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Summary Report on One-on-One Meeting between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, May 10, 1995, 10:10 a.m.-1:19 p.m., St. Catherine’s Hall, the Kremlin

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Yeltsin and Clinton discuss arms control agreements such as START II, the nuclear aspirations of Iran and North Korea, NATO expansion, and other subjects.

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BNY: Thank you for coming to Moscow and for attending this occasion, the 50th anniversary of our great victory. Your participation in yesterday's celebration will add to our partnership, relationship, cooperation, and personal friendship. Thank Hillary, too; she seemed glad to see the Victory Memorial.

WJC: All the ceremonies were televised back to the U.S., so our people can get a better understanding of the sacrifices of the Russian people -- a better sense of our partnership of 50 years ago. That should make it easier for our people to see that they have a chance to take up where we left off 50 years ago. That is what you and I have been doing. The world is a safer place than it was two and a half years ago when we began our partnership.

BNY: No question. We now have only to ratify START II. I keep pounding on my parliament to ratify START II. I squeeze, squeeze, squeeze them. Do it!, I say. So that then we can work on START III!" I think this will happen in a short while.

WJC: I agree with that entirely. We both must work to ratify START II so that we can then go farther.

BNY: We have a chance. The hardest thing, Bill, is to persuade our militaries -- both yours and ours -- to accept the next step: START III. I've already carried out this operation. My military is prepared to move toward START III. We're firmly abiding by START I. And with respect to strategic and tactical arms, we've destroyed all tactical weapons; we've started to destroy strategic weapons. We've removed the strategic weapons from Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Now on the question of Ukrainian strategic arms -- we're working together on this issue.

We're complying with the timetable for strategic-arms elimination, but so far we've been putting warheads in storage because we don't have the facilities for eliminating them. We appreciate the assistance we've gotten from you; we're building facilities to reprocess weapons-grade material into ordinary fuel for peaceful purposes.
I must say that two years ago, if we were to say, "we're going to destroy this stuff," a lot of people would say, "This is making us weaker than Western countries!" But this talk is over. Even the opposition -- everyone! everyone! -- agrees that this process of denuclearization should go forward. I feel confident we will get past this threshold and go on to START II even before both of our 1996 elections.

But what causes us concern here -- and what we've got to do in time -- is developing a common view of Pan-European security and NATO. This is a complicated issue. We need to discuss it today in a very frank way.

WJC: I agree, but first I want to finish on the other subject and mention something else about disarmament. We are dismantling our weapons ahead of schedule.

BNY: We are, too.

WJC: I know, and I'm pleased with the work we're doing together and the agreements with with Ukraine, Kazakhstan; and Belarus. However, just before I left to come here, I received a report from a committee that advises me on science. It contained distressing information, and I want to share it with you. They concluded that nuclear materials in Russia are quite well managed and secure in terms of not being subject to sale on the black market or diverted. But they expressed concern about a deterioration of safeguards on fissile materials under the control of MINATOM, i.e., non-military material. We can't resolve this today, and I won't say anything about it publicly. Among other things, we need to get on to the subject of European security. But let's ask VP Gore and PM Chernomyrdin to study it and make recommendations to us.

BNY: Good, but I want to say we have our problems; one is Tomsk-7 -- a huge facilities -- where we produce nuclear materials. I've been there; it's huge. If we close it, we won't be able to provide electricity to an entire city that depends on it. So we need to build a new atomic power station that will allow us to close down Tomsk-7. The problem so far is that we don't have enough money. But eventually we won't have any power plants that produce weapons-grade material.

WJC: The report I spoke about raises concerns about small amounts of nuclear material under MINATOM. It is vulnerable to being stolen. I'd like to instruct VP Gore to share our information with PM Chernomyrdin and review it and come up with recommendations for us.
BNY: Good, but I can only say here that this issue involves just Tomsk-7, where they make weapons-grade nuclear material.

