Detailed records of the conversations between Gilpatric and top Italian officials have yet to surface. The sole source is a telegram from the Rome Embassy summing up the talks with Fanfani. On February 11, Gilpatric and Ambassador G. Frederick Reinhardt met with Prime Minister Fanfani. Gilpatric reviewed U.S. plans for three Polaris submarines assigned to SACEUR to patrol the Mediterranean and the projected visit to Rome by Ambassador Livingston Merchant to discuss the multilateral force proposal. In that connection, Fanfani said that Italy had given up the proposal to equip the Garibaldi with Polaris missiles. Gilpatric discussed some of the negative implications of French President Charles De Gaulle’s 14 January 1963 press conference, which included statements critical of NATO. This raised concerns in Washington that  if the American people felt “unwanted” in Europe, there might be pressure to take a “more restrictive” position on the U.S. military presence in Europe. Fanfani agreed that it was “more important than ever for … the alliance to strive for greater unity.”

The State Department sent a proposed statement (not yet identified) on the Jupiters to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) for Fanfani to consider, but the Italian prime minister was holding it “exclusively” at his office. Fanfani was involved in “delicate maneuverings” on the Jupiters with the Socialists and other “center-left groups,” and leaks by “indiscreet” Foreign Office officials could harm the talks. 

Concerning President Kennedy’s proposed remarks on the Jupiters for a press conference, Fanfani understood that Kennedy had to tell the press something but hoped that he “will say as little as possible.” According to Fanfani, “too much talk and too many details will give ammunition to communists and left wing” socialists.  When Kennedy held his press conference a few days later, he said the minimum, with only a passing reference to Jupiters.

Following his instructions to begin reaching a deal, Reinhardt met with Andreotti. The latter raised the date of April 1 as sort of a deadline and asked Reinhardt how important it was, noting that it would better to remove the missiles after April 1 so it would not be an election issue, where the right could “condemn a great defeat,” while the left could claim a “great victory.” Reinhardt declared that Washington wanted the action on Jupiters taken “as soon as possible,” which Andreotti accepted, observing that an “optimum solution” would be a “two key” arrangement for Polaris, which he realized was not practical in the short term.

When Andreotti noted that the decommissioning of the Jupiter sites would be a “graphic step backward” for Italy in terms of direct Italian participation in nuclear defense, Reinhardt mentioned the replacement of Corporals with Sergeant missiles, which Andreotti acknowledged would be “helpful” for demonstrating a U.S. “presence” in Italy.