June 23, 1954
Record of Conversation between Zhou Enlai and Pierre Mendès-France

Citation:
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Summary:
Mendes-France and Zhou discuss the Indochina issue during their first meeting together. Both men feel they are in agreement with each other regarding several points (establishing a cease-fire before discussing political issues, that no US military bases should be established in Indochina, elections in Cambodia and Laos, cooperation between France and Vietnam and between the two sides in Vietnam). They end on a positive note, both certain that their few differences of opinion will be worked out.

Original Language:
Chinese

Contents:
- English Translation
- Scan of Original Document
[Pierre] Mendes-France: It is said that [you,] Mr. Premier[,] postponed your trip to India for one day in order to come here. I really appreciate it.

Zhou Enlai: We are so glad to meet Mr. Prime Minister and Foreign Minister before my brief return to China.

Mendes-France: It is very good to make this meeting happen quickly. I am very glad about this. The reason is that I'd like to solve all of the problems concerning us quickly. Mr. Premier knows under what kind of circumstance our new national government was established. The French National Assembly has decided on a date and hopes that a settlement will be achieved before this date. This settlement of course must bring about peace.

Zhou Enlai: It is for this reason that the leaders of our two countries have this early meeting to exchange our opinions. I believe this [will be] helpful in making conference progress from now on.

Mendes-France: Mr. Premier has been attending all the meetings. I couldn't participate in the conference before. But I had the information on your conversations with Mr. Bidault. I'd like to know more about Mr. Premier's observation and opinion on what measures we should take in order to achieve peace in Indochina.

Zhou Enlai: In the past meetings I have exchanged many opinions with Mr. Bidault and Mr. Chauvel. Nevertheless, I'd still like to talk to the new French prime minister and foreign minister now about the Chinese delegation's opinion on the conference. The Chinese delegation's purpose of coming and attending this Geneva Conference is to resume and realize peace in Indochina. This is our goal, and we do not ask for anything else. We oppose any enlargement or internationalization of the war. We oppose any use of threatening or provocative methods. They do not help negotiations. China, however, is not afraid of threats, as Mr. Prime Minister knows. We need to employ conciliatory methods to help both sides to arrive at an agreement.

It is because of this common spirit, we'd like to address my opinions to Mr. Prime Minister.

To solve any problem in Indochina, the first [requirement] is a cease-fire. Military issues are always related to political issues. The military issue is being discussed presently, and the political issue can be discussed later on. After an agreement is reached, the first [step] is to stop the war. As Mr. Prime Minister said, the French Parliament has expressed this kind of desire, because the people of France, Indochina, and the world all support this. The current situation in Indochina is that all three countries are involved in the war. They have a similar situation. All of the three countries need a cease-fire, and their people demand independence and national unification. The French government has shown its willingness to recognize the independence of the three countries and their national unification. China is willing to see they will stay in the French Union. Our country also intends to establish a friendly and peaceful relationship with France.

The three countries, however, have different problems. Therefore, we should accept different ways in solving the problems in each country. Vietnam, for example, needs a general election for its national unification after the war, and then [the new national government] decides on the type of its political system. This will be determined by the Vietnamese people themselves. Regarding Laos
and Cambodia, as long as the people in the two countries are still supportive of their current royal governments, our government will be very happy to see these two countries become part of the normal Southeast Asian countries, like India and Indonesia. I have expressed the same opinion to Mr. [Georges] Bidault.

Of course, on the other hand, we don't want to see that these three countries become military bases of the United States, or that the United States builds up a military pact with them. This is what we are against. If the United States establishes its military base there, we have to check it out, and we can't just let it go without checking.

I talked to the foreign ministers of Laos and Cambodia a few days ago. They all assured me that they don't want any American military base in their countries. I said that was good and encouraged them to make friends with France, as long as France respects their independence.

I also heard that [Minister of Foreign Affairs] Mr. Pham Van Dong, representative of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, talked to them and expressed that Vietnam will respect the independence and sovereignty of Laos and Cambodia, and assure a non-aggression between them and Vietnam. It was very good when I heard they were talking like this.

