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Digital Archive International History Declassified

October 04, 1961

ACCOUNT ON THE RECEPTION OF THE DELEGATION OF OUR PARTY BY COMRADE KIM IL SUNG AND THE TALKS THAT TOOK PLACE IN THIS MEETING BETWEEN HIM AND COMRADE MANUSH

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    Ther record of the talk between Kim Il Sung and Manush on the foreign relations of DPRK, especially the DPRK-Soviet relationship.
    "Account on the Reception of the Delegation of Our Party by Comrade Kim Il Sung and the Talks that Took Place in this Meeting between Him and Comrade Manush ," October 04, 1961, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AQPPSH, MPP Korese, V. 1961, D4. Translated by Enkel Daljani. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/123133
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Account

On the reception of the delegation of our party by Comrade Kim Il Sung and the talks that took place in this meeting between him and Comrade Manush

Even though Comrade Manush knows well what was talked about at the meeting with Comrade Kim Il Sung, since no notes were or could be taken during the meeting, either by the comrades or the delegation, or by the translator that accompanied them, for the purpose of not losing something that might be forgotten, we are presenting in this account the specific thoughts expressed by Comrade Kim Il Sung during the meeting to the extent possible and to the extent of my recollection of the topics. We are including here topics from the talks and topics discussed between their ambassador to Albania, Comrade An Yong, and Comrade Manush, two days before the reception by Comrade Kim Il Sung.

On September 7, 1961, the Director of Foreign Affairs of the CC of the Korean Workers’ Party called to a meeting all the heads of the diplomatic missions of the socialist countries. He informed those present of the arrival of the foreign delegations of the communist and workers’ parties on the occasion of the 4th Congress of the party, on the agenda of the congress and the order of activities on each day, and on their general plans for the visits by the delegations during their stay in Korea for the congress. They were of the opinion that the foreign delegations should attend the primary reports and the most important discussions of those reports. For the rest of the time during the proceedings and especially during the discussions by the domestic delegates, they thought they should organize visits to centers of production, agricultural cooperatives, and cultural centers in Pyongyang and the surrounding areas so that the foreign delegations could use the opportunity to learn as much as possible about the country and so that the delegations would not get too tired by continually attending the proceedings of the congress. After the congress, they would be separated into groups that would visit some of the country’s provinces. He said that should the foreign delegations so wish, they could stay the entire time in the congress, but according to his opinion, it would be more useful that they follow the program that he was recommending. He said this so that each of us could discuss them with our delegations and then they could bring their opinions on this or express their desires about anything they would like to do and especially on the visits around the country.

The Director of Foreign Affairs of the CC said that there were no plans for any special ceremonies on the occasion of the arrival of the foreign delegations. It seems that here he was talking about the fact that there would not be any speeches, honor guards, etc. For those delegations that would come before the opening of the congress, the leadership, along with Comrade Kim Il Sung, would come to greet them at the point of entry, as it in fact happened, and from there, they would be escorted to the place of stay that has been decided for them. Our delegation was accompanied to the appointed villa by the member of the Presidium of the CC of the party who is also Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Peoples’ Committee of the City of Pyongyang and at the same time also the Vice Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Comrade Jeong Ilyong. On the second night after our arrival, he came again accompanied by their ambassador to Tirana and dined along with our delegation. He took this opportunity to tell us about the program of the congress proceedings and the visits, making sure to reiterate that the delegation should feel at home and be free to express its desires.