WJC: You might disagree with this approach, but we need to discuss this kind of thing. I want to give you the information -- just as I'd expect you to share with me any information you thought I should know about.

BNY: Yes, Bill, that's good. But I was being honest when I said that Tomsk-7 is not military -- it's Mikhailov's, MINATOM's.

What's the gain if we close Tomsk-7 and cannot get power to the big city tied into this station? It's impossible to steal anything from Tomsk-7. I've been all over that site; I've walked through it on foot, in white gloves and a white uniform, with all that protective stuff and safety badges that they make you wear. They have disciplined people and the best security facilities.

WJC: I'd like to repeat what I said earlier. We've got to focus here on a different issue, which is a small amount of nuclear material in a non-power-plant setting in Russia -- which could be stolen and sold on the world market: that's something on which perhaps we could do something quietly together. We don't have to discuss this now. I'd like to have the Vice President talk to Prime Minister Chernomrydin, and they can do it.

BNY: Well, there is a question of Beloyarsk station, which is a fast-neutron reactor and there's some plutonium. We have shut down one unit, and the two units still working are only for peaceful purposes. They are not for weapons but for power for Sverdlovsk and other cities. When the Gore-Chernomrydin Commission meets, we'll open all facilities and who them every site in Russia. Let them see and report to us.

Before getting back to European security, I want to talk about the subject of our relations with Iran. What decisions did I take just before your visit? In our contract, we've left in place only the delivery of energy-producing units for peaceful purposes. We have turned them [the Iranians] down on anything in the contract that has to do with military issues.

There are four points I want to make here:

First, no centrifuge -- Nyet!

Second, the two silos -- Nyet!
Third, we'll refuse delivery of military weapons-gradematerials.

Fourth, only peaceful reactors will be delivered.

In light of what I've said, we should take it easy and stop torturing each other about Iran. You have outcries from your opposition, and so do I. Let's stop stirring them up.

You have $5.6 billion per year in trade of your own with Iran. We don't give you a hard time for that.

We don't give you a hard time for the fact that it was the U.S. and not Russia that gave them all they wanted; you armed Iran in the first place [in the days of the Shah].

We're giving them equipment for peaceful use, for electric power stations -- not one iota more -- even though we will lose financially because we'll have to cut back on the contract [to eliminate the gas-centrifuge].

WJC: First, let me say that I appreciate the fact that you are not going forward with the enrichment facility. That's a good decision.

But let me tell you about my own decision, which answers one of your points. Ten days ago I announced a total embargo on U.S. trade with Iran, so we'll be giving up the money you mentioned. I realize this is a sensitive economic and political issue for you and for me. Senator Dole and Speaker Gingrich have called for an aid cutoff if Iran is given this reactor. I don't agree with what they're saying, and I don't think that we should get into that kind of use of our aid program to punish Russia. I want to discuss this issue in terms of what is right for Russia and what is right for the world.

BNY: Bill, here's what I propose: let's have Gore and Chernomyrdin reach agreement on a protocol that will establish what deliveries can go ahead and which ones we should stop. You and I will then review the protocol.

WJC: Let me make sure we understand each other. If you'll let the GCC present arguments and evidence on why there should be no sale, then I agree. If you expect me to agree now that the sale should go forward, even in part, I cannot agree.
Our position is that nuclear cooperation of any kind with Iran is a mistake -- from your standpoint as well as our. We can also provide you with information to prove that. We can also talk to you about how to minimize the economic cost to you for the loss of the sale.

BNY: Bill, what are you talking about? These are light water reactors! You're providing the same thing to North Korea.

WJC: There's a big difference. First, by building a nuclear reactor and getting money from South Korea and Japan, we're reducing North Korea's nuclear program from the level that already exists. Iran doesn't have LWR technology. So in North Korea, we're moving them drastically away from a program they have, while in Iran we're trying to persuade you not to help them start one up. Don't you see that difference?