Politically, the three countries face different situations. Currently, Vietnam has two governments. The military regrouping areas must be determined, but it doesn't [require] a [political] division. During a period of time after the cease-fire, a free election will be held through negotiations between the two governments. This is their own domestic affair. We can show our support, even though we can't intervene. Laos and Cambodia also need to achieve their unifications through elections. I think the Democratic Republic of Vietnam can agree on this point. The question is whether the two royal governments can recognize the resistance movements in their countries, and unite with the resistance governments in order to achieve their national unifications. The Bao Dai government should approach the Democratic Republic of Vietnam through discussions and negotiations, instead of opposing it. Unfortunately, his [Bao Dai's] political proposal aims exactly at opposition, hegemony, and at inviting the United Nations to intervene. This is unacceptable.

Militarily, the military representatives from both sides are negotiating the issue of Vietnam. We all hope that a settlement will be reached sooner. Laos and Cambodia have two situations. The first is that they have local resistance forces; it is small in Cambodia, and large in Laos. In Cambodia, the Royal government should talk directly to the resistance forces about cease-fire, neutral nation supervision, and political solutions there. So it should in Laos. In the meantime, the royal governments should also join France in the negotiations of both sides to determine the regrouping areas for the local forces. This will lead to their political unifications. The second situation is that all the foreign armed forces and military personnel should withdraw from these two countries. Vietnam had sent some volunteers over there. If it is still the case at the present, they may follow the resolution provided by the military staff meetings, requiring the withdrawal of all the foreign troops from all of Indochina.

By now the representatives from both commands have reached an agreement in principle about the military meetings. They will meet and talk intensively in the next three weeks. Currently, the meetings of the belligerent states became the center of the conference. France and Vietnam are the most important parties from both sides. Our desire is a direct contact of both sides and a signed settlement [to be reached] soon. All the nations at the conference, including China, are willing to make contributions to genuine progress, and [are] firm to oppose any obstruction or destruction.

These are the main points of my opinion.

Mendes-France: The Premier's points help me realize that the Premier's thoughts on the issues are very clear. Of course, I can't respond to every point, but some particular points should be
discussed carefully. What made me glad is that our opinions are pretty close on the main points. I heard that the discussions on Laos and Cambodia have made some progress in the past several days. I also know that the progress was achieved mostly through the efforts by the delegation under the leadership of Premier Zhou. I believe that we don't have any unsolvable problems between us over the issues of Laos and Cambodia.

As the Premier mentioned, coping with the domestic problems in Laos and Cambodia also requires international supervision. Certainly, a solution requires some work, but I don't think it is too difficult to find out.

The problem in Vietnam is different. The Premier just said that it is tougher. And then the situation is not optimistic because the war has been [going on] in that country for so long. Moreover, as the Premier said, the two governments there have their own administrations and armies. The Vietnamese people are divided into two sides, and both sides have been fighting the war for many years. One of the points mentioned by the Premier needs to be noticed[:] that many problems can be solved through direct contact between both sides. If workable, we certainly welcome [direct contact]. In fact, however, it is difficult. Although it is difficult to contact and to obtain any result, we will make our vigorous effort to arrive at this goal. Nevertheless, we agree on this direction. The Premier also said that the goal in this region is unification, and that the methods and procedure can be considered differently. Vietnam is divided into two parts, it is difficult to reach any agreement in a short period of time. It is impossible to complete its national unification as soon as the cease-fire becomes effective. The time issue was just mentioned because the war has been there so long that peace would not be stalled immediately, and that procedure will not be that simple, for example, talking about an immediate election. In fact, if the Vietnamese people really want their unification, they have to cooperate and need certain procedures. Generally speaking, [our] goals are not much different in principle.

There is one more final point. I am glad the Premier made such a suggestion: it is the best to go through two steps. This first is a cease-fire, and the second is a political settlement. I fully agree for the same reasons the Premier stated. For genuine progress, the first step is to concentrate our attention and energy on the cease-fire issue, including the determination of regrouping areas. This is a practical solution, it should be reached quickly. I'd like to ask the Premier if you agree that we have many points in common?