The Director of Foreign Affairs of the CC also reiterated during the meeting that the delegations of the socialist countries will also hold protocol meetings with Comrade Kim Il Sung. During the proceedings of the congress we were informed that the delegations of the other socialist countries were being visited by Comrade Kim Il Sung, and, on another occasion, the driver of our mission saw one night that Comrade Kim Il Sung, accompanied by one or two members of the party leadership, visited the Romanian delegation that was staying not too far from our delegation and stayed there approximately two hours. Our delegation was still not getting its turn for the visit despite the fact that the proceedings of the congress were nearing the end. In cooperation with Comrade Manush, an inquiry was made to the delegation interpreter about whether a meeting was scheduled according the program of the visits. He said that he did not know, but that he would check with the chief of protocol. Nonetheless, he did not give an answer to the inquiry. On another occasion, when a visit to a province was discussed, he told Comrade Manush that he did not know whether there would be another meeting aside from the dinner that would be organized on the occasion of the end of the proceedings. As a result, we started to lose hope to a certain degree about a meeting with Comrade Kim Il Sung. This was also because of the fact that during the proceedings of the congress, Comrade Kim Il Sung was not associating with our delegation. The delegations were spread out in different rooms from where they would rarely, if at all, meet with others and Comrade Kim Il Sung himself stood with the delegations from the Soviet Union and China and had also brought in the same room the delegations of Romania, Poland, and Cuba. In addition, we noticed that the other members of the leadership, with few exceptions, associated little with our delegation. The day the congress proceedings ended, when the leaders of the delegations and their members were gathering to take pictures together with the leadership of the country, Comrade Kim Il Sung met Comrade Manush and told him that he had not met with us until then, because he had heard that Comrade Manush would not leave Korea until September 26, and that now that the congress was over, he would find the time to meet with him.

[...]

Notes from the meeting and conversation with Comrade Kim Il Sung:

As we also pointed out before, the reception of our delegation by Comrade Kim Il Sung was held on September 25, 1961. The reception was held from 6 PM until ten minutes before 9 PM; in other words, it lasted close to three hours. Our delegation was accompanied by the translator of our mission here. Aside from Comrade Kim Il Sung, the Vice Chairman of the party, Comrade Ri Hyo-sun and the Korean ambassador to Albania, An Yong, represented the Korean side. It must be noted that the reception by Comrade Kim Il Sung was friendly and warm, and the conversation was sincere.

The conversation was started by Comrade Kim Il Sung. He asked Comrade Manush how his health was because he had heard that in the past few days he had not been well. Then, Comrade Kim Il Sung asked whether Comrade Enver Hoxha’s health was good, and Comrade Manush answered that he was healthy and well and that he had been charged with the special task of transmitting his greetings. “Very well,” said Comrade Kim Il Sung, “but wouldn’t Comrade Enver Hoxha like to visit our country or China? We invite Comrade Enver Hoxha to visit Korea.” Comrade Manush said that he does not know and would ask, and thanked him, assuring him he would transmit the invitation. At this point, he did not press the issue any longer.

“We think,” Comrade Kim Il Sung said to Comrade Manush, “that our congress went well, but I do not know what you thought.” Comrade Manush, giving his impressions, said that the congress went very well and was held in high spirits and that the correct course of the party was demonstrated in the report he read (Comrade Kim Il Sung’s report about the 7 year plan) and in the discussions he had heard during the congress where grand tasks are undertaken and the most pressing problems in all fields are treated correctly. He pointed out that the proceedings had left a great impression on our delegation; that during the visits to the provinces and the various centers of production, he had noticed that the simple people were enthusiastically speaking about the new tasks and perspectives that are being opened everywhere; and that there is a trust and a mobilization for the fulfillment and the exceeding of these tasks. Comrade Manush pointed out that though we know Korea well, it is one thing to read about it and entirely another to see it for yourself, and that our delegation was pleasantly surprised from what it saw in the field of the great progress that has been achieved in Korea in the multisided development of the economy and culture, after all that destruction that the war caused and in such a short time. He also said that such achievements can only come from a party that has complete unity and that is closely linked to the masses that follow it and who are mobilized with all their strength for the execution of its party line.