BNY: No, no. All the cadres -- all the atomic workers [in Iran] were trained by the U.S.! There are no Russian experts in Iran. We're refusing to provide experts, and we're letting them have only the LWR for peaceful purposes.

That's why I urge that Gore and Chernomyrdin look into the matter and draw up a protocol. We'll provide only what we should. All other parts of the contract we'll cut out. We'll take the loss and maybe you will be able to make part of it up. The Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission will have to produce a protocol stating what is to be provided and what is not.

WJC: There's a point here you should understand. We have intelligence that we believe proves Iran is trying to develop nuclear weapons. I will share a copy with you. [Hands over Russian-language text.] Iran does not need nuclear facilities for energy because it has enough oil. It wants reactors for other purposes.

BNY: They are not capable of developing a nuclear-weapons program.

WJC: They are not capable of doing so now, but North Korea proves that even a country under IAEA safeguards can develop such a program over time.

Also, Russia is closer to Iran than the U.S. is; that should make you all the more careful here. Moreover, you are a co-sponsor with us of the Middle East Peace process. Even the Arab states say that Iran is a principal force trying to disrupt peace -- and that it would be a big mistake to build a power plant there. Think about that factor, too.
Now, Boris, I recognize that even if you believed I was right, you could not announce today that you were ending the sale. So I propose announcing today that the enrichment facility and other military-related or potential aspect are cancelled, and the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission will examine the issue of the reactor sale in the light of our information. This is the kind of equipment that requires maximum safeguards under any circumstances. But we think the answer in this case is cancelling the sale altogether, even though you can’t say that today. So you say you are reviewing the information we have given you, the intelligence, and alternative proposals to deal with the economic impact. I realize you can’t say today, "I can’t sell the reactors." But you can say, "Let’s look at the report." So no centrifuge, no militarily useful technology -- that we’ll announce today, and we’ll turn the rest over to the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission to work hard on a resolution. For our part, the resolution we’ll be arguing for is cancelling the deal, and trying to find ways to help you the overcome the cost of the loss.

BNY: We’ve got a deal. [Offers his hand and they shake on it.]

Now to the issue of European security -- a question no less important than the one we’ve been discussing. In fact, it’s more important! I want to get a clear understanding of your idea of NATO expansion because now I see nothing but humiliation for Russia if you proceed. How do you think it looks to us if one bloc continues to exist while the Warsaw Pact has been abolished? It’s a new form of encirclement if the one surviving Cold War bloc expands right up to the borders of Russia. Many Russians have a sense of fear. What do you want to achieve with this if Russia is your partner? they ask. I ask it too: Why do you want to do this? We need a new structure for Pan-European security, not old ones!

Perhaps the solution is to postpone NATO expansion until the year 2000 so that later we can come up with some new ideas. Let’s have no blocs, only one European space that provides for its own security. If we leave the question of expansion to the year 2000, we’ll calm the whole situation down.

You and I are heading for elections. The extremists and hardliners are exploiting this issue for their own purposes -- on both sides. I am being attacked from both the right and the left on this. We need a common European space that provides for overall security. So let’s postpone any change in NATO until 1999 or 2000.
By the way, France is not in agreement with your policy. Mitterrand told me so. As for Kohl and Major, I understand they’re are under your influence. They tried to talk me into your approach.

But for me to agree to the borders of NATO expanding toward those of Russia -- that would constitute a betrayal on my part of the Russian people.

I’d be prepared to talk about an alternative: Let’s say that Russia will give every state that wants to join NATO a guarantee that we won’t infringe on its security. That way they’ll have nothing to fear from the East.

WJC: I understand the political complexity of this issue for you, but first I’d like to discuss it on the merits. Then we can talk about the political difficulties it presents for you.

NATO was established for the purpose of making sure that the U.S. and Canada are fully involved in European security; it was founded during the Cold War, and it was set up against the Soviet Union. Now the Cold War is over, and Russia does not present a threat to the NATO states. I acknowledge this. The question is, does the U.S. at the end of the Cold War still need a security relationship with Europe along with a political and economic relationship?

