CABLE, TEREBIN TO STALIN [VIA KUZNETSOV]CITATION SHARE DOWNLOAD
get citationMao, via Terebin, tells Stalin, via Kuznetsov, of his, Mao's, plans for the next few months. He will continue his meeting with the Central Committee for a few more days; afterward he will go to Moscow and will stay for a month, to discuss the various questions he has mapped out. Upon returning to China, Mao will attempt to finish off the Chinese Nationalist Party (GMD). Mao discusses how to do so. Terebin relays further conversations with Mao concerning whether or not Fu Zuoyi should be tried as a war criminal and the state of the war against the GMD."Cable, Terebin to Stalin [via Kuznetsov]," January 10, 1949, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, Ll. 54-58. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 11-14. Translated for CWIHP by Sergey Radchenko. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112226
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To Com[rade] F. Kuznetsov
Transmitting in a brief form the main content of a conversation with Mao Zedong on 7 January 1949.
After conveying to him the content of [telegram] No. 0100, after reading the written translation, Mao Zedong said that our plan is as follows:
After taking Beiping [Beijing], to call the consultative meeting and then to create a coalition government. This can also be done after the taking of Nanjing, Wuhan, Shanghai and a number of other cities, in the fall or next winter.
Now my intentions are as follows: the meeting of the CC will last for another 3-4 days, after which on 20 January [I] want to go to Moscow so as to be there by the end of January.
[I] want to stay one month in Moscow, talk about many questions, including a common line in foreign policy, trade and others.
At the end of February [I] want to come back so as to conduct the second plenum of the CCP CC in March, and then in April conduct the consultative meeting, but it is better to rest for one month, to prepare well and to conduct it in May, thereafter creating a coalition government in the summer.
Perhaps it is better to do this also after taking Nanjing, Wuhan, Shanghai and other cities. We have confidence that in the fall or next winter we will be able to do this.
In this case the government of the GMD will be no more, it will be compelled to run away, [and] the capital will be ours. Then everyone will see that only our government exists in China, [and] it will be considerably more convenient in diplomatic terms for the USSR to be the first to recognize our government. But [we] will finalize all of this in Moscow.
If the GMD creates its own coalition government, we are not afraid. Probably this would be even better. None of the democratic politicians will go over to them. The GMD will lay down all of its cards and open them, as it did also in 1946-1947, when it twice created the national assembly.
We will keep our cards hidden, no one knows anything about them. [They] will speculate, make guesses about our undertakings, but will not know anything for certain. We will keep our weapons behind our backs.
Currently the democratic organizations and their leaders do not support the peaceful howl of Jiang Jieshi, they are standing on the sidelines and [are] keeping silent.
At the present time the majority of the democratic politicians are in our areas, they themselves want to be there, and [come] to us. Whereas before we invited many but they did not go, now after the victories of our armies, it is enough to give them the smallest hint, and they immediately come.
Now in Shanghai only three politicians of the democratic wing remain - Zhan Lan, Luo Longji and Huan Yanpei, the latter two also want to come, but we are not yet calling them.
Now many noted Guomindang politicians, including, and in particular, the intelligence operatives, are looking for contact with us.
[GMD General] Bai Chongxi was asking our people - what will be the orders of the CCP, I will carry them out now and with precision. He was given an oral hint to keep his forces in the area of Hankou and not to obstruct our future offensive.
The commander of the 8th A[rmy] G[roup?] [GMD General] Liu Ruming was also told, orally, to stay in the place where the Guomindang ordered you [to be], and to allow our forces to pass during the offensive.
[GMD General] Tan [Tang] Enbo is looking for contact with us.
[GMD General] Zhong [Zheng?] Jiemin wants to establish contact with us.
Our radio station in the Xikang province did not transmit for a long time, but now the commander of the 24th army, Liu Wenkui [Wenhui], daily comes to our man and asks him if there are any instructions from the CCP.
[We] have contacts with many ships of the river fleet on the Yangzi R[iver]. During the offensive they will take our side (on Fu Zuoyi, see further and in more detail):
Many noted intelligence operatives, especially after the publication of the list of war criminals, are trying to save their lives, [and] pass to us valuable information.
The situation is such that if we now wanted to, and gave instructions, then there would be a massive uprising against the forces of Jiang Jieshi and their defection to our side. This is not profitable to us now. For in this case we would have too many forces of the GMD, and this is very worrisome. Especially that their commanders will want to occupy high positions, but they are not reliable.