Comrade Kim Il Sung thanked Comrade Manush for his generous words. He then asked him about the harvest in Albania this year. He said that, as he had heard, this year had been a good year for all the socialist countries of Europe and the Soviet Union, but it had been especially good in Poland and Albania. Comrade Manush told him that we did not do very well and did not do as we expected this year. While the start had looked promising, a drought then hit us. From the second planting of corn, we got almost nothing, and we had to turn whatever we got into animal feed. He also told Comrade Kim Il Sung that the goals set for the first grain plantings were not achieved satisfactorily and that according to this year’s plan, we are around 80 thousand tons short, for which we are forced to make plans to import substitutes. Then, Comrade Kim Il Sung said that this year’s agricultural production in Korea is satisfactory, both in rice and in corn and other cultures, but that despite this, they still need to import around 100 thousand tons of grain. He reiterated that they are going to solve the bread issue in-country. Then, the conversation was concentrated once again on the problems of agriculture as it pertains to new measures such as irrigation, fertilizing and mechanization systems and others. Comrade Kim Il Sung said that this year, they are getting an average of four-and-a-half to five tons of rice per hectare, etc. He also said that, maybe in Albania, the amount of land planted with rice should also be increased. “We,” he said, “have experimented with the planting of rice not with stalks, but with seed, like wheat and [the experimentation] has given us good results.” He then brought out a kind of grain seed that our delegation could look at. This grain looks like rice, but of very small seed. It can be said they were smaller than the rye seeds we plant. He said that he had brought that there to discuss it at the Politburo with the intention of deciding a wider planting of it, because they had tried it out at one of the cooperatives, planted one thousand hectares of it in dry land and it had given a good production of up to four tons per hectare. “Perhaps,” he said, “this is suitable for Albania to be planted in lands without water nearby, but I do not know whether your people use this kind of grain.” Comrade Manush told him that our people do not know this grain at all. While talking about grains, he said that the issue of bread should be solved in-country.

Then Comrade Kim Il Sung said that, “it is true that we have achieved results and progress in the development of the economy in our country. We have had many difficulties. Our results have been achieved particularly during the last few years and especially since 1958, and during these years, we announced and spread the Cheollima movement as a method of mobilizing the masses for the construction of socialism in our country. For this, we have been forced to fight against the difficulties and the hurdles that have come up and in the end, we have surpassed them due to the unity of the party and the people, just like in your country. We understand your difficulties,” he said, “and it may even be true that yours are bigger than ours because you have to operate while surrounded by enemies.”

“After the war, faced with the destruction it caused, we were confronted with very difficult conditions,” Comrade Kim Il Sung said. “Our friends gave us assistance and loans, and we wanted to use them in a correct way and not only use them to eat, because had we decided to do that, we would eat for a year and a half or two years, but the assistance would then be gone without a trace. We accept assistance, but we use it as we wish and according to our needs and not as others dictate. The Soviets would ask us then, ‘Why do you not take food from us, but seek to get machinery?’ Factional elements rose up against us and attacked us in many ways. They said that we should not, and could not, have started up the development of our economy, that we were condemning the people to die of hunger, that they wanted to separate unions from the party and urge them against the party, that we were rushing and completing the collectivization of the agriculture by coercion, etc. In fact,” he said, “in 1956, around the time that Comrade Enver Hoxha came to visit Korea, we were facing great difficulties and were at war with these elements, and we had yet to subdue and unmask them. We talked to Comrade Enver Hoxha about this and he supported us in this issue.”