BNY: I’m not so sure you do.

WJC: Well, I believe we do. Yesterday’s ceremony was a reminder of why. Europe, including Russia, certainly wanted us involved against Hitler, and for the 50 years since then, during the Cold War, we needed such a relationship. So the question now is how can the U.S. continue to be involved in Europe in a way that makes sure Russia is integrated into Europe and plays its rightful role? Our purpose is to use our presence to work cooperatively with Russia toward integration. But a lot of this is up to you -- what you do, and what you don’t do.

Our goal is for the U.S. to stay in Europe and promote a unified, integrated Europe. I propose the following:

First, that we do the best we can with PFP, which I’ve worked hard to make an important organization in its own right.

Second, that there be a role for Russia in PFP and a clear statement from the U.S. that Russia should not be excluded from NATO membership.
Third, that there be a special relationship between Russia and NATO, as discussed by Vice President Gore with you when he visited you in the hospital.

Fourth, that there be a very deliberate process for review of NATO’s membership.

Boris, let me describe for you what we’re planning under the decision that NATO made in December. It’s important for you to understand what we are, and are not, doing.

I told you in January 1994, after our NATO summit, that NATO is open to admitting new members. We recognized that admitting new members raised a lot of questions that required careful study by our experts as well as our political leaders. In December of 1994, we agreed to start a process to answer those questions. That’s what we call the "how" and "why" of NATO enlargement. Those are the questions we need to answer before we could even begin to think about "who" and "when."

We decided to do a preliminary, internal NATO study of the how and why. We’ll probably finish that study sometime this summer. Then, after the study is finished, we intend to present the results of that study to all the members of the Partnership for Peace, including Russia. That’s going to take place this fall -- we plan to finish the presentations by December.

We expect that our conversations about the how and why are going to raise as many questions as they answer. So after December 1995, we’re going to review the results of those presentations -- that will consume us for the first half of 1996.

BNY: The first half? Meaning what?

WJC: At least the first half; at least up to June or July -- the summer of ’96. What I’m telling you is that this process will take a major portion of 1996 for further reflection.

I am mindful of political pressures on you. But there are also substantive merits to what we’re doing. I’m explaining the structure of the process we have in mind.

There’s another point you should understand. You should look at my approach to NATO in the context of greater integration of Russia into other international institutions, like the G-7. You want to be a founding
member of the post-COCOM regime (which I want to discuss with you later). I want a clear partnership for you with the West that protects the rightful role of Russia and respects your security. I don’t want to harm your interests. And I want the U.S. to make sure all the doors are open to you.

But you have to walk through the doors that we open for you. That’s why I’ve urged you to sign the PFP documents and launch the NATO-Russia dialogue. By building up PFP it can enhance the security of these other countries. Whatever other arrangements are necessary, we’ll work out in the course of the NATO-Russia dialogue. That’s the beset way for you to play your part in how European security develops.

BNY: [After a long pause] I understand your line of reasoning. But, Bill, what is involved here besides a strategic issue is that there’s an overlay of political problems -- this year the parliamentary elections, next year the presidential ones. One false move now could ruin everything. So please postpone this issue if not until 2000, then at least for the next few years until you and I get through our elections -- so that there is only theoretical discussion about expansion. Then we can explain all this to the Eastern Europeans and the Central Europeans; we’ll tell them that the time will come for expansion later.

I’ve got to tell you, my position heading into the 1996 elections is not exactly brilliant. I have to look for positive reports and head off even the smallest wrong moves. Yesterday boosted my standing, and you helped me in that. But let’s postpone NATO expansion for a year and a half or two years. There’s no need to rile the situation up before the elections.

