, AND WHETHER ANY EQUIPMENT FOR REPROCESSING PLANT MAY HAVE ALREADY BEEN EXPORTED BY FRENCH. HE SAID WE WERE NOT CERTAIN, BUT WOULD RAISE THIS WITH WASHINGTON.

ACTION REQUESTED: ANY INFORMATION BEARING ON THIS POINT:
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7. FINALLY LAUTENSCHLAGER PROMISED KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH US SINCE, AS HE INDICATED, FRG SHARED USG NON-PROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES AND WOULD BE CONCERNED OVER POSSIBLE ACQUISITION BY PAKISTAN OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITY.

8. EMBASSY COMMENT: LAUTENSCHLAGER'S VIEWS WERE OF COURSE PRELIMINARY AND LABELED AS SUCH. MIGHT BE USEFUL IF WE HAVE ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE BEARING DIRECTLY ON PAKISTAN'S ATTEMPT TO COMPLETE CHASMA PLANT AND BUILD PINTECH FACILITY, TO SUPPLY THAT TO FRG. THIS WOULD BE HELPFUL IN DISPELLING ANY LINGERING DOUBTS FRG MIGHT HARBOUR OVER SERIOUSNESS OF PAKISTANI INTENTIONS.

STOESSEL