June 24, 1975
Memorandum for General Scowcroft from W.R. Smyser, “Defense of the Northwest UNC-Controlled Islands in Korea"
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MEMORANDUM 4333
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET GDS ACTION
June 24, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: W.R. SMYSER
SUBJECT: Defense of the Northwest UNC-Controlled
Islands in Korea
Heightened concern about North Korea's intentions in the wake of the Indochina collapse has underscored the vulnerability of the five islands of£ the northwest coast of Korea. President Park, in a letter of May12 to ROK Defense Minister Suh, instructed the Minister to work out jointly with General Stilwell a coordinated plan for the defense of the islands in case of large- scale surprise attack by the enemy. Minister Suh, in a subsequent letter to General Stilwell of May l3 requested that a clear-cut policy on the defense of the islands be established as soon as possible. Minister Suh specifically requested that the plans provide for the contingency employment of U.S. air and naval forces in the defense of the islands (see Tab B).
The issue is whether or not we should affirm that the islands indeed fall under the MDT and thus whether or not to engage in joint planning. (A year ago when the ROK unilaterally reinforced the island garrison. whether or not to engage in joint planning. (A year ago when the ROK unilaterally reinforced the island. If we assume that joint planning is now appropriate and necessary, The issue is whether or not we should affirm that the islands indeed fall under the de th der thee MDT and thus whether or not to engage in joint planning. (A year ago when the RO K der th unilaterally reinforced the island garrison. unilaterally reinforced the island garrisoccc
Ambassador Sneider and General Stilwell have both recommended that we engage in joint planning regarding the islands The issue is whether or not we should affirm that the islands indeed fall under the de th der thee MDT and thus whether or not to engage in joint planning. (A year ago when the RO K der th unilaterally reinforced the island garrison. unilaterally reinforced the island garrisoccc The issue is whether or not we should affirm that the islands indeed fall under the de th der thee MDT and thus whether or not to engage in joint planning. (A year ago when the RO K der th unilaterally reinforced the island garrison. unilaterally reinforced the islan
State/Defense Position
A joint State/Defense message attached at Tab A reaffirms that the islands fit the definition of territory under ROK administrative control and therefore come under the MDT. The message authorizes CINCUNC to discuss planning for the defense of the islands with a view toward reaching uncle r standing that (a) the ROK will not act precipitously and unilaterally and CINCUNC will exercise opcon [operational control] of ROK forces; and (b) in the event of an attack on the islands, CINCUNC will immediately commit ROK forces but these commitments must not jeopardize the capability to defend the R OK as a whole. The issue is whether or not we should affirm that the islands indeed fall under the de th der thee MDT and thus whether or not to engage in joint planning. (A year ago when the RO K der th unilaterally reinforced the island garrison. unilaterally reinforced the island garrisoccc The issue is whether or not we shoul
Our View
The issue is whether or not we should affirm that the islands indeed fall under the de th der thee MDT and thus whether or not to engage in joint planning. (A year ago when the RO K der th unilaterally reinforced the island garrison. unilaterally reinforced the island garrisoccc The issue is whether or not we should affirm that the islands indeed fall under the de th der thee MDT and thus whether The issue is whether or not we should affirm that the islands indeed fall under the de th der thee MDT and thus whether or not to engage in joint planning. (A year ago when the RO K der th unilaterally reinforced the island garrison. unilaterally reinforced the island garrisoccc The issue is whether or not we should affirm that the islands indeed fall under the de The issue is whether or not we should affirm that the islands indeed fall under the de th der thee Except for this addition, we recommend approval of the joint State I Defense message. Joint planning will remove the element of ambiguity regarding our commitment, will reassure the ROK, and once Pyongyang hears of it may constrain DPRK adventures. By asserting CINCUNC opcon, we will also be better able to control ROK response and to head off any precipitous:: ROK effort whether or not we should affirm that the islands indeed fall under the de th der thee MDT and thus whether or not to engage in joint planning. (A year ago when the RO K der th unilaterally reinforced the island garrison. unilaterally reinforced the island garrisoccc The issue
Recommendation
That you approve the joint Defense/State cable at Tab A with our recommend addition.
Approve _____ Disapprove ____
Approve without our addition ____________
Richard Smyser writes to General Brent Scowcroft about the defense of the five islands off the northwest coast of Korea and whether or not the defense of these islands is bound to the U.S.-South Korea Mutual Defense Treaty.
Author(s):
Associated Places
Associated Topics
Subjects Discussed
- Northern Limit Line Dispute, 1973-
- Territorial waters--Korea (South)
- Territorial waters--Korea (North)
- Korea (South)--Foreign relations--United States
- Korea (North)--Military policy
- Korea (South)--Military relations--United States
- Korea (North)--Military relations--Korea (South)
- Korea (North)--Military relations--United States
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Original Archive
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