WJC: You know how I’ve tried to help you, Boris. When I was preparing to come here, I never had a second thought, despite criticism and advice not to come. Even yesterday, when I was getting ready to speak at the War Memorial, I was thinking: what words can I say that will help President Yeltsin? That’s why I said, "Until the Cold War was over, the world didn’t appreciate what Russia had done."

BNY: Yes, those were great words.

WJC: But you’ve raised political forces, so let’s talk about those. You described what you are facing in ’96. Let me tell you about my situation. I face a difficult campaign, but I have a reasonable chance. The Republicans are
pushing NATO expansion. Wisconsin, Illinios and Ohio are key; they represented a big part of my majority last time -- states where I won by a narrow margin. The Republicans think they can take away those states by playing on the idea of NATO expansion.

Let me be clear, Boris: I’m not bargaining with you. I’m not saying, "Do what I want or I’ll change my position." I’ve already met with those groups who want to see NATO expand rapidly and told them I’m not speeding up the process. We’re going to stay with our plan, with our decision -- no speed-up, no slow-down; we’re going to proceed in the gradual, steady, measured pace, according to the plan I just laid out for you. You can say you don’t want it speeded up -- I’ve told you we’re not going to do that -- but don’t ask us to slow down either, or we’ll just have to keep saying no.

There’s a third factor. The truth is that for the people in the Central European countries who most want to be in NATO, it’s part of being accepted by the West. But they also have security concerns. That’s where it gets complicated. They trust you, Boris. They know it would be inconsistent with your interests for them to be in NATO overnight. But they are not so sure what’s going to happen in Russia if you’re not around. So they’re conflicted: on the one hand, they want to be in NATO in a hurry, but on the other they also want you to succeed with reform and don’t want anything to happen that will prevent you from doing so.

So here is what I want to do. I’ve made it clear I’ll do nothing to accelerate NATO. I’m trying to give you now, in this conversation, the reassurance you need. But we need to be careful that neither of us appears to capitulate. For you, that means you’re not going to embrace expansion; for me, it means no talk about slowing the process down or putting it on hold or anything like that.

I have a suggestion: months ago you were on the verge of signing the PFP documents. Do it now. Sign PFP and launch the NATO-Russia dialogue before the NAC ministerial in May.

BNY: We need something that will hold back the process [of expansion] until after the elections.

WJC: I told you what our timetable is. Under our plan, we're going to consult with all PFP members, including Russia. Even in what you would regard as the worst case, 1996 would be consumed with a review of the "how and why" and maybe the beginning of a debate on the "who and when."
[Yeltsin’s protocol chief Shevchenko enters and says that the others have gathered for the plenary.]

BNY: This is important. Let’s keep talking here. Let them start without us.

WJC: Agreed. I was explaining what will happen in ’96. You will have questions of your own, along with those submitted by the other PFP members. That will take a few more months.

BNY: So we’re talking about half a year in ’96?

WJC: At least half a year. When are your parliamentary elections?

BNY: Oh, they’re this year, but that’s no big deal.

WJC: I’ll work hard on this and take some heat. I don’t want to see you get hurt. But, Boris, understand: I can’t back off. You should sign the PFP and begin the Russia-NATO dialogue. I won’t support any change that undermines Russia’s security or redivides Europe.

[After a 15-minute break, Yeltsin presents POTUS with a sword and silver medal in recognition of U.S.-Russian cooperation during World War II. Yeltsin then invites Gen. Volkoganov to make a presentation on the work of the MIA/POW joint commission.]

BNY: Okay, back to our work.

WJC: [pouring himself a bottle of mineral water] Would you like some water?

BNY: No, how about beer?

WJC: It’s too early.

BNY: On European security and NATO -- how do we deal with this in what we say to the press and the public? I would accept your plan, especially what you said about delaying through the Presidential elections in 1996. But this is something we should not tell the press. Let’s tell them that we discussed the issue -- not conclusively, but we understood each other. Then we can say our next discussion will be at Halifax.

As for the political fallout, we can both absorb the punches we’ll take.

