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Documents

November 20, 1970

Letter from Director of the Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs Herman Pollack to Miller N. Hudson, Jr. at the US Embassy in Rio De Janeiro

Miller thanks Pollank for his letter (attached) with historical background on Brazil's interest in developing nuclear weapons.

May 16, 1968

Telegram from the Consul of the US in Sao Paulo to the Department of State, 'Brazilian Centrifuge Program'

Information about the classified Brazilian centrifuge program.

March 23, 1968

Airgram from the Embassy of the US in Rio De Janeiro to the Department of State, 'Assessment of Brazilian Nuclear Device Capability'

The US Embassy in Rio De Janeiro sends airgram to the Department of State with a technical and political assessment of Brazil's nuclear capacity.

March 28, 1964

Airgram from the Embassy of the US in Rio De Janeiro to the Department of State, 'Non-Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy by Brazil'

The US Embassy in Rio De Janeiro sends airgram to the Department of State regarding military pressure in Brazil to produce fissionable material for nonpeaceful purposes.

June 1981

Secretary's Talking Points: US-China Relations

This is a document containing talking points for Secretary of State Alexander Haig's meeting with Deng Xiaoping. Topics addressed in the document include: Chinese exportation of uranium and heavy water to South Africa and Argentina; the intention to suspend the prohibition of arm sales to China; greater nuclear and security cooperation; the increase in Chinese arm sales to countries dependent on the Soviet Union; and the desire to open a new consulate in Shenyang.

September 8, 1986

Memorandum by Director of Global Issues, 'President Sarney and Brazil´s Nuclear Policy'

This is a CIA assessment of Brazilian nuclear politics a few weeks before President Sarney's visit to the U.S.

September 8, 1986

Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 'President Sarney and Brazil’s Nuclear Policy'

A Directorate of Intelligence analysis, prepared in 1986, provides an interesting contrast with excisions in the NIEs on the indigenous program; it includes details on the major Navy, Air Force, and Army components of the indigenous program, including the nuclear submarine objective. As with the NIEs, the authors of this report saw no “political decision” on nuclear weapons and further noted President Sarney’s public statements against a weapons program. But a piece of political intelligence initially excised from this report suggested, rightly or wrongly, that Sarney may have been personally ambivalent.

December 1985

Memorandum to Holders of Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 93-83, 'Brazil’s Changing Nuclear Goals: Motives and Constraints'

The SNIEs from 1983 and the 1985 update emphasize Brazil’s quest for technological-industrial autonomy which in nuclear terms meant developing an indigenous program to master the fuel cycle, including uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities. In seeking those objectives, Brazil did not want to face any constraints, and its leaders were unresponsive to US or other pressures for safeguards on nuclear facilities. According to the 1985 report the prominent role of the military in nuclear activities, “the direction of Brazil’s nuclear r&d,” and the CNEN president’s “reputation of favoring a nuclear option” posed a “danger to US interests in Brazil.”

November 19, 1976

US Embassy Cable, Brazilian Public Reaction to US Nuclear Policies

The US Embassy in Brazil quotes a Brazilian ministry official who declares Brazil will continue its nuclear program “despite all the threats and reprisals” from the US. The unnamed official goes on to say, “The Americans, our allies, are behaving in a way worse than that of our common enemies, the Russians.”