“The sectarian elements were not alone. They had support from abroad. The Soviet comrades used them to exert pressure on us, and wanted to clarify the situation. They wanted to call a plenum to discuss this and wanted to attend, too. We knew what they sought to do. They wanted to make changes in the leadership by bringing up baseless pretexts. It was our decision and we could have refused the request for a plenum meeting and their participation in it, but we calmly looked at the issue and did not take that step. Despite the difficulty, we knew that we were strong. Despite the factional antiparty elements, we were certain of the unity of the party CC. We discussed this with the comrades and decided to call the plenum. At that time, Mikoyan also came to attend the plenum. The plenum was gathered and discussed the issues. We all spoke there, and through our unity and through facts, we destroyed the factional elements and their supporters. The factional elements also spoke at that meeting, but they could not achieve anything. We unmasked them and threw them out,” said Comrade Kim Il Sung, and made the hand gesture of cutting someone’s throat. “In these conditions, even the Soviet comrades could not do anything. They saw that these elements did not have support or backing. Those that came to that meeting with the intention of cutting my head,” said Comrade Kim Il Sung, “were forced to leave empty-handed and the right remains with us. Now, they maneuver,” said Comrade Kim Il Sung, “but they see that they have nothing to stand on because we acted correctly. Now, they also say that we were right, that the assistance they gave us we knew how to use well, they commend us on the achievements we have made, and are surprised by our results. Now, they say that the responsibility and fault for that rests with Mikoyan. It is a good thing,” Comrade Kim Il Sung said tauntingly, “that they place the responsibility on Mikoyan.” Here, he was hinting that it was not only the hand of Mikoyan in this mess, but of the entire Soviet leadership, and that when they have no more moves to save themselves they place the responsibility on one person or another. “The ambassador, Ivanov, that worked here,” said Comrade Kim Il Sung, “was a very bad man and he has dealt directly with these elements by urging them and whispering in their ears [slogans] against the leadership and our correct course. We said this to Comrade Kozlov,” he said, “and Kozlov himself spoke openly and accepted that Ivanov was truly a bad man, and he also told us that now they have appointed him to a very simple position.” Comrade Manush told Comrade Kim Il Sung at this point that we know Ivanov very well because after he left you, he came to us and after he saw that it did not work for him here, he started the same activities in our country against the party and our leadership. In fact, he went so far as to seek to infiltrate our military by talking to and provoking our generals. A concrete example was when he asked the political director of the military for which side and for whom would the military fight. The director answered that the military would fight for the party.

Then, Comrade Kim Il Sung said, “We overcame our difficulties thanks to our unity against the factional and antiparty elements. We threw them out of our ranks and this did not weaken us. On the contrary, it strengthened us. The party gets stronger without them. We have many examples,” he said, “and have had cases with these people where we have helped them, but the best thing for them is to send them down where they can be reeducated. We had,” he said, “a writer who worked in the Writers’ League. He was a factionalist and did not work well. He stayed too long in the office. We took measures against him and sent him to a work center for wood production. In the beginning, he did not work there either, because he was used to comfort. One day, the workers themselves rose up against him, telling him that if he did not work well, they would cut off his head with machetes. Then, he realized that he had no other choice and set off to work and worked well. After two to three years of work there, and after, he had changed; we took him back to the Writers’ League, and now he works well. We also have had,” Comrade Kim Il Sung said, “here in the CC the Director of Industry, another factional element. After we helped him and he did not change, we removed him and we sent him to a production center. As soon as he got there, the workers gathered around him and told him that even though, until then, he had a car, he had not worked well. And now that he was without it, he had better work well; otherwise, he would be in trouble with them. Under pressure from the workers, he worked well, he changed and now we have brought him back here in the center.”

“This is the situation with the factionalists and the antiparty elements,” said Comrade Kim Il Sung, “they must be helped, but we have taken, and will continue to take, measures against them, because very often, by sending them down to the production line, they can be educated well. By acting in this way the party does not weaken, but gets ever stronger, and the work is not impeded, but goes on even more forward without these elements. This is our experience,” he said.

“The APL [Albanian Party of Labor] has also faced and overcome such difficulties. It has passed them by fighting and cleansing these kinds of elements and it has been a correct course,” he said. “The taking of measures against them has strengthened your party even more; its unity around the CC and Comrade Enver Hoxha has been strengthened. The unity of the party and its links to the masses are the most important factors for the progress forward and the overcoming of difficulties.” At this point, Comrade Manush agreed with what Comrade Kim Il Sung said while pointing out the experience of our party, the measures taken against such elements after all the possible help had been given to them, and they have still resisted change, and the great strength and unity of the ranks of the party, etc.

“Your difficulties,” said Comrade Kim Il Sung, “have perhaps been greater and heavier than ours because of the fact that you are constructing [socialism] under the reality of being surrounded by enemies and the Yugoslav revisionists. We know and appreciate the difficulties that you have had and still have today. We have our own experience in this field. We follow and worry about your difficulties related to the developments of the situation over the existing disagreements.”