WJC: Good. So join PFP.
We sign [podpisivayem] both documents.

[changing the subject] Bill, I must tell you that we’re not pleased to hear statements about U.S. plans that are unfair or hurtful to Russia. It’s not proper for you to have contacts with the opposition or those in the State Duma who have aspirations to be Presidential candidates in ’96. I value your time so much that I wouldn’t want you wasting it on them. It’s certainly bad to have contacts with Dudayev’s people.

Another thing: The CIA is deliberately infiltrating the Russian Central Bank. I ask that it stop because otherwise we have to take steps to protect ourselves. We need to take joint action to keep this from becoming a problem. We should guard against improper behavior.

Partnership is not just being on a first-name basis. It’s a genuine determination to understand each other and to work with each other. It’s a matter of common values, of understanding each other’s problems -- not just of Bill and Boris.

During the break, I’ve talked to Chernomyrdin and told him he should invite Gore to check on Tomsk-7 and any other facility. Gore should come to Russia from the Far East, via Vladivostok, Tomsk and other places and see these facilities for himself.

Regarding the CIS, we have decided to proceed with deeper and broader integration starting in Belarus, then in Kazakhstan and eventually Ukraine and the others so that integration will have real meaning. The former republics of the Soviet Union will resemble the European Community.

Perry came out against this idea in Kazakhstan. He said not to rush with integration. He got them to agree with him. I think there should be one policy of the U.S. government -- the policy of the President.

On Chechnya, there is no need for concern. We intend to establish order. It will be a democratic republic within the Russian Federation. Of course we want to take action to contain pressure from Islamic countries, especially Turkey and Saudi Arabia, in Central Asia and the Caucasus. When I say "measures," I mean not military but diplomatic measures.

We should do more, as we agreed to counteract terrorism and organized crime. I’m very sorry about what happened in Oklahoma. We deeply grieve for you. We haven’t done enough on this. We should work together and really squeeze these people [terrorists and criminals].
On Halifax, it will be easier for us to resolve a lot of
other issues, including European security, and do so a lot
faster if you can follow through on including us in the
G-8. This will help me on the eve of the elections here.

WJC: On the G-7, I'll talk to Kohl. He and I consult and
cooperate very closely. On terrorism, we just opened an
FBI office in Moscow, but there is more we can do. Let's
put our scientists together and do joint research work on
things like tracers in explosives that can't be destroyed
in explosions. Another example of what we can do
together is developing non-explosive chemicals in
fertilizers so they can't be used to make bombs.
Terrorism makes our cooperation on CBW even more
important. Take the Japanese subway incident and the
agents used there. We need to have a strategy so that we
can work together -- and let's put something on this in
our joint statement. These are issues that count with the
voters.

BNY: Yes, and let's make a statement about this at Halifax.
WJC: Absolutely. On the CIS, the European Union is a good
model of the kind integration we favor. I'll make it
clear that our administration is unanimous in saying that
as long as integration is genuinely voluntary and open --
that is, that it promotes not just integration among the
countries involved but external integration, with the rest
of the world -- we'll not oppose it.

On Chechnya, I've been as supportive as I could.

BNY: Yes, I know; thank you.

WJC: My concern is that the longer it takes to get this on a
genuinely political track, the more it hurts Russia.
Beefing up the OSCE would be a good thing to do. If the
violence could be brought to an end, we'll make more
progress on other issues.

The first time we met in Vancouver you said you wanted to
be part of the post-COCOM regime. We talked about that
last September too. Vice President Gore and Prime
Minister Chernomrydin have been following up on the issue
of arms sales to Iran. There are only two issues: the
first is I need an assurance that the agreement to cut off
arms includes a definition of what will be covered, and
that definition covers not just arms, but also
arms-related technology that's on a recognized list. If
you can give me that assurance, our experts should be able
to move quickly to an agreement.
BNY: You’ve got it. I fully agree. But you have Iranian students who are attending courses in your country who are studying nuclear power. We have none.

