Keating alleges that the Soviet Union is building "rocket installations" in Cuba and urges President Kennedy to take action.

Ambassador János Beck reports on diplomatic relations between the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) and Cuba. Beck speculates that FRG does intelligence work for departed Americans. Central to Beck’s report is the fact that Cuba wants to preserve diplomatic relations with as many countries as possible. Relevant is the Hallstein principle and the presence of FRG diplomats and German Democratic Republic’s Political Commission. (There are two self-governing and independent German states in Cuba.)

Boissevain writes after the conclusion of the crisis the Cuban response to the Tripartite Agreement. Fidel Castro proclaimed that no guarantee would be sufficient until all of the following had ceased: the naval and economic blockade, American aid to anti government forces and espionage, piracy from the United States and Puerto Rico, American military flights over Cuba, and dismantling the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo Bay.

The Chinese Embassy in Iraq passes on information from the Cuban Embassy about forces prepared by the CIA for an invasion of Cuba, claiming they included armed anti-Castro exiles of the Cuban Revolutionary Council as well as a separate group of "special agents committed to sabotage and subversion operations."

Comrade Josef Houska submits a document concerning issues related to cooperation with the Cuban intelligence service especially the Operation MANUEL to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The Operational MANUEL started in 1962 when the Cuban intelligence asked the Czechoslovak resident in Havana to arrange a transit through Prague for Venezuelan nationals who underwent guerrilla training in Cuba. In 1964 talks were held between Cuban and Czechoslovak intelligence services but no formal agreement of the tasks and responsibilities was concluded between the two. The Soviet government was informed about the Operation MANUEL and stated its agreement with the project. Houska says that the main objective of the operation is the education and training of revolutionary cadres from Latin America and the organization of combat groups. Participants of the operation were not confined to cadres from among the ranks of communist parties but also included members from various nationalist and anti-American groupings. The routes of individual participants in the operation were determined by the Cuban intelligence service who mainly directed the Operation MANUEL. Houska says problems that arisen in the course of the operation were solved in collaboration with Cuban and the Soviet authorities. The document cautioned about counter-espionage institutions' increasing interests in the operation and the fact that the US intelligence service agents were among the operation participants. Houska says refusal to offer assistance would have a negative impact on Cuba and Czechoslovakia would lose control over the operation.