There is another important point. The Premier raised a concern about establishing American military bases. I fully agree on this point. I want to make it clear that we don't intend to establish any American bases in that region. We don't have such a plan.

Zhou Enlai: I'd like to explain regarding your points:

You had a very good answer to my last point. France has no intention to establish any American bases. This is very good not only for the three countries, but also good for China, France, and Southeast Asia. All of us hope for a peaceful co-existence and for building a common foundation for the future.

You also said that the military and political solutions in Laos and Cambodia needed international supervision. Our opinions are the same on this point.

The situation in Vietnam is different and difficult. But I think the military and political principles can be reached first. The problem-solving should deal with the troop regrouping and cease-fire issues first, and then turn to the political settlement. It should be two steps, not one step. The length of each step depends on the effort of both sides, and requires discussions between the two sides. France bears more responsibilities for them to get closer, not confrontational. If the two sides refuse to make contact or refuse to talk to each other, it will slow down the cease-fire. I believe that
you have found that the Chinese delegation is pushing the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to approach not only France, but also Bao Dai Vietnam. France may find it difficult to ask the Bao Dai government to make contact with the others. The Prime Minister knows where the difficulty comes from. That is the situation. Mr. Chauvel knows [it] even better.

Of course, if we want to satisfy the reasonable requests made by Laos and Cambodia, we should meet the reasonable requests in Vietnam made by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Therefore, the military meetings between both sides may reach an agreement more easily.

**Mendes-France:** I don't have a whole package of opinions. We have the same opinion on some of the issues. Let me repeat this, it is a good thing if we can help to put the two Vietnamese governments together. The French government really wants to use its influence to facilitate their cooperation. It is, however, very difficult. We just talked about the long war, a long period of division, so that it is difficult for them to come together psychologically and politically. But [they] need to follow this guideline in order to achieve some settlements. It is better for them to set up some kind of foundation for implementing a cease-fire and troop regrouping. As you know, the negotiations between their military experts are still ongoing. Even though they do not seem to be having any major problems, the direction of their meetings is unclear. If we know what the foundation is and an agreement can be based on it, it would be much easier for us to push Vietnam. So far the French-Vietnamese meetings haven't yet made any important progress. Mr. Pham Van Dong made contact with Mr. Chauvel yesterday. Currently, the focus of the conference is on military issues, but there is not much progress. I am returning to Paris tonight and will meet [French Commander in Chief and Commissioner General for Indochina] General [Paul] Ely. I will surely discuss this issue with him in order to further instruct our military representatives here and push the negotiations forward. And, if the Vietnamese government could do the same and give new instructions, it would be very good and easy to reach an agreement. Could [you, Mr.] Premier[,] use your influence over the Vietnamese government to do this like us and help us on this? Once the military experts have made progress in their discussions, arrived at an agreement, and created a foundation, it will be easy for diplomacy to proceed.

I have one more point to make. If we go with the Vietnamese government's proposal on 25 May suggesting to have two main regrouping areas, only the military experts can provide us a foundation for diplomatic discussions.

**Zhou Enlai:** To avoid misunderstanding, I'd like to explain one thing. I said the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Bao Dai government should establish their "contact," not "cooperation." Since both sides have engaged in the war for many years, it is impossible to talk about any cooperation. Our expectation is that France could influence Bao Dai and make his government contact the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in order to reduce difficulties and leave no room for any external disruption. The negotiations on the troop regrouping should now enter the phase of discussing specific matters. My opinion is the same as Mr. Prime Minister regarding this issue. The current discussions should get into specific matters. We know that the military representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam also intend to achieve early and positive results.

I am very glad to hear that Mr. Mendes-France is going to meet General Ely, commander-in-chief of the French expeditionary forces in Indochina, after returning to Paris, and that General Ely will give specific instructions to the French military representatives at Geneva. The agreement on the main regrouping areas by both sides will lay the foundation for further diplomatic negotiations. I agree with Mr. Prime Minister at this point. Regarding the main regrouping areas, [I'd like to know] whether Mr. Prime Minister has any specific idea. If you have not decided on this point, [we] don't have to talk about this issue right now.

