1893-1976
Eastern Europe
(372) documents
North America
South Asia
Western Europe
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1925-
1923-
February 21, 1962
Radio Liberty outlines its perspective on U.S. nuclear testing, specifying that its goal is to provide credible information, convince listeners and that the resumption of nuclear testing is for self defense.
July 19, 1994
The EU Working Group on Non-Proliferation developed the first draft what later became the Council Decision 94/509/CFSP. The draft identified three decisions: to convince states outside the Treaty to join it; to encourage participation in the remaining Preparatory Committee meetings;and to build consensus for indefinite extension. The proposal was a so-called āAā Item, meaning that the Foreign Ministers would not even discuss it; they only were to approve it.
August 14, 1967
Soviet tests of a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) attracted the interest of the US intelligence community because of the unique challenges it posed to defenses. At that point, August 1967, the US had no means to detect a FOBs attack but INR noted that a satellite detection system would be operational during 1970. This was a reference to the secret Defense Support Program (DSP), which would use infrared technology to detect missile launches and reduce any surprise advantage from the FOBs. The Soviets recognized this and later retired their twenty or so ICBMs with FOBs capabilities in 1983.
May 30, 1967
A prospective Chinese MRBM force led INR to consider whether Beijing would believe that it had more freedom of action to step up its involvement in the Vietnam War: it āmight feel freer in extending aid to Hanoi and becoming more involved in the war if US pressure on the North Vietnamese seemed to require it.ā
April 21, 1967
Not altogether sure whether the Soviets were really committed to the NPT, the fact that the Soviets had been discussing security assurances with the Indians was seen as evidence that Moscow was interested in having a treaty. India was one of the countries that was especially resistant to the NPT and the Soviets were only one of a number of governments, e.g. Canada, which vainly tried to persuade Indira Gandhi to sign on.
April 12, 1967
The Soviets were insisting that article III on safeguards mention only the IAEA but not the European Atomic Energy Community [EURATOM], even though West Germany and other EURATOM members resisted the idea of IAEA inspections in Western Europe. It would take quite a few months before the Article III wording was to everyoneās satisfaction, but the Soviets also objected to US interpretations of the proposed Article II which would permit a nuclear-armed, united Western Europe.
April 14, 1967
INR assessed several recent newspaper articles by Kiichi Saeki, a defense expert close to the government, whose thinking was ānoteworthy for [its] frank consideration of Japanās need for nuclear-defense planning to cope with Communist Chinaās growing potential.ā
April 8, 1967
By the late winter/early spring of 1967, controversy over the NPT was hurting U.S.-West German relations, placing them at perhaps their lowest point during the Cold War. While an earlier report suggested that West Germany would ultimately sign the Treaty, despite objections, only weeks late INR this report was issued wondering whether Bonn was trying to wreck the NPT.
March 1, 1967
By the late winter/early spring of 1967, controversy over the NPT was hurting US-West German relations, placing them at perhaps their lowest point during the Cold War. While this report suggested that West Germany would ultimately sign the Treaty, despite objections, only weeks later the INR issued another report wondering whether Bonn was trying to wreck the NPT.
March 27, 1967
Years before Beijing actually deployed an ICBM in 1981, US intelligence estimated the possibility of the deployment of a āfew operable, though probably relatively inefficient missilesā as early as 1971.
