This note explains the processes of localizing the effects of the accident, lead deposits in the area, and the evacuation of collective farms and the city of Chernobyl.

The document describes levels of radiation in the immediate area, populations which may have been affected, and steps which have been taken in the first few days following the incident.

This document relays data received from chemical protection troops on radioactivity levels in Pripyat.

The document refers to the detention of a civilian vehicle which exceeded the level of radiation permitted by the decontamination project of the Institute for Nuclear Research, USSR Academy of Sciences.

The document refers to the level of radiation in the area affected and the measures undertaken for planned evacuations.

This document discusses how radioactivity is measured, radiation safety norms and categories, and the permissible dose of radiation for different groups (i.e., accident responders, plant personnel, the regional population)

This document summarizes the specialists' report on the lack of reliability of the reactors at Chernobyl, citing that the lack of protective layers and other structural flaws in the reactor that could lead to radioactive contamination and accidents.

The document refers to a conversation with a specialist in nuclear energy, who explains how gaps at the joints of pipes are causing problems in the blocks at both the Chernobyl and Kursk plants.

This report discusses to violations of reactor designs and the disintegration of load-bearing concrete due to extreme temperatures and improper wall insulation.

This document discusses weaknesses in the technical designs of nuclear power plants in the USSR and their potential consequences, concluding that the Leningrad, Kursk, and Chernobyl plants are extremely dangerous.