Report on the Armenian Secret Army's locations across the Middle East, Europe, and other parts of the globe.

Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Switzerland describing the efforts of the United States, the West and the Soviet Union to downplay China's nuclear test.

The Swiss Ambassador, Hans Keller, discusses Chinese-Soviet relations, political and cultural tensions due to China's Cultural Revolution, and other detailed observations about life and current events in a political report. 

With a nuclear nonproliferation treaty under consideration in Washington, INR considered which countries were likely to sign on and why or why not. INR analysts, mistakenly as it turned out, believed it unlikely that the Soviet Union would be a co-sponsor of a treaty in part because of the “international climate” and also because Moscow and Washington differed on whether a treaty would recognize a “group capability.”

The correspondence from Molochkov at the USSR Mission in Switzerland to USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs Molotov addresses the growing concern of the representation of East and West Germany as two independent states in international organizations.

This estimate updated an estimate (NIE-4-2-64) published in 1964 of the nuclear proliferation problem. That estimate, like this one, overestimated the likelihood of an Indian bomb, while somewhat underestimating Israel’s program. This assessment followed the same pattern—predicting India would produce a weapon within a “few years” and also putting Israel in the “might” category, although treating it as a “serious contender” nonetheless. Also following a short discussion of the “snowball effect” (later known as “proliferation cascades” or “chains”) suggesting that the United Arab Republic (Egypt-Syria) and Pakistan were likely to take the nuclear option should India or Israel go nuclear.

Recalls a conversation with Heldring of the Netherlands Council for Trade Promotion, during which Heldring said he had received word from the North Koreans that they were willing to sign the proposed agreement even though they kept urging the establishment of a permanent trade mission. Heldring pointed out such a mission had recently been established in Switzerland and similar contacts were ongoing in the Scandinavian countries. The Dutch company VMF had, however, by now changed to a much more cautious position because of its South Korean interests. Heldring was putting of a reciprocal visit to North Korea until he knew the Ministry's position.

The note points out the North Korean mission in Paris (since 1968) and the intent of both the Swiss and the Austrians to establish similar missions soon. It mentions the drying up of significant communist loans as a motivation for Pyongyang's increasingly Western economic orientation, particularly through machine and equipment import.

Van Schelle reports that pending the outcome of an investigation the Belgian government has told its Embassy in Warsaw to avoid further contacts with the North Koreans. Furthermore the Belgian Embassy in Bern will look into a presumable visit to Switzerland by a highly placed North Korean and possible motivation of the Swiss to establish a North Korean trade office. The Belgians have reiterated their restrictive standpoint and have no current intention to recognize North Korea

The Swiss Ambassador to Cuba (Stadelhofer) describes the difficulties he has faced in overcoming the misunderstandings between the Cuban, U.S. and Swiss governments in attempting to return the coffin and remains of Major Anderson.