North Korea is said to have started acknowledging the World War II and Korean War-era assistance of the USSR and China once again. Some Western literature is now available in the DPRK. And a flurry of construction projects have begun outside of Pyongyang.

Soviet Ambassador in the DPRK Puzanov visits a meatpacking plant and is informed about its production and requests to the Soviet Union.

Puzanov visits the construction site of a furniture factory built with USSR aid and comments on its production capacity and shortcomings. He also informs PRC Ambassador Qiao Xiaoguang of Soviet feedback on the DPRK's draft five-year plan and the internal political situation of the KWP leadership.

Kim Il Sung tells Puzanov that the North Korean delegation to Moscow seeks consultation for the first DPRK five-year plan and the development of economic ties between the DPRK and the USSR. He states the expected North Korean production increases in agriculture, industry, consumer goods, capital investment, and export goods. Kim Il Sung also articulates the intended goals of the first five-year plan.

Kim Il Sung requests technical assistance from the Soviet Unions for currency reforms in DPRK. He and Puzanov then discuss plans for elections in North Korea, DPRK agricultural and fishing conditions, progress in construction, and the exchange of delegations between the two countries. Later, Puzanov meets with the PRC Ambassador to the DPRK, Qiao Xiaoguang. They discuss the potential American bid to legalize weapons deliveries to South Korea as well as USSR and PRC consultation for the DPRK five-year plan.

Letters exchanged between the President of the IOC, Juan Antonio Samaranch, and Dr. Klaus Georg Wieck on the security situation in South Korea in the lead up to the 1988 Olympics. Wieck's enclosed security report provides details on the South Korean opposition, security preparations completed by the South Korean government, and the potential for terrorist threats or activities during the Olympic Games.

A message from Gromyko to Stalin relaying the assessment of Shtykov that it would be prudent for the Soviet Union to withdraw some nonessential embassy personnel and specialists from North Korea. Gromyko advises that withdrawals should be considered only in consultation with North Korea and the appropriate Soviet ministeries.