The cable from van Roijen concerns a conversation between him and Director of UN Political Affairs at the U.S. Department of State Joseph Sisco. Sisco informs van Roijen that the Kennedy Administration has decided to let the Cuban issue quietly die, boiling down to the United States and the Soviet Union "agreeing to disagree." The State Department does not think there should be further debate on the issue in the UN Security Council because the U.S. is not willing to make further concessions while there have been no UN inspections. Sisco also reports that the Soviets have made a commitment to withdraw all combat troops from Cuba.

Van Roijen cables from Washington about a conversation he had with British Ambassador to the United States David Ormsby-Gore. Ormsby-Gore explains the possible reaction from Moscow to the defeat suffered in the crisis as twofold: Those who are of the opinion that Khrushchev will make a countermove, while those whose judgment is that Khrushchev has finally understood that the Americans in fact are willing to fight for their vital national interests has learned severe lessons for future Soviet policy in the Cold War. Both van Roijen and Ormsby-Gore that perhaps the most decisive moment of the whole crisis was the American blockade of Cuba herself. The cable concludes with Ormsby-Gore addressing the possibilities of hidden missiles in Cuba, to which he claims aerial reconnaissance has not produced any evidence to support this.

The cable concerns a conversation between Dutch Ambassador to the United States van Roijen and Director Ward P. Allen of the State Department's Bureau of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs, regarding further actions of the Organization of American States (OAS) in the aftermath of the Cuban crisis. Allen made note that he had very little information regarding Cuba and how Cuba would fit into future dealings with the OAS.

Dutch Ambassador to the United States J. Herman van Roijen sends a cable on a conversation he had with a member of the U.S. State Department. Firstly, the State Department was pleased to know Indonesian President Sukarno had not pledged support to Cuba during the crisis. Secondly, they hoped to make the point to Sukarno how alliance with the Soviets could not be relied upon, as the Cuban crisis and the Soviet abandonment of India have demonstrated. Thirdly, the Indonesian Ambassador Zain was going to pay six week visit to Jakarta, in an effort to promote U.S. economic support to Indonesia.

Van Roijen relates in this cable the details of a meeting with the US State Department's Bureau of Western European Affairs. With regards to Cuba, the Soviets assured the United States that they would not supply Cuba with offensive military weapons and even detailed the ranges of the missiles shipped. The construction of the bases was done in such haste that no attempt to conceal them was made, indicating the construction was on a time limit. These along with several other factors (the 1961 Berlin crisis, internal pressure within the Soviet Union) had convinced the administration that the Soviets had the fixed determination to confront the US.

This cable comes from Dutch Ambassador to the United States J. Herman van Roijen, regarding the subject of Cuba and the discovered Soviet missiles. Van Roijen reports on the current status of negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, noting that the Soviets are willing to dismantle the missiles in Cuba if the Americans would do for "obscolescent bases near Soviet territory." The State Department fervently denied that any such tradeoff would happen or was even being considered.