**Mendes-France:** To avoid any misunderstanding, I'd also like to give an explanation. When I said "cooperation," I meant using "cooperative" methods to solve problems.
I agree with Premier Zhou Enlai's point. We really hope that the military staff meetings can move into practical phase quickly, and that the Vietnamese representatives will receive their new and clear instructions from their high command. The determination of the main regrouping areas can be used as the foundation for diplomatic negotiations. It seems that the main regrouping areas can be decided pretty soon. Regarding particular ideas on the main regrouping areas, I can't make any suggestion right now, because I don't know how the military staff negotiations are going. They are planning to draw a horizontal line from west to east. The line, however, proposed by the Vietnamese staff is much more to Pierre Mendes-France and Zhou Enlai at the Geneva Conference (courtesy PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives) the south than the real situation [reflects]. Our experts, who know the field situation, have taken note of all the points proposed by the Vietnamese on 25 May. I think it is possible for them to provide a basis for further diplomatic negotiations. Another [piece of] evidence is that the negotiations on supervision currently are about practical methods. We think that, if the objectives of supervision are known in particular, the problem of supervision could be solved easily. Thus, we should push the negotiations on the regrouping forward and quickly in order to advance the discussions on supervisory issues.

Zhou Enlai: That's right. We should resolve the problem of the regrouping areas first. I have noticed Mr. Prime Minister's stance on these issues. We believe that, after the military staff of both sides detail their discussions, the supervisory problem will be solved easily. I have exchanged my opinion on this issue with Mr. Eden. He agrees with my opinion.

Our current efforts should help [the military staff of] both sides to reach an agreement soon, achieving a result within three weeks. This result will bring both belligerent sides their glorious peace, and realize the desires of the people of France, Vietnam, and the world. All the foreign ministers can return to Geneva earlier.

Mendes-France: Three weeks should be the maximum time. During this period, as soon as the military representatives of both sides reach their agreement, they should inform their delegations. Thereby, there will be a few days for the foreign ministers to return to the conference.

Zhou Enlai: The sooner, the better. After my departure, Mr. Li Kenong, our vice minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, will be in charge here. I hope that Mr. Chauvel will continue the communication with Mr. Li Kenong.

I am very glad to meet Mr. Prime Minister. I really appreciate you are willing to spend time in Bern.

Mendes-France: This is for our common task for peace.

Zhou Enlai: Mr. Mendes-France said in the Parliament that everything is for peace and friendship. We fully agree with this point.

Mendes-France: This is our first meeting. I hope we will have more contacts later on. I am really happy about this meeting. I'd like to express my appreciation here. Although I am very busy with many things since I have just organized my new cabinet, I really want to come here and meet you. I have another practical question, that is, what we are going to tell the reporters. What do you think about this?

Zhou Enlai: Mr. Prime Minister can make a suggestion, please.

Mendes-France: I agree with a news release draft suggested by Mr. Chauvel: “We had a frank conversation on the issue of peace in Indochina, not a negotiation. This conversation may lead to our desire that the Geneva Conference will achieve genuine progress.” It seems that not too much besides this can be said.

Zhou Enlai: It is good not to say too much.
Mendes-France: Hopefully, Mr. Li Kenong will contact Mr. Chauvel often later on.

Zhou Enlai: I have a wish. Within the next three weeks, if Mr. Mendes-France comes to Geneva or has other opportunities, I hope you can make a contact with Mr. Pham Van Dong, head of the delegation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. We think such a direct contact beneficial.

Mendes-France: Mr. Chauvel already met Mr. Pham Van Dong yesterday. Mr. Chauvel told Mr. Pham Van Dong that I'd like to meet him. But it is not clear when and where the meeting can take place. It may depend on the progress of the conference. I agree that this kind of the meeting is very important. I hope this meeting can happen.

Zhou Enlai: I will be happy to pass on Mr. Prime Minister’s idea to Mr. Pham Van Dong. We hope that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and France can build a friendship on the foundation of peace.

