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Digital Archive International History Declassified

October 30, 1962

TELEGRAM FROM YUGOSLAV EMBASSY IN RIO (BARIšIć) TO YUGOSLAV FOREIGN MINISTRY

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    Fidel Castro, after his first contacts with Brazilian President João Goulart’s special envoy Albino Silva, accepted well the Brazilian thesis which contains following: Denuclearization of the whole of Latin America and the embargo on atomic weapons delivery; Inspection by UN; Cuba would commit neither to export revolution nor to carry out any subversive activities; Cuba would be given guarantees for keeping its sovereignty and independence. The USA will accept the plan after negotiations. Russians “couldn’t think of anything better.”
    "Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Rio (Barišić) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry," October 30, 1962, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (AMIP), Belgrade, Serbia, PA (Confidential Archive) 1962, Kuba, folder F-67. Obtained by Svetozar Rajak and Ljubomir Dimić and translated by Radina Vučetić-Mladenović. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115479
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs, FPRY

Sending: Rio

Received: 1.XI 62 at 11.10

No. 412

Taken into process: teletypewriter

Date: 30.X 1962

Completed: 1.XI 62 at 14.10

Telegram

14

TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Today, in the talks with [Yugoslav journalist Jasha] Almuli, [it was] said that Fidel Castro, in his first contacts with [Brazilian President João] Goulart’s special envoy gen. [Albino] Silva, accepted well the Brazilian thesis which contains following:

Deatomization [denuclearization] of the whole of LA [Latin America] and the embargo on atomic weapons delivery. Inspection of the fulfillment of this decision will be performed by the UNO, which would make a precedent for the overall problem of inspection.

Cuba would commit neither to export revolution nor to carry out any subversive activities.

Cuba would be given guarantees for keeping its sovereignty and independence.

The USA will accept the plan after negotiations. Russians “couldn’t think of anything better.”

The USA succeeded to expel Russians in the military sense from the continent but this doesn’t mean any new issue of the Monroe doctrine, because all the decisions and inspections will depend on the UNO [United Nations Organization], and not on the USA.

Bonding to the bloc proved unfeasible but the small NATO in LA will not be made either. A somewhat more flexible policy is expected from Kennedy, which Brazil will try to make use of, but there will be no big changes in the Alliance for Progress.

There was a crisis because the USSR tried to violate the balance which was the basis of the Cold War. The USA came out with strengthened prestige and the possibility of strengthening the Pentagon policy.

The influence of Brazil as well as the position of Goulart became stronger. Bonds with the UN actions brought great international recognition to Brazil. Observation: Goulart attaches great importance to the exchange of messages with Tito. He connects it with his increased activity. They are spreading interpretations that non-aligned countries, and especially Tito, want Brazil to take over the initiative.

Barišić