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Digital Archive International History Declassified

October 25, 1962

TELEGRAM FROM YUGOSLAV EMBASSY IN HAVANA (VIDAKOVIć) TO YUGOSLAV FOREIGN MINISTRY

This document was made possible with support from the Leon Levy Foundation

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    A telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Havana to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry describing Vidaković's meeting with Brazilian Ambassador Pinto. They mostly discussed the Cuban crisis in relation to decisions made in the Organization of American States (OAS) councils.
    "Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Havana (Vidaković) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry," October 25, 1962, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (AMIP), Belgrade, Serbia, PA (Confidential Archive) 1962, Kuba, folder F-67. Obtained by Svetozar Rajak and Ljubomir Dimić and translated by Radina Vučetić-Mladenović. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115459
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    https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115459

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Ministry of Foreign Affairs, FPRY

Sending: Havana

Received: 26.X 62. at 07.00 (?)

No. 226

Taken into process: 25.X 62 at 23.45

Date: 25.X 1962

Completed: 26.X 62. at 07.30

Telegram

16

D

To the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

From the talks with the Ambassador to Brazil, [Luis Bastian] Pinto.

Yesterday [Brazilian President João] Goulart personally phoned him asking him to suggest to those here to choose a couple of neutral people to [send to] Cuba of their own choice for the sake of assurance that they [i.e., the Cubans] didn’t possess any offensive weapons. P. thinks that Brazil and some other LA countries needed that because of the easier resistance to American pressure to which all LA countries were uncompromisingly exposed. He says that they have phoned Brasilia to warn at least twice a day and all that in the prime of elections.

He was a representative of Brazil to OAS. He says that the USA used unauthorized means in its pressure. Forged the resolution and published it and only at his explicit demand they corrected it 12 hours later.

They point out the unconvincing side of the stated reasons by Kennedy for such an act. He doesn’t believe in installing the rocket launch sites. He pays attention to the lack of any logic in Kennedy’s attitude and that of the Administration in the last ten days in comparison to the earlier period. The USA is neither naïve nor is advancing to Cuba without solid information. Personally, he thinks that this was provoked by Kennedy’s need to improve his sheltered image before elections. If it weren’t like that it could have been timed earlier and not twenty days before elections.

He keeps telling me the same what [Brazilian UN Ambassador] A. Arinos told to [Yugoslav diplomat Ivo] Vejvoda: [Polish Foreign Minister Adam] Rapacki used to tell them about all conditions under which Cuba started its own independent way like Yugoslavia; that there was confusion in the heads of Cuban leaders.

[Boško] Vidaković