Mendes-France: This is also our hope. Mr. Zhou Enlai is a senior and experienced premier and foreign minister. I am a new and inexperienced prime minister and foreign minister. So there are too many things to be handled. But I will try my best to establish a friendly relationship between France and China, and between France and Vietnam.
周恩来与孟戴斯-弗朗斯会谈记录
（1954年6月23日）

案卷编号：206-Y0007

时间：一九五四年六月二十三日
地点：巴黎法国大使馆
中外出席人员：周恩来总理、李克农副部长、冯铁公使、崔司长、章文晋、董宁川（译员）
法方出席人员：孟戴斯-弗朗斯、勒维尔大使、鲁希、吉勒马延、利加罗斯（译员）

孟戴斯-弗朗斯：听说总理先生为了来这里，去印度的行程推迟了一天，我很感激。

周恩来：我很高兴在我短期回国之前见到总理兼外交部长先生。

孟戴斯-弗朗斯：这次会见能这样迅速实现是好的，我对此特别高兴。因为我愿意尽快地解决我们所关心的一切问题。总理先生知道，我国政府是在何种情况下成立的。法国人民总会坚定不移地支持在日内瓦达成协议。这个协议对于印、法都是有利的。

周恩来：正是因此原因，我们两国负责人的会面是必要的，我相信对今后的会议是有好处的。

孟戴斯-弗朗斯：总理先生一直到今天都在参加会议，我过去是没有能够在会场参加的，但我已得悉总理先生和皮杜尔先生谈话的情形。我愿意知道总理对我们采取何种措施，以达成印法和平的和谈。

周恩来：我在这次的会谈中，也觉得主席和皮杜尔先生的意见有分歧，但我们现在愿意把中法代表团对会议的意见向法国新的总理兼外长说明。

这次中国代表团来日内瓦开会就是为了实现恢复印度支那和平，这也是我们的目的，但无其他条件。我们反对战争扩大化、国际化，反对使用威胁、挑衅的手段，这样不利于有意。中国不怕威胁，这总理先生是知道的。我们是用和解的办法来推动双方达成协议。

正因为有这样的共同精神，我愿意向总理先生说说我的意见。

关于解决印度支那问题，首先是停战。军事和政治问题是有关的。现在是讨论军事问题。以后则要讨论政治问题。协议达成以后，首先要停战。因为这是法国、印度支那和全世界人民所赞成的。正如总理先生所说的，法国政府已表示了这种要求。在印度支那目前的情况是三国都有争议，这是相同的，三国都要停战，人民都要求独立、统一。法国政府曾有意愿意承认三国的独立、各国的统一。中国也愿意看见它们留在中国联邦之中，我国也希望同法国建立友好和平关系。

三国的情况各不相同，所以我们承认解决三国问题的办法会有所不同。就越南来说，它在停战后还要经过选举才能达到统一，确定国内制度，这只有越南人民自己解决。至于老、柬，如果三国人民愿意承认现在的政府，那我国也愿意看到两方成为东南亚盟，如印度、印尼的国家。这问题我向皮杜尔先生说过。

当然，我们另一方面不愿意看到三国成为美国的军事基地，或美国和他们成立军事集团。这是我们反对的。如有美国军事基地，我们便要过问，不可置之不理。

我前几天和老、柬外长们都谈过，他们向我保证他们不发展美国军事基地，我说好，并鼓励他们和法国友好，如果法国尊重他们独立。

我也听到越南民主共和国代表团向他们表示，他们愿尊重老、柬两国的独立，自主和统一，即不侵犯。我听到他们彼此这样谈，是好的。

政治上，我们认为三国是有所不同的。越南现有两个政府。要把军事集结地区划开，不能把这解释为分治，因停战后经过一定时期还要有自由选举，这要双方协调。这是他们自己的事，我们不能干涉，但要推动。在老、柬也要经过选举，求得统一，这一点我向越南民主共和国是能同意的。这问题是两国政府要承认当提出问题，和抗议政府消极，要求得到统一。要使越南民主共和国政府应同意同法国政府建立，而非反对。但他的政府方宇文（英文如此）亦为“协”——就是：既要反对。建盟，引联合国来干涉。这是不能同意的。