“Perhaps,” Comrade Kim Il Sung said to Comrade Manush, “you are not authorized to talk about such issues, but I would like to talk to you about my thoughts on the disagreements that exist and would like to ask you to transmit them to Comrade Enver Hoxha. We are far away from each other and meet each other very rarely. Had we been a little closer, we would meet more often and would talk with Comrade Enver Hoxha about the current situation. Since I was sick last year and could not go to the Moscow Conference, I could not meet Comrade Enver Hoxha. That is why it would have been better to meet with Comrade Enver Hoxha, but the opportunity is not presenting itself.” Here Comrade Kim Il Sung made the allusion that his invitation for Comrade Enver Hoxha to come and visit Korea was made for this particular reason, but that was kept hidden because no other pretext could be used for a meeting that could be justified to public opinion.

“We think,” Comrade Kim Il Sung said, “that the disagreements between your party and those of the Soviet Union and other countries must be smoothed over because they are not in the interest of and do not serve the cause of the revolution. This situation must not go on any longer. A solution to it must be sought. Such situations should not go on any longer amongst socialist countries which are working toward common goals and walk the same course. We are worried about the current situation and we are particularly sorry about your party and the difficulties that you are facing. The longer this situation goes on, the worse it is. We think that it is still not too late. There is still time to grasp and solve the issues, which is why there is a need to act with bravery and to maneuver with care and smartness in this situation. By continuing on in this road, nothing can be gained, because it is possible that the situation can become even frostier. Through correspondence, retorting and anti-retorting by letters, etc. there cannot be any results, besides the worsening of the problem and the situation becomes more serious. Furthermore,” he added, “it is not prudent that this go on for longer because of the fact that it has already been one year since the Moscow Conference from where we came up with a common product, the Declaration.”

“We know your difficulties, and we have supported and support your war against revisionism. These have passed and will pass thanks to the unity of your party. As I mentioned before, we have ourselves gone through these difficulties in 1956, and later during 1958. As you know, at that time Mikoyan and Peng Dehuai, etc., had bad intentions to meddle in our internal affairs. Our disagreements with them were the same as yours today. We passed them in silence, thanks to the unity of our party. At that time, we did not go to the other parties and did not write about those disagreements at all. We paid attention to the internal conditions of our country, seeking to work well and to strengthen unity, so they had no chance to catch us in the wrong to accuse us of anything, though they sought reasons to do so. In 1957, I went to Moscow and took part in the meeting of the parties and spoke there without uttering a word about the divergences that existed. I did not even take part in the 20th Congress because of the disagreements. When I spoke in the meeting of the parties, everyone trained their ears, waiting to hear me talk about the divergences, but I did not speak like Gomulka did and did not touch that topic. So, the Soviets and the others had nothing to say or to latch on to. We told our points of view on the disagreements to the Soviets openly. The same we did when we met Comrade Mao Zedong. We openly discussed with him our thoughts and they accepted their mistakes. At that time, Comrade Enver Hoxha supported us. We talked to him about our troubles and he, while raising the glass of cognac and drinking with me, was very touched by our situation and difficulties and his eyes filled with tears. It was in this fashion,” Comrade Kim Il Sung said, “that we passed our difficulties and now we have normalized and smoothed our relations over with everyone. Now, they are left with nothing but to accept that we were right, and they are very careful in their actions where we are concerned. As far as we are concerned, we do not give them a chance to start something, and, thus, we progress. That is why,” he said, “much patience is needed when dealing with the issue of solving your disagreements as well.”

