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Documents

March 23, 1979

Cabinet Ministerial Group on Nuclear Non-Proliferation, 'Pakistan's Nuclear Programme: Pressures and Inducements'

This report, created in March 1979 by the Ministerial Group on Nuclear Non-Proliferation, explores the state of Pakistan’s nuclear program. The document also explores topics like Pakistan’s political status among its neighbors in the Arab world, as well as possible ways Pakistan could be induced to terminate its nuclear activities.

In the face of alarmists such as Arthur Hummel in the US and Anthony Parsons in the UK, the influential British analysts on the Ministerial Group on Nuclear Non-proliferation thought it unlikely that Arab countries would knowingly fund Pakistan's nuclear programme, even though it was suggested many Muslim states might welcome a co-religionist achieving the ‘ultimate technological feat’. For nations such as Saudi Arabia, relations with the West were situated as far more significant than connections with Islamabad, despite Pakistan's position as a bulwark between the Muslim world and the USSR. The group suggested enlisting Arab governments in order to put pan-Islamic pressure on Pakistan, arguing that security concerns related to India – and not a desire to equip the Muslim world with a ‘nuclear sword’ – were the nuclear programme's main drivers. Addressing Islamabad’s security issues – a constant in British and American discussions about Pakistan – represented the surest way of achieving positive results. Where the pan-Islamic issue might come into play – analysts suggested – was after any Pakistani nuclear test, where Islamabad might enlist Muslim countries to help resist Western pressure to give up ‘the first nuclear weapon to be developed in a Moslem country.'

June 25, 1981

Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State, 'India-Pakistani Views on a Nuclear Weapons Option and Potential Repercussions'

A U.S. Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research report offers an overview of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs, and speculates how the development of a weapon in one country could strain relations with Washington and lead to a regional nuclear arms race. India is less likely to take preventive action against Pakistan because of the risk of “antagonizing China,” the report suggests.

September 23, 1978

US Embassy Paris cable 31540 to State Department, 'Elysée Views on Reprocessing Issues'

A source in President Giscard's staff informed the US embassy that Pakistan was determined to complete the reprocessing plant and was searching for another country willing to supply the necessary technology. Also discusses a developing nuclear deal between West Germany and Brazil.

November 4, 1978

'US Demarche on Pakistani Reprocessing Plant,' Department of State cable 281962 to US Embassy United Kingdom et al.

U.S. demarche and "non-paper" on Pakistan's attempts to complete the plutonium reprocessing plant and develop nuclear weapons. Sent to 12 countries to ensure that they "exercise vigilance and appropriate control to deter Pakistan from acquiring sensitive facilities."

November 9, 1978

'US Demarche on Pakistani Reprocessing Plant,' US Embassy Netherlands cable 6352 to State Department

Dutch response to U.S. demarche on Pakistani nuclear development, agreeing to cooperate fully. Foreign Minister van der Klaauw also express concern about less developed countries ("LDCs") that consider non-proliferation discriminatory.