在军事上，对越南问题双方军事代表已在谈判。我们希望更迅速地提出方案。老、柬双方各种情况，一种是保底抵抗力量，在柬埔寨小一点，在老挝大一点。在柬埔寨，王政府应与之直接谈判，停战，中立国监察，求得政治解决。在老挝也亦是有（英文如此）——编
周恩来与孟戴斯 - 弗朗斯会谈记录
(1954年6月23日)

时间：一九五四年六月二十三日
地点：巴黎法国大饭店
中方出席人员：周恩来总理、李克农副部长、冯铉使公使、崔司长、章文晋、董宁川（译员）
法方出席人员：孟戴斯 - 弗朗斯、萧维利大使、鲁悉、吉勒马兹、利加罗思（译员）

孟戴斯 - 弗朗斯：听说总理先生为了来这里，把去印度的行程推迟了一天，我很感激。
周恩来：我很高兴在短期回国之前能见到总理总长先生。

孟戴斯 - 弗朗斯：这次会谈能这样迅速实现是好的，我很高兴。
因为我想尽快地解决我们所关心的一切问题。总理先生知道，我国政府是在何种情况下成立的。法国人民会已经决定下台了。希望在今后的会谈中取得协议。这个协议对中国和法国都是有利的。

周恩来：正是因为这个原因，我们两国负责人的早日会面交换意见，我相信对今后会议的准备是很有好处的。

孟戴斯 - 弗朗斯：总理先生一直在同你参加会谈，我过去是没有能够去参加的。但我已得到总理先生和皮杜尔先生的谈话情况。我愿意知道总理先生的主要观点，以达成印度支那的和平。
周恩来：我过去的会谈中，有许多意见已和皮杜尔、萧维利两次先生交换过。但现在我愿意把我们中国代表团的意见向法国政府的总理兼外长先生说一说。

这回，中国代表团来日又会开就是为了实现恢复印度支那和平，这也是我们的目的。没有其他条件。我们反对对越的扩大化、国际化，反对使用威胁、挑衅的政策，这样不利于和平。中国不怕威胁，这总理先生是知道的。我们是用和解的办法来推动双方达成协议。

正因为有这样的共同精神，我希望向总理先生说说我的意见。

关于恢复印度支那问题，首先是必须停止。军事和政治问题是紧密的，现在是讨论军事问题，今后要讨论政治问题。协议达成后，首先应当停止。因为这是法国、印度支那和全世界人民所赞成的。当然总理先生所说的，法国政府已表示了这种要求。在印度支那目前的情况是法国有战争，这是相同的；三国有战争，人民都要求独立、统一。法国政府曾有意愿承认三国有独立，各国的统一，人民的统一。中国也愿意

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老) 一样，两国政府也要在法国外交部长和其同行的友谊和在联合国等国际组织中一致行动。如今这种情况，是两国政府应有的政策和外交人员所应当采取的方针。因此，我们现在和将来，在国际事务中将采取新的方针。现在国际形势，和从前不同，我们应当在国际事务中采取新的方针。因此，我们应当在国际事务中采取新的方针。
一，二要之点，总理刚才提出建立美国军事基地问题，我完全同意，意见也是如此，我们不预备在该地区设立美国基地，没有这样的计划。

周总理：对于您的几点意见，我要说一下：

对最后一点，您做了很好的解释，说明中国无意建立美国基地，这不仅对美国，对日本、中、东南亚都好，大家希望和平相处，为将来建立共同基础。

你先讲到老，中，军事政治问题也要国际监察，这点的意见是相同的。

关于越南问题，情况不同，是有些困难。我想先把军事政治原则定下来，解决的步骤要先定军事集结区，先停战，再（原文如此。）——总理者。再政治解决，先要两个步骤，非一个步骤。第一，停战的领域主要看双方努力，要经过双方协商。我有更多责任使他们停战，而对双方。双方停战，话也不谈，是对停战有碍的。相反，会这种冲突方面是推动越南民主共和国，对双方努力，而和解的越南也得努力。我们法会要求和越南有关部队在拉开有困难。困难关系到外，总理会的形势。所以，周总理先生更清楚。当然，如我们要想继续下去，要么要和合理要求，也应满足越南民主共和国在越南的合理要求，这样双方军事会谈时就达成协议。

