An outline of next steps the Politburo plans to take in response to the 1968 Thule Air Base B-52 crash.
April 15, 1968
Directive Sent to the Soviet Ambassador, Washington
This document was made possible with support from Carnegie Corporation of New York (CCNY)
Per Point 30, Prot. No. 79
Direct the following memorandum to the State Department.
“In connection with the memorandum of the U.S. State Department from 21 March of this year regarding the catastrophe of the American B-52 strategic aviation bomber with four hydrogen bombs on board off the west coast of Greenland, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs considers it necessary to declare that it fully confirms its own memorandum from 10 February 1968 on this issue.
The criminal practice of flights of military aircraft with nuclear weapons over the territory of other countries does not succeed in justifying any false caustic exercises on paper. The arrogant tone of the State Department’s memorandum does not in any measure make the position of the American side more convincing.
It is high time for the government of the United States to heed the demands of the governments of many countries and of the world community and issue an order to immediately halt the flights of bombers with nuclear weapons on board beyond the national borders of the US, which are senseless and dangerous to the life of many thousands of people.”
Telegraph when carried out.
 Translator’s Note: The following information is extracted from Protocol No. 79 of the CPSU CC Politburo meeting, finalized on 15 April 1968 and covering numerous resolutions made during 8 to 15 April 1968. A number of decisions were made during the meeting, including Point 30.
Statement sent to the Soviet ambassador in Washington chastising the United States for the B-52 crash in Greenland.
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