Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric visited Rome in February 1963 for meetings with Prime Minister Fanfani and Defense Minister Andreotti. The Jupiter missiles were on the agenda and this lengthy briefing book conveys the tacit linkage between the Jupiter dismantling and the range of nuclear and conventional forces issues that were then under discussion. They included, among others: the possible deployment of Polaris aboard the cruiser Garibaldi, “with the US retaining custody of the warheads”; the long-standing Italian quest for help in the development of a nuclear-powered submarine; and the conclusion of an arrangement for a co-production of M-113 armored personnel carriers in Italy.

Perhaps the most striking part of this compilation is the paper reviewing the Italian experiment to use the cruiser Garibaldi as a delivery vehicle for Polaris missiles.  According to the briefing paper, the main U.S. objection to the Garibaldi proposal had less to do with its technical aspects than with the broader NATO context. The problem with a bilateral deal was political, namely the Garibaldi’s potentially negative impact for the creation of a multilateral NATO force, including the potentially adverse repercussions for Turkey and West Germany.” The former could see it as an “unfair advantage to Italy ... in the  matter of [the] adequacy of a replacement for Jupiter missiles,” while the latter could see it giving Italy “some of preferred status.”

Not included in the copy that went to the State Department are the probably more sensitive papers on Polaris forces and the “Assignment of Forces” to NATO.

In this overview of the state of the Jupiter/Polaris negotiations and the next steps, the State Department instructs Ambassador Hare to lead the negotiations with Turkey and to inform U.S missions that McNamara’s letter to Andreotti on the Polaris and Sergeant deployments was in the works; that Turkish “conditions” were not clear; that the U.S. and the two countries had to formally notify NATO of the “modernization” program; that bilateral agreements with Ankara and Rome on the Jupiter/Polaris arrangement would need to be negotiated; that steps had to be taken to prepare Polaris submarines for missions in the Mediterranean by April 1; and that the U.S. needed “considerable lead time” to prepare for the removal of the Jupiters. The negotiation of Turkey’s conditions for the Jupiter removal should not hold up notifying NATO or cause delay of the U.S.-Italy arrangements. On the use of the naval base at Rota, Spain, for stationing Polaris submarines, several NATO governments had objected (because of the Franco dictatorship), and so far Madrid had rejected U.S. proposals.

Following his instructions to begin reaching a deal, Reinhardt met with Andreotti. The latter raised the date of April 1 as sort of a deadline and asked Reinhardt how important it was, noting that it would better to remove the missiles after April 1 so it would not be an election issue, where the right could “condemn a great defeat,” while the left could claim a “great victory.” Reinhardt declared that Washington wanted the action on Jupiters taken “as soon as possible,” which Andreotti accepted, observing that an “optimum solution” would be a “two key” arrangement for Polaris, which he realized was not practical in the short term.

When Andreotti noted that the decommissioning of the Jupiter sites would be a “graphic step backward” for Italy in terms of direct Italian participation in nuclear defense, Reinhardt mentioned the replacement of Corporals with Sergeant missiles, which Andreotti acknowledged would be “helpful” for demonstrating a U.S. “presence” in Italy.

Members of the Nassau Decisions Steering Group worked up the texts of letters from Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to the Italian and Turkish Defense Ministers, which President Kennedy approved when he met with Dean Rusk and Thomas Finletter in Palm Beach on January 5, 1963. The State Department sent the letters later to Ankara and Rome later that day.

McNamara’s letters expand on the points about the need to replace Jupiters with Polaris missiles that he made to Andreotti and Sancar when he met them in Paris. To both, McNamara wrote that the Polaris force would be “on station” by April 1 as the replacement for the Jupiters. Writing to Andreotti, he also mentioned substituting “obsolete” Corporal with Sergeant missiles. In his message to Sancar, McNamara informed him that he is exploring the possibility of accelerated delivery of the F-104s and that “emergency actions” could make it possible to deliver the first squadron during April 1963.

In a meeting with Italian Defense Minister Guilio Andreotti, McNamara had several matters to raise, but soon brought up the Jupiters and the need to “substitute something more responsive and less vulnerable to sabotage or direct attack.” When Andreotti raised the possibility of a naval deployment, McNamara agreed, suggesting assigning Polaris submarines to SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe), “with an Italian role in the targeting.” Suggesting that the U.S take the initiative on the matter, Andreotti preferred that it be settled before the spring 1963 elections.

Kennedy, McNamara and Rusk moved ahead with the Jupiters matter by making plans to bring it up with Italian and Turkish defense ministers at the NATO meeting in Paris in December 1962. The goal would be to persuade them of the obsolescence of the Jupiters, the dangers that they posed during the Cuban crisis and in future crises, and the need for “better arrangements,” such as “a rearrangement of Polaris deployments.”

President Kennedy continued to monitor the Jupiter missiles problem. During a meeting with Rusk a few weeks later, McNamara explained that President Kennedy, who he had seen in Palm Beach on December 27, had asked him what steps were being taken “to remove the Jupiters.” Consistent with that, McNamara favored the “earliest possible date” and asked whether a “deadline” could be set for April 1 to begin the removals.