孟加拉。弗朗斯：我们憋大选的经验，有意见我们可以说。再谈一次，如可能要帮助越南赶上这个发展，对事前的尊重，利用自己的影响便利他们。方面是可能的，但这是不是也有困难的。今天才到从当年战争，长期分裂，心理上，政治上难于考虑。可是有这样必须有二步得出的结果，要采取在什么基础上来实现停火，军事集结等，你认为军事专家应该否要。这样，我不能讲。我不能说，要我们考虑，解决这问题。要完全统一。但非采取军事问题，是因为战争这样长，和平不是立即实现，把问题（原文如此。）（——总理）说的很简单，例如根据选举，事实上。有统一，要越南全，一定的乡条是必要的。总的说，原则是必须的，走了，还有一点，总理提出的意见，即最好要经过两个阶段，先停战，然后政治解决。我完全同意，如总理所提的理论，我真正要进去的问题，第一要集中精力解决停战问题，包括集结区问题的划定。这要完全研究，迅速解决，我请问总理，我有信心认为我们共同点不少？
三、关于恢复印度支那和平问题

孟良崮——弗朗索瓦：三周应该是最大的限度，在此期间，当双方军事代表取得协议之后，应即与其他代表团进行联系，以便留出几天的时间，好让外长们回来。

周恩来：我走之后，我们的外交部副部长李先念先生将在此负责，希望萧伯纳先生继续与李先念先生保持联系。

孟良崮——弗朗索瓦：这是为了我们共同的和平事业。

周恩来：孟良崮——弗朗索瓦先生在会谈里说，一切都为了和平友好，这点我们完全赞成。

孟良崮——弗朗索瓦：这是我们第一次的接触，希望以后还有再接触。我对这次接触感到很高兴，我在这里表示感谢。我自己虽然初到这个新（内）间，刚才已经提到过，对内改组，工作较多，但是我很愿意来此与会友好。

现在有个具体问题，就是如何答复记者们的追问，不知您有何意见？

周恩来：我想总理先生提出建议。

孟良崮——弗朗索瓦：我想总理先生所建议的这样一个公报草案：“我们希望在日内瓦会议取得的协议继续得到尊重，而不致再次讨论，这次讨论（草案）应由总理先生（即我）根据现在的需要，我们能接受日内瓦会议取得的协议（此乃外交术语）之，“草案”’“即我”除外，除此之外，似乎不能再做更多。我想……

周恩来：不多说的好。

孟良崮——弗朗索瓦：希望今后李先念先生和萧伯纳先生多来联系。

周恩来：我愿在此表示一个愿望，希望孟良崮——弗朗索瓦先生来日内，在其他条件，希望他与越南民主共和国代表团团长范文同先生进行接触，我们这样直接接触是好的。

孟良崮——弗朗索瓦：昨天萧伯纳先生已与范文同先生会面，他已告示范文同先生我与范文同先生会谈，但现在在不知道什么时候实现，可能要看看会议的进展情况而定。我这样的会面是很重要的，我这样的会面很有意义。

周恩来：我愿将总理先生的意见转告范文同先生。我们希望越南民主党国与法国在和平基础上友好起来。

孟良崮——弗朗索瓦：这也是我们的愿望。周恩来先生已与老的和有经验的总理兼外长，是我新的和我没有经验的总理兼外长，所以许多事情都不能不问，但是，我愿意使得法国、中国和越国之间的友好关系建立。
1954年日内瓦会议

三、关于恢复印度支那和平问题

孟戴斯-佛朗斯：这是为了在日内瓦开会，我同苏联的代表和美国的代表进行了多次的讨论，最后达成了一个协议，这个协议是经过美国和苏联的共同讨论和协调的。这个问题是关于恢复印度支那和平的问题。