Comrade Kim Il Sung said, “I am not delegated by the Politburo to talk about this, but from my personal opinion and what I know from talking to the other comrades (they also agree with me), is that the disagreements should be solved. Our party is one that commands full unity, and when faced with this, the Soviets cannot do anything. The course to the solution must be found. I, for my part, have not delved too deeply into the course that must be followed,” he said, “but I think that there must be talks. I ask you to please transmit our opinion to Comrade Enver Hoxha. For as long as you command full unity, there is no reason for you to be afraid. You should talk to them with courage. There could be talks with a moderator, perhaps, but I think,” he said, “that there should be no judges in the relations between the parties. In Moscow they tried to impose their majority will on the minority, but that was not successful. In the end, a document accepted by all was produced. That is why,” he said, “I think that the best course of action is a bilateral conversation between the leaderships of the two parties. You should bravely take the initiative,” Comrade Kim Il Sung said, “for talks directly with the Soviet leadership. Comrade Enver Hoxha should also pick some members of the Politburo of the CC and, along with them, should courageously ask to go to Moscow to meet and talk to the Soviet leadership. Let the points of view and opinions be laid out openly and sincerely; let their actions be criticized; let the mistakes, if there are any, be accepted; and let the road to the solving and the smoothing over of the disagreements be laid out so that this situation does not drag on any longer. They do not pay any attention to your letters, even though they are good letters. On the other hand, you should also bear in mind that the leadership of the other parties of the European socialist countries follow, step by step, the Soviet leadership. They operate according to whatever it says. If this goes on, they will continue on the same road in their relations with you, but if an agreement can be reached in talks with the Soviet comrades, the other countries will surely change their stance toward you. In these conditions, there is no other course. The Soviets will have no reason to refuse the visit to Moscow and the talks, since they are also interested in solving the disagreements because there is no gain or interest in the continuation of the disagreements, and, in fact, they lose from them. The initiative should be taken from your side,” he said, “because the Soviets, due to their prestige and the claim of being the larger country, will not take the initiative first. Under these conditions one should operate tactfully,” he said. “There is no other way. Whether we love Khrushchev or not, he is the one with the power at the moment. We must also keep in mind that he is not separate from the CC that chose him, and this is the CC that is at the helm of the CP of the Soviet Union. It is not in our hands to topple him. He is what we have to deal with and there is no one else to talk to. Whether we want to or not, we have to tip our hat to him. The others can also do nothing against him, because he holds the power. Khrushchev would also have liked to remove Comrade Enver Hoxha from power, but cannot do this, just like he cannot remove me from power. I,” he said, “hold the power here, and whoever rises up against me, I will cut his head off and take measures against him. And when there is nothing you can do to him,” he said, “you must maneuver differently. On the other hand,” Comrade Kim Il Sung said, “it must be kept in mind that Khrushchev, since the Bucharest meeting, has changed his stance somewhat on the issues of foreign affairs. We used to have bad opinions of him,” Comrade Kim Il Sung said, “and some of those concerns have been solved over time. For example, now he speaks a lot about the struggle against imperialism and Yugoslav revisionism.” Comrade Manush told him at this point that the recent rhetoric on these issues is just words. Comrade Manush said further to Comrade Kim Il Sung that our party has a high respect for him and that whatever he told us, he would faithfully take to the leadership, but added that he would also like to express his opinion on this matter. He pointed out our party’s position on the matter. He asked how the disagreements could be smoothed over at a time when they are engaging in rabid attacks everyday more and more against our party, and also enumerated one by one their anti- Marxist activities that they have done during this whole time and especially since the 4th Congress of our party. He pointed out that their actions have for a long time been done with specific reasons, that they do not count us as a socialist country any more, that the letters come every day like hail from the leadership of all the parties following the example of and urged on by the Soviet leadership, that they are full of unparalleled slander and lies, and that we do not desire to continue on like this, but are forced to answer them. He mentioned the issues of the military base, the specialists, the loans, the students, the intention to discontinue the commercial trade with customs clearance, and an array of other antagonistic actions. Furthermore, he pointed out the multisided campaign against us, and said that, as far as the disagreements, it is they who bear the responsibility because they do not come about because we wanted them, but because of our critiques which we brought out in the open and following a correct course of action both in Bucharest and in the Moscow meeting, etc. He also said that these disagreements are deep and of an ideological character, and they also moved them into the field of governmental relations. They bear the responsibility for the current situation, etc. We are on a correct course and we will not budge from the truth. “I can tell you,” said Comrade Manush, “that they are using all the possible maneuvers against our party in order to influence, for the worse, the bulk of the international communist movement. They are lying and seek to sway one party or another. Recently, Comrade Ho Chi Minh came to Moscow, and, there, he told our ambassador that he desired to arrange a visit the following day to Albania to converse with our leadership about the disagreements and the course to a solution. We have a great respect for him, but he did not follow a correct course in this matter.” Comrade Kim Il Sung acted like he did not know anything about this and only asked, “Well, did Comrade Ho Chi Minh come to Albania?” Comrade Manush told him that he did not, because he was told that he first needs to go to the leadership of the other parties, to find the source of responsibility and then come to us. It is possible that the Vietnamese comrades are not happy about this, but there is no reason why it should be that way. Khrushchev is a mischievous person and he always seeks to influence others.

