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Documents

June 4, 1957

Department of State Office of Intelligence Research, 'OIR Contribution to NIE 100-6-57: Nuclear Weapons Production by Fourth Countries – Likelihood and Consequences'

This lengthy report was State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research's contribution to the first National Intelligence Estimate on the nuclear proliferation, NIE 100-6-57. Written at a time when the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom were the only nuclear weapons states, the “Fourth Country” problem referred to the probability that some unspecified country, whether France or China, was likely to be the next nuclear weapons state. Enclosed with letter from Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Division of Research for USSR and Western Europe, to Roger Mateson, 4 June 1957, Secret

February 8, 1993

Cable from Brazilian Foreign Ministry to Embassy in Washington, 'Brazil-France. Science and technology. Visit of D. José Israel Vargas. Meeting with Minister Hubert Curien.'

This cable describes the visit of Brazilian Minister of Science and Technology José Israel Vargas to France. Israel Vargas met his French counterpart Minister of Science and Space Hubert Curien. Israel Vargas asked the French minister about the possibility of a French contribution to the Brazilian space program by transferring technology. Curien answered that this is not possible because the French government respects its international commitments regarding the transfer of sensitive technologies.

June 18, 1979

Notice No. 135/79 from the General Secretariat of the Brazilian National Security Council

In 1978 the National Security Council identified the most important shortcoming of nuclear cooperation with Germany: the non-transfer of technology for the production of uranium hexafluoride (UF6). The lack of this crucial phase for the production of nuclear fuel led Brazil to decide to develop this method by national means, in view of the unwillingness of France and Great Britain to export said technology without a full scope of safeguards. The document reports how the government decided to create an autonomous nuclear project with regard to cooperation with Germany and free from the international safeguards regime. Coordinated by CNEN and implemented by the Institute of Energy and Nuclear Research (IPEN), this project represented the first phase of the “parallel” nuclear program whose objective was the autonomous mastery of the nuclear cycle.

1975

Cables between the Brazilian Embassy in Washington and the Brazilian Foreign Ministry on the Transfer of Nuclear Material

A series of correspondence between Brazilian Foreign Ministry and Brazilian Ambassador to the US about the transfer of nuclear material from France to Brazil. Myron Kratzer, Acting Assistant Secretary for Scientific Affairs in the US, expressed his concern over the fact the nuclear material was of American origin.

September 23, 1978

US Embassy Paris cable 31540 to State Department, 'Elysée Views on Reprocessing Issues'

A source in President Giscard's staff informed the US embassy that Pakistan was determined to complete the reprocessing plant and was searching for another country willing to supply the necessary technology. Also discusses a developing nuclear deal between West Germany and Brazil.