周恩来：中国代表团在日内瓦会议上的代表是周恩来和李济深。周恩来是代表中国政府和人民参加此次会议的代表。周恩来在会议上的发言和主张，围绕着恢复印度支那和平的问题进行了深刻的讨论和激烈的辩论。他在发言中指出，恢复印度支那和平是所有爱好和平的国家和人民的共同愿望，也是世界和平与发展的必然要求。周恩来强调，中国决不会放弃自己的正当权益，决不会让任何国家侵占和破坏中国的领土完整和主权独立。他呼吁，世界各国应该共同维护世界和平，以实际行动来支持和促进恢复印度支那和平的进程。

孟戴斯-佛朗斯：这是一次非常重要的会议，它标志着印度支那问题的和平解决和印度支那地区的和平与稳定。这个会议的成果将是历史性的，它将对世界和平与安全产生深远的影响。
三、关于恢复印度支那和平问题

法国外长对印支问题的解决存在分歧。法国民议会在1954年6月8日—9日对印支问题进行辩论。在辩论中，许多议员鼓吹印度支那政府，特别是总理拉瓦尔在日内瓦会议上取得的成就。10日，法国内阁批准拉瓦尔提出信任投票的要求。12日，国民议会以306票对291票否决了对拉瓦尔的信任，内阁集体辞职。13日，总理皮埃尔·孟戴斯—弗朗斯组阁。孟戴斯—弗朗斯在7月20日之前正式成立印支和平条件，于6月17日以419票对47票的绝对优势当选为总理。当选后，孟戴斯—弗朗斯以总理兼外长身份出席日内瓦会议。法国内政局的变化，对日内瓦会议的进展产生了积极的影响。

说：如果要使法越之间易于接近好望角而到相信他所说的话都是真的，接着他说：近来日内瓦会议的进展虽然不快，但仍然是在慢慢地进展着。他今天早晨接到孟戴斯—弗朗斯的一封私人信件：法国希望迅速解决问题，但需要有耐心。他认为为了把法越部队从北部运往南部，法国需要在一定时期内控制制海权。他说：在法国控制期间可以找出一种具体的安排来让中国利用海权，在法国撤退后这问题当然是中国与越南人民之事。我当是为日内瓦会议进行的进展缓慢，会议的主要当事国法越双方，所以希望双方多方努力，使会议能够早日获得结果。法方何意我们愿意倾听，如有必要我们将尽力协助。关于海防问题我答以中国方面只有一个希望就是在印度支那早日撤退。外交则无所求。戴维斯则说何时可以回日内瓦，我答以现在还不知道确定日期，只要我们达下良好条件我们就可以早日回国。戴维斯称：将来几天之内就可以看出一些结果。另，法国代表团团长托马斯加多称圆明会上进展很慢，如果在七月底前不能解决印度支那问题，孟戴斯—弗朗斯政府就很危险。法国内阁局时变化如何很难预料。他说目前外力推动法国改变政策，但孟戴斯—弗朗斯正在自己负责解决印度支那问题。如果他的措施不能获得成功，外力推动就会与法国内部的某些力量结合起来压迫孟戴斯政府，迫使法国走孟戴斯政府所不希望的路。果然如此则印度支那战争将无期限地延长，而欧洲局势也会发生改变。

弗朗斯的政策英国是知道的，如果弗朗斯政府支持下去，英国是否能支持下去就很难说，把法国所处的目前地位，但一个天平的中心，他认为法国虽然是一个天平强国，但如果他站在天平的中间对整个欧洲局势有利。相反的，如果弗朗斯政府支持下去，天平就要歪了。而整个世界政治力量的均衡就会有变化，这样的结果是不堪设想的。作为一个法国人他憎恶看见这样的结果。

综合以上情况我个人意见认为：

（1）法方似在暗示目前英法正站在一条线上抵抗美国的压力，但如果不法越政府被迫下台，对法国的亲美势力即将抬头，而美国也不一定能保住，言外之意似在要中国帮助促成印度支那问题早日解决，以免情况恶化。

（2）法方提出裁撤问题目的可能有三种：

（甲）向我卖空头人情；

（乙）分化、挑拨中越关系；