Comrade Kim Il Sung then said that Khrushchev can go ahead and try this wherever it works, but not with our party, and Comrade Manush quickly interrupted and said that we don’t even worry that it could be different. He then said, “We are with you and we will support you. They can send all the letters they want to us, they will not influence us.”

“We think,” Comrade Kim Il Sung said, “that talks should be held with the Soviet comrades. We are very sorry to see this situation go on. We respect your party and the Albanian people. We respect Comrade Enver Hoxha who is an old war comrade and that is why we think that this problem should be solved. Patience is needed when these issues are concerned. The ideological issues and disagreements cannot be solved right away. They need a long time, and it is time itself that helps in figuring out the course for turning solutions into action. The point is to talk things out so that the inter-governmental problems are solved and they do not go on as they have. I think,” he said, “that there are no grave and serious problems that cannot be solved. The most serious problem at this time is that of the military base. The talks could be had,” he said, “if only for the matter of their ceasing the pressure and the blockade, etc. When the meeting and the talks for the various issues are held, it is possible,” he said, “that they may not seem as difficult as they do now. By dealing sincerely with each other, an understanding could be achieved, and after the talks, it is possible that the delegations will come out shaking each other’s hands and laughing with each other.”

When Comrade Manush was speaking as necessary during the conversation (whose words are not all included here because we did not see it necessary and because we thought that if we acted differently, we would go on for longer than we have already), Comrade Kim Il Sung listened attentively and often, in silence, with his movements and other times by speech, he approved of what was being said.

Finally, Comrade Kim Il Sung reiterated once more that the meeting should be held and said, “I ask Comrade Enver Hoxha to do this for the sake of the revolution. He should choose some members of the Bureau and should take the initiative and go to Moscow because I am certain that they will not take this initiative. At the end of the day,” he said, “you have nothing to lose here. I know that you will not relinquish your position. The point is that the problems be discussed and if there are results, then good.” His point was that we do not really have to make any concessions. “If there are results after the talks,” he said, “the Soviet leadership will have learned and gained experience during this on the relations between the parties and, so, they will be more mature in the future and will not dare as much to interfere in the internal affairs of your party.”

Then, with the intention of not being misunderstood, Comrade Kim Il Sung said, “I can tell you that this is our opinion. I have not been told anything by the Soviets on this issue, and Kozlov and I did not talk at all about the relations between your party and that of the Soviet Union. Furthermore,” he said, “the Chinese have also not said anything to me about this. We are saying these things because we feel bad about you and because it is also not good for our movement that this goes on.”

In the end, Comrade Kim Il Sung asked Comrade Manush if he had anything to say and whether anything was required of them. Comrade Manush said, “I do not have anything to say but I would like to point out again that all the other socialist countries of Europe along with the Soviet Union seek to also discontinue commercial trade with our country. They seek to do this as a means of exerting pressure on us, and, at the same time, to force us to start trade relations with the capitalist countries, to withdraw our funds from the camp and to go back to the westerners so that later they can accuse us of turning over to them. We,” Comrade Manush said, “will not fall for it and will never do such a thing. We will keep the small things we have with Italy, France or some other country. If they will continue to go down this road,” he said, “then even though we are far from each other, we must find a way to increase trade relations between the two countries.” Comrade Kim Il Sung said, “You have thought well in relation to the point about trade with the westerners. We,” he said, “will be glad and are ready to trade even more with each other.”

Comrade Manush thanked him and said that he would transmit all that he said about the disagreements to Comrade Enver Hoxha. Comrade Kim Il Sung also gave him greetings to send to Comrade Enver Hoxha and the other comrades.

