September 2, 1972
Cryptogram No 9517 from Polish Embassy in Bucharest, Romania Moves Closer to the Soviet Union and the Socialist Countries
This document was made possible with support from Leon Levy Foundation
Cryptogram No 9517
from Bucharest, on Sep 2nd, 1972
Com. Ochęduszko informs in his telegram No 141 dated 1st this month:
As we have already reported, after the Crimea [meeting] there is a tendency in Romania to move closer to the Soviet Union and socialist countries. At the core - mainly economic reasons. Ceaușescu’s participation in the meeting in the Crimea and his talks with Brezhnev was an important moment in the evolution of Romania. Revival of Soviet-Romanian relations. Over the last 10 days - Ceaușescu meets the Soviet ambassador twice.
Among Socialist Countries, Romania did not go beyond the routine only in relations with Czechoslovakia, although there has been some warming. However, a visit of Czechoslovakia's Minister for Foreign Affairs in Bucharest - probably in September – and then Ceaușescu's visit in Prague in autumn will be of great importance for normalization and development of these relations. Romania has not changed its position on the Warsaw Pact troops entering Czechoslovakia, but at the present moment they are trying to hide differences between them and other socialist countries. These trends can be observed since the visit of the GDR government and party delegation in Romania. Not later than during Kádár's visit, talks with Ceausescu were full of polemical accents.
In this situation it seems that a stronger connection of Romania to the Camp can be achieved mainly by creating economic facts. All these actions are intended to "calm down" the Soviet Union and to end the isolation which Romania has been facing within the Camp since Ceausescu’s Chinese travel. This also explains in part Ceaușescu’s participation in the congress of our party. At the same time, Romania counts on economic benefits, primarily from the Soviet Union, as a result of adopting new measures. On the other hand, new situation in Europe reduced interest of the West for Romania and its dialogue with the East, which also contributes to Romania's isolation.
Moreover, uneasiness expressed with the internal situation in Yugoslavia undermined Belgrade's role as a partner of Bucharest in its activities in the Balkans. It should be noted that Romania's steps to strengthen relations with the Warsaw Pact countries – as far as we know - were received coldly by the Chinese and with disapproval by the Albanians.
We feel that some of the moves made by the PRC also did not meet with Romania's enthusiasm – for instance Chinese position on the Conference on Disarmament. It seems that China's activities in the international arena will force Romania to take a more polarized position.
With this in mind we want to point to the complexity of the process of Romania's entering the path of unity. In this process, withdrawal is still possible, but we have noted recent trends inward, which found expression in reducing the divergence in views on the economic integration and closer military cooperation within the Warsaw Pact. However, the differences are still big on the concept of the unity of the socialist countries and the [communist]movement. You cannot see that Romania wants to abandon its neutral position in the conflict between the PRC and the socialist community, especially with the Soviet Union.
The Polish Embassy in Bucharest reports on improved relations between Romania and the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, motivated in part by economic reasons.
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