April 7, 1979
Telegram to the Direct of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, “Report on DPRK’s Foreign Minister Heo Dam’s Visit to Yugoslavia, etc."
This document was made possible with support from Kyungnam University
File No. : Ah Il (Asia Japan) 760 – 663
Date : 79. 4. 7.
Drafter : Cho Nam-shin
Division : Japan Department, Asia Division
From : Minister of Foreign Affairs
To : Director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency
Cc : Deputy Directors of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency
Title : Report on DPRK’s Foreign Minister Heo Dam’s Visit to Yugoslavia, etc. (extracted)
Related report file no.: PNIO 9 – A – P – 15 – 3
PNIO 9 – A – P – 13 – 1
Heo Dam, Foreign Minister of North Korea, visited Yugoslavia, Malacca City, Iran, and Pakistan from March 6 through March 19. The Japanese Embassy to the R.O.K. informed our ministry of what the Japanese Embassy to Yugoslavia was answered by the Yugoslavian Foreign Ministry (Mr. Gricizi, Counselor on Far East Division) about North Korean Foreign Minister Heo’s visit to Yugoslavia. For your information, please be advised to refer to the following:
1. It seemed that North Korea was anxious about the Non-Aligned Movement, and she wanted to know the analysis and prospect on the movement by Yugoslavia, which has close relationships with a lot of Non-Aligned nations; thus, North Korean Foreign Minister, Heo Dam was sent to Yugoslavia. Most of the conversation with Heo was centered on the Non-Aligned Movement.
2. Yugoslavia told Heo that the Non-Aligned Movement should be independent of “bloc” and should not become “bloc” itself (i.e. should not bind members based on specific ideology). That is the only way that it would have a future, and this kind of thinking has been gaining increasing recognition among Non-Aligned countries.
Yugoslavia added that there is, however, an exception such as Cuba, which wants the movement to wield influence as a “bloc”; nevertheless, such is an extreme minority exception within the entire Non-Aligned movement.
3. North Korea completely agreed with Yugoslavia’s idea mentioned above. North Korean Foreign Minister Heo stated that the Non-Aligned diplomacy is the primary policy of the North Korea’s diplomacy and North Korea would like to contribute as most as possible to the development of the Non-Aligned Movement.
4. Additionally, North Korea asked Yugoslavian’s support for North Korea’s “initiative” in inter-Korean reunification. In response, Yugoslavia told that North Korea, Yugoslavia believes, had made constructive efforts as best as possible on that matter. For example, North Korea recognized the South Korean government as her “partner” of the negotiation, which signaled a “jump” that required considerable resolve on North Korea's part and this should be duly noted. Yugoslavia would not expect North Korea to do something more at this moment. (It implies that such “resolve” of North Korea, mentioned above, was exercised at the request of Yugoslavia.)
5. There was some mention about political situation in Indochina. North Korea stated that she totally has the same attitude as that of Yugoslavia on the matter of the armed forces of Communist China’s invasion of Vietnam. However, North Korea refrained from making such position public.
6. The full text of the joint statement is almost the same as what was reported in newspapers. Even though it assumed the format of an official visit, the meeting was mainly about the Non-Aligned Movement as mentioned above. It was thought to be needless to announce a joint statement; however, simple one was announced at the request of North Korea.
(A longer statement was avoided presumably because it would have touched on the Sino-Vietnamese conflict.)*
* ( ) contains the presumption of the Japanese Embassy in Yugoslavia.
Report on Foreign Minister of North Korea Heo Dam's visit to Yugoslavia. The report covers the conversation between Heo and Yugoslavia on the matter of the Non-Aligned movement, Yugoslavia's support for North Korea's inter-Korean reunification, and the political situation in Indochina.
The History and Public Policy Program welcomes reuse of Digital Archive materials for research and educational purposes. Some documents may be subject to copyright, which is retained by the rights holders in accordance with US and international copyright laws. When possible, rights holders have been contacted for permission to reproduce their materials.
To enquire about this document's rights status or request permission for commercial use, please contact the History and Public Policy Program at [email protected].