The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for Monday, 16 July 1990 describes the latest developments in USSR, Poland, Iraq, East Germany and Afghanistan.

The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for Thursday, 5 July 1990 describes the latest developments in USSR, Germany, Albania, Korea and Hungary.

The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for Friday, 29 June describes the latest developments in USSR, India, Liberia, China, Indonesia, Germany and Japan.

The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 27 October 1989 describes the latest developments in the German reunification.

The CIA’s memorandum published on 11 October 1989 brings up the German reunification as an international agenda and assesses its implications for the Soviet Union and the United States.

The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 2 February 1990 describes the latest developments in German unification, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Arab States, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union.

The report assesses German unity in three parts. The first regards internal factors of integration such as integrating monetary systems and elections. The next portion regards external factors, focusing mainly on the USSR's parameters for reunification regarding NATO and Poland's western border. Finally, the report assesses German reunification and predicts the process will be complete by the end of the year (1990). In addition, it discusses the positive prospects for European Unity and emphasizes Austria's role in binding a newly united Germany to Western Europe.

Representing the SED CC delegation, Ulbricht writes to Khrushchev requesting a meeting with the CPSU CC presidium, for which he outlines the topics necessary for discussion. Topics include the West Berlin question and the need for an agreement between Western powers and the USSR, and a treaty between the GDR and West Germany to establish territorial sovereignty.

The large-scale migration of GDR’s population to West Germany is becoming a major issue in Germany. The SCC in Germany, the SED, and GDR government discuss and outline measures for preventing this defection in the future.

In a personal letter to the Field Marshall regarding to his assumptions made in a memoranda, President Eisenhower presents an opposing view that the successful integration of West Germany into Western Europe would increase pressure within East Germany for reunification.