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March 3, 1980

Colonel Ștefan Blaga, No. 009794/03.03.1980, 'Report regarding the Intelligence Measures undertaken within the PLO Office in Bucharest'

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Code names

‘ALADIN’ – Imad Abdin (PLO Representative)

‘ARMAȘU’ – Ahmad Arif Alia (PLO Deputy Representative)

‘CĂLIN’ – Waleed Hammami – First Secretary

‘NACU’ – Mohamed Ali Jama (terrorist, who on 20.01.1978 tried to smuggle weapons into our country; a part of these weapons supplies were meant for ‘ARMAȘU’)

‘IORDAN’ – Mohamed Daoud Awdeh


Ministry of the Interior


Department of State Security

Copy no. 1

Special Counter-terrorism Unit

No. 009794/03.03.1980





regarding the intelligence measures undertaken within the PLO Office in Bucharest


I. The political-juridical status of the PLO Office in Bucharest


Following the accord signed between the party leadership of our country and the PLO leadership on March 18 1974, the PLO Office in Bucharest was inaugurated, [after having been] accredited by the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party.


The protocol signed by the Central Committee of the RCP and the Executive Committee of the PLO on December 29 1978, which specifies the norms and rules for the activity of the PLO Office, stipulates that the PLO representative and his deputy are granted the same immunities, privileges and rights as [the rest] of the diplomatic corps [in Bucharest], that the PLO Office, the residence of the PLO representative, and that of his deputy, as well as the PLO Office archive are inviolable, that the PLO Office has the right to communicate through radio and telegraph, as well as the right to use ciphered [communication], diplomatic pouch and couriers, according to the provisions of the 1961 Vienna Convention.


Moreover, the Romanian [government] provides the PLO Office with the space for the building, a car made in Romania, [the necessary] means of communication (telegraph, two telephone lines), residences and the necessary furniture for the members of the Office, as well as admin staff (three Romanian citizens).


When the PLO Office started its activity, it had four members, now it has nine members


II. The output of surveillance [carried out by the Romanian Ministry of Interior]


Following the surveillance measures we undertook to learn about the activity of the PLO Office, we found the following matters:


1. Most Arab citizens of Palestinian origin who come to our country, irrespective of the group they belong to, visit the PLO Office and get in touch with the [diplomats] who work there. Some of them are relaying instructions and assignments and carry propaganda materials with them.


In 1975, ‘Iordan’ [Mohamed Daoud Awdeh], the leader of an extremist organization, tried to smuggle weapons through our country, leaving a designated marksman rifle with the PLO representative.


Moreover, ‘ARMAȘU’ [Ahmad Arif Alia], the PLO deputy representative, was aware of the passing through our country of certain [people] who were tasked with committing terrorist acts in other countries. In the ‘NACU’ [Mohamed Ali Jama] case, which was discovered in January 1978, he left some of the weapons and ammunition he carried with him to ‘ARMAȘU’ [Ahmad Arif Alia].


2. On the occasion of special events that take place in the international arena, especially in relation to the Near East, regarding the Palestinian issue, the PLO Office receives instructions from the PLO HQ to organize rallies, propaganda activities and protests which can affect Romania’s relations with other states, may disturb public safety and order. We established that the PLO Office in Bucharest played an important role in planning the riot at the Egyptian Embassy on November 19 1977.


The indications for such [hostile] activities were received in the aftermath of the Camp David Accords signature, as well as more recently, on the occasion of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Egypt and Israel, activities which [we] managed to prevent.


3. The PLO Office in Bucharest frequently hosts meetings of the Palestinian students or of the Committee of the Association of Arab Students in Romania, which has had Palestinians elected for the top positions over the past few years. During these meetings, which are attended by the members of the PLO Office elected to the leadership of the Union of Palestinian Students in Romania, the discussions focus on not only student-related issues, but also to relaying the assignments received from the Headquarters, with a view to mobilizing the [Arab] students to take part in certain activities. In some cases, following these meetings, [the Palestinian students] write manifestos which are copied on the premises of the PLO Office or in other diplomatic missions, and then disseminated among foreign students. On special matters, [the Palestinian students] consult with the Palestinian representative, and [major] decisions are taken only with his approval.


4. The members of the PLO Office initiate meetings with various Arab and foreign diplomats, accredited to Bucharest, during which they exchange intelligence regarding the state of affairs in the Middle East and comments on the position of our party and government on various international events.


5. We established that the members of the PLO Office are assigned to gather intelligence regarding political, diplomatic, and economic relations between Romania and Israel, the activity of the Jewish communities in Bucharest, the position of our country vis-à-vis the situation in the Middle East, and on various other aspects in international politics, the social and economic situation of our country, internal political events, and many more. ‘ALADIN’ [Imad Abdin (PLO Representative)], ‘ARMAȘU’ [Ahmad Arif Alia], and ‘CĂLIN’ [Waleed Hammami] are the most active members in this respect.


In order to gather intelligence, the members of the PLO Office rely on Palestinian students as well, whom they [recruit] by [helping] them solve some of their personal problems.


Moreover, the PLO Office has lately intensified its counter-intelligence measures among Palestinian students, with a view to identifying those agents who work for the Israeli intelligence services, for the intelligence services of [various] Arab countries, and of other states [in general], including our country.


III. Dimensions of intelligence operations [against the PLO Office in Bucharest]


To learn about the activities undertaken by the members of the PLO Office in Bucharest and to prevent the initiation and launch of hostile activities on the territory of our country, our intelligence work will be focused on the following aspects:


1. Gathering intelligence about the possible intentions or the support that the PLO Office could provide to preparing or committing terrorist-diversionary acts on the territory of our country.


2. Permanently verifying intelligence on the possibility of storing weapons and ammunition on the premises of the PLO Office for later use in terrorist-diversionary acts.


3. Learning about the activity of the members of the PLO Office among foreign students in our country, and preventing potential hostile acts.


4. [Focusing] on the areas in which the members of the PLO Office are interested to gather intelligence on, their position on the domestic and foreign policies of our party and state.


5. Intercepting envoys sent from abroad to the PLO Office in Bucharest, [identifying] the communications channels [that they use], so as to learn about the plans, orientation, and assignments received [from the HQ], and which concern our country’s security.


We will achieve these goals by implementing the action plans for the 9 intelligence files [we opened], by analyzing the intelligence we obtain, by training our sources, complementing the intelligence gathered from these sources, ensuring cooperation and intelligence exchanges with the First Directorate, the Third Directorate, county-level police units and the Police of Bucharest, the Passport Service [within the Ministry of the Interior], the Special Units ‘F’, ‘S’, and ‘T’.


On urgent cases and matters, pending approval from the leadership of the Department of State Security, we will also liaise with Military Unit 0544 and Military Unit 0195.


Commander of the Unit

Colonel Ștefan Blaga


Report about the establishment and activities allowed in the PLO office in Bucharest.


Document Information


Consiliul Național pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securității (National Council for the Study of the Securitate Archives), Folder D13891, Volume 43, Surveillance Target: OLGA [Palestine Liberation Organization], pp. 49-52. Contributed and translated by Eliza Gheorghe.


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