These were the main thoughts that Comrade Kim Il Sung expressed at the meeting with Comrade Manush.

Though the delegation of the party with Comrade Manush at its helm will give its own account of the meeting and the leadership of our party will evaluate it on its own (and I as a communist and titular have unshaken trust in it), I am not making a mistake if I give my opinions on this conversation since I was present there.

Comrade Kim Il Sung spoke openly and was very congenial with the delegation at the meeting. He showed his high esteem for the party and its leadership and his speech was truly given from the position of seeking to have the problems of misunderstanding solved and the unity of the camp and of the entire international communist and workers’ movement strengthened; something that our party does not take more lightly and always wants to do. But this is dependent on others who are at fault for the current situation.

It is my opinion that during the proceedings of the congress, Comrade Kim Il Sung could and should have had more contact with our delegation, something that should also have been done for the eyes of the public to show that not everyone has turned their backs on us. Perhaps he did this because he was afraid of being noticed by the Soviets and the others with whom the Korean comrades keep normal and regular relations, as Comrade Kim Il Sung himself pointed out during the meeting, and as we have also noticed in many occasions.

During the conversation, despite the support that is given to the correct position of our party and the difficulties it faces in the struggle against revisionism, etc. there were also some unkind allusions made. This is keeping in mind all that went on there. For example, he said that they passed all troubles in silence and without danger until they passed, that they did not write or speak about the divergences until they were smoothed over and that is how they achieved their goals, indirectly. Perhaps he was trying to say that we should also not talk, should not answer, should not muddle the waters, etc. Furthermore, Comrade Kim Il Sung is saying that since we cannot do anything else now, we should tip our hat, in other words, to kneel if they will not do it first, and that for the sake of the revolution, we must accept things we are not responsible for. He recommends that our delegation should go to Moscow. The initiative should be from our side because the Soviets will not agree to be the ones to take it.

I know that we will proceed as the leadership of our party will judge correct and prudent, but my opinion is that should we be the one to take the initiative for something like this. Our party might be put in a more difficult position because Khrushchev’s authority will increase further in the eyes of the movement, because they will use this visit for their own interests by bringing up trouble for the solution of the issues, by asking for their own conditions, by not agreeing to bear responsibility for what has happened so far, and later by starting an even heavier campaign against our party and leadership in the circles of the communist movement. Even if a result would be achieved in the talks, they have the strength, the means, and the tools to make it look, in front of the others, as if they had made no mistakes, that those that had made the mistakes came and kneeled, etc. That is why I think this is important. It is my opinion that here we are talking about the solving of the disagreements as the party sees fit after the uncovering of the reasons and the responsible parties. It would be better that this be done through the moderation of those that are worried about this in wider meetings where the leadership of various parties would be present and where the reasons would be analyzed, and the responsibility is borne by those that created the situation, rather than directly by the initiative of our party alone.

Comrade Kim Il Sung says that he has not talked to the Soviets about this. It could be so, but I do not believe that these issues have not been touched upon during the many meeting and exchanges of visits that have taken place between the two sides recently. In particular, we could remind you that the idea of a meeting between Comrades Enver Hoxha and Kim Il Sung is not a new one that only came out after this meeting. The son of Comrade Kim Il Sung has said (as we have notified you before) since the time of the visit of Comrade Kim Il Sung in the Soviet Union that should an Albanian delegation visit Korea, they would be received very warmly. So, this is something that has been pondered previously.

Despite the fact that they say that they have not spoken to others about this, we think that the Soviet leadership, with Khrushchev at its helm, is doing here the same that they tried to do with Vietnam. Their intentions seem to be that they want to make them unhappy with our party should we not take to heart their proposals, recommendations, and mediation for the taking of the initiative by our side for the reconciliation and the smoothing over of the disagreements.

Excuse me one more time for my opinion on these matters, which may not be my prerogative in this case.

Pyongyang, on October 10, 1961 The Ambassador

Typed in three copies. Hasan Alimerko

Conceptualized by H. A. [Signed]

Typed by H. A. [Seal]