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Documents

December 6, 1973

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 61.537

The document describes how the North Koreans enthusiastically celebrated the consensus of Committee No. 1 over the Korean issue in the UN; however, Lazar believes that the Korean leadership has not actually grasped the full implications of the decision. In addition, the telegram describes how Pyongyang's attempt to reassert control over South Korean islands close to the North Korean shores in the Yellow Sea has created friction between the two countries. The author also mentions that North Korean support for the student movements in South Korea legitimized Seoul's harsher crackdown on the dissident movements.

June 29, 1973

Telegram from Pyongyang, No.061.253, Urgent, SECRET

North Korean officials blame pressure from Japan and the US as reasons why South Korean representatives are not receptive to the North's proposals in the North-South Coordination Committee meetings. The official believes that Seoul is attempting to slow down negotiations with Pyongyang because South Korea is unstable. Pyongyang worries that Seoul's plan for joint accession to the US will enshrine the division on the peninsula.

June 16, 1973

Telegram from Pyongyang, No.061.238, Urgent, SECRET

Romanian officials report on the third session of the North-South Coordination Committee (NSCC) in Seoul. Due to differences in each side's ideas on cross-border cooperation and the organization of NSCC, the meeting ended without notable accomplishments. Both sides blame each other for espousing two separate Koreas.

April 11, 1973

Telegram from Pyongyang, No.061.119, Urgent, SECRET

Conversation between Romanian and Soviet representatives reveals that North Koreans are slowly withdrawing from direct contacts with South Korea. Instead, Pyongyang is seeking external support for its position. Meanwhile, North Korea is now looking at China with increased suspicion after Zhou Enlai noted that Beijing was not interested in the withdrawal of US troops from Asia. On another note, North Korea asks the Soviets to forbid South Koreans to enter the Soviet Union for the University Olympics held there.

March 17, 1973

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 061084

Lazar discusses the stalling inter-Korean negotiations and blames the overly cautious attitude of the South and the ‘all or nothing’ strategy of the North. He also notes that the North Koreans are buying time until the US disengages from the peninsula to ensure a position of superiority.

March 9, 1973

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 061077

Lazar reports on the tense 3rd meeting of the South-North Coordination Committee but expects the meeting to conclude with a reaffirmation of inter-Korean cooperation.

March 5, 1973

Telegram from Pyongyang, No.061.074, Urgent, SECRET

Lazar describes an incident along the DMZ, where North Korean infiltrators shot South Korean troops.

March 1, 1973

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 061072

The document discusses the political strategies of the two Koreas' and their respective visions of unification. The author notes that North Korea is reaching out to the world to shore up support for Pyongyang's vision.

January 16, 1973

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No.061.009

Lazar describes setbacks in inter-Korean cooperation following South Korea's hostile attitude towards North Korea. The author obvserves that DPRK is irked by President Park's growing cult of personality home and abroad.