Even the Americans are trying to establish contact with us, not even speaking of the fact that many American correspondents (and the English ones) in Hong Kong and [those who] came to us from Beiping [Beijing] asked us to allow them to come to the liberated areas just to take a look - we refuse everyone. But recently [US Ambassador John Leighton] Stuart, before bringing into Shanghai amphibious boats with US forces, sent his man to Hong Kong to our people.
This person, in words which could be understood as more than a hint, was in essence asking - will the CCP allow [them] to bring forces into Shanghai.
Our man refused to transmit an inquiry like this, replying that generally the CCP is on principle against the presence of foreign forces in China.
Mao Zedong was saying that now our forces are stronger than the forces of the GMD, especially the artillery.
Here I inserted, artillery is the god of war, as Comrade Stalin said. Mao Zedong immediately replied: we are learning from Comrade Stalin.
Once again returned to No. 0100. This is good that they are writing. It means, [they] care about us, want for us to form a government sooner. I will discuss this with the leaders - Zhou Enlai, Sif, Kutuz [nicknames, evidently referring to Liu Shaoqi and Zhu De] and Ren Bishi.
Talked about the aid to them from the USSR. Gave an example. [In] Manchuria the representative of the USSR fairly clearly hinted why don't you ask us to send you engineers and other workers for the railroads. As soon as [we] sent a telegram, people came. Probably they were already prepared. [They] think and care about us. (Here, I saw two new automobiles ZIS-150).
True, we rely on our own forces, but [we] need help and are grateful for it.
At the meeting I told everyone that [we should] trade with the USSR and the democratic countries. To sell to America, England and other countries only that which is not needed by the USSR.
About Fu Zuoyi (collected from the entire conversation in one place).
With Fu Zuoyi [we] had regular radio contacts. [We] are conducting negotiations with him and point out who should be sent to us to conduct them.
After [we] defeated 10 divisions of Fu Zuoyi, after [we] declared him to be a war criminal, Fu Zuoyi was in a fairly depressed mood. He believed that he fell into a trap, hit himself on the face, cursed himself as a fool (hundan). However, after we orally, without passing any scraps of paper, conveyed to him our 6 points (what these 6 points are Mao Zedong did not say), he calmed down.
We explained to him that we could not help [it] but [had to] include him in the list of war criminals.
Fu Zuoyi committed many evil deeds in northern China, the people hate him. If he were not included in the list, Jiang Jieshi would suspect that he has contacts with us.
However, if Fu Zuoyi implements our instructions, we will tell the people about his merits and the people can forgive him and then [we] will cross him off the list.
The main demands of the CCP.
Fu Zuoyi allows the CCP forces to enter Beiping [Beijing] through his forces, [they] will not destroy the city. After that his four remaining divisions are [to be] reorganized into one army and are [to be] taken from the city to a pre-determined place. His forces are not [to be] touched.
But Fu Zuoyi grabbed us by the weak point - we do not want to destroy the cities, he is bargaining with us. Therefore we are conducting negotiations with him for a long time. Tianjin is another matter - [we] will have to take it by force.
Mao Zedong supposes that the capture of Tianjin and the destruction of the encircled group of forces of Du Yuming will take place in January, and the taking of Beiping [Beijing] - in February. Then Mao Zedong turned to other questions. He said that he is called a dictator everywhere (this and the following he told me before as well) - yes, I am a dictator.
All the affairs are managed by me, Zhou Enlai, Sif, Kutuz, Ren Bishi. Mao said that after abandoning Yan'an, three people managed everything - he, Zhou Enlai and Ren Bishi.
After the supper talked a lot about the difficulties which the CCP went through in 1927 and 1931.
[He] said that as a result of the incorrect decisions of the 4th Plenum of the CCP CC, which was led by Wang Ming, 9/10th of the territory occupied by the CCP [and] a large part of the army were lost, that the membership of the party fell sharply after that.
Talked about attacks on him, about an attempt to arrest and kill him, about how [PLA Beijing Military Control Commission Chairman] Ye Jianying warned him about this.
Speaking of the intra-party struggle and disagreements within the party, said that not until the 7th Congress was unity reached, which has now become even firmer. When parting [he] thanked [me] for the message [and] said that [he] will discuss it with the leadership.
Koroleva [literally, "the Queen" - Jiang Qing - Mao's wife] asked [me] to visit her. When I was listening to her various complaints about various diseases, I heard that Zhou Enlai came to Mao Zedong, and then Ren Bishi, and a meeting began there.
To Com[rade] F. Kuznetsov