WJC: I’ll look into that and get back to you on it. On COCOM, if we can agree that there will be a cutoff date by the end of 1999, then Russia can be a full member.

BNY: I guarantee it.

WJC: Good. [Offers his hand, and they shake.]

Boris, I know we’re running short on time, but I do want to ask you for all your help in finding and returning safely Fred Cuny, our American citizens who is a humanitarian worker in Chechnya.

BNY: It’ll be easier for us to help on this now that we have the territory under control. I’ll instruct our special services to work on this. Maybe we’ll have Volkogonov work on it too. He’s very conscientious.

WJC: We hope Cuny is still alive.

BNY: Yes, who knows, they may have him in a basement or something.

WJC: On CFE, I believe we can work this out. We know you have difficulties, but we’ll try to find a solution. We’ll discuss NATO enlargement at Halifax: you’ll hear me say again that the process is going to be gradual, deliberate, and consistent with the goal of an undivided Europe and enhancing the security of all parties, including Russia.

BNY: But what about not letting anything happen [on enlargement] through the first half of ’96? How are we going to convey this to the journalists?

WJC: I’ve already explained that there can’t be a delay: no slow-down, no speed-up. All I can do is keep explaining what we are doing so that people will figure out what we’re not doing.

BNY: Okay [normal no]. We will discuss European security and NATO in Halifax.

WJC: Yes. In the meantime, NATO will put emphasis on PFP and Russia’s role in it, and the Russia-NATO dialogue. We’ll refer to a slow, gradual, deliberate process, consistent with the goal of an undivided Europe. The NAC Ministerial will formally launch the NATO-Russia dialogue. But you understand we can do that only once you’ve signed the PFP documents. Do you understand?
BNY: Yes. We'll do it.

[President Clinton then tries to get Yeltsin to agree to add a passage in the Joint Statement on European Security that would mention NATO expansion. Yeltsin first seemed inclined to go along, but his notetaker Dmitriy Ryurikov intervened, suggesting they look at the language. President Clinton handed Yeltsin the Russian text; Ryurikov swooped it up, looked unhappy with it, whispered to Yeltsin, who proposed alternative language about how the two Presidents would keep discussing European Security in Halifax....]

WJC: Boris, rather than trying to improve on the good work of our colleagues, let's just go with the statement they've prepared as it is.

BNY: Fine.

Postscript No. 1

Just before the press conference, President Clinton took Yeltsin aside and walked him through again the necessity that Russia proceed with the PFP documents before the NAC Ministerial if the Ministerial was going to be able to take the steps President Clinton had promised to seek. Yeltsin said he understood.

Postscript No. 2

During dinner in the Hall of Facets at the Kremlin, the following exchange took place:

WJC: Boris, I am your friend. We made great progress today. I was moved by yesterday -- your victory and your sacrifices. The door is open now to progress and partnership on many fronts.

To nail it down and avoid a new debate in Washington and attacks by Dole and others on NATO -- attacks that will make it harder for me to hold to the course we have laid out --let me ask you this:

Instruct Kozyrev as soon as possible to take the steps necessary to inform NATO that Russia is implementing the two NATO documents. To make sure that the NATO-Russia dialogue can be launched at the May ministerial, NATO should be informed well before the May 30 Ministerial meeting. Can you give me a date? Would May 25 be all right? I need this to do all I promised.
BNY: I'll sign it the next day after they meet -- on the 31st or June 1st.

WJC: No, you don't understand. You don't have to sign anything yourself. Kozyrev has to take the necessary step, and he has to do so no later than the day the NAC meets. Then, if you want to acknowledge it and sign something yourself, that's fine. But Kozyrev must take the step and proceed with the documents at least the day before the NAC meeting.

BNY: Okay, I'll have him do it the day before.

WJC: We're completely agreed on this?

BNY: Yes.

END