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Digital Archive International History Declassified

January 12, 1958

CODE MESSAGE NO. 454 FROM AMBASSADOR GAJEWSKI IN PARIS

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    The Polish Ambassador to Paris discusses the support for the Rapacki Plan voiced by various socialist parties at a recent session of the Socialist International, as well as the SFIO's opposition to the proposal.
    "Code Message No. 454 from Ambassador Gajewski in Paris ," January 12, 1958, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Polskie dokumenty dyplomatyczne 1958 (Warszawa: Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, 2011), Document #17, pp.38-39. Translated by Jerzy Giebułtowski. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/208863
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17

January 12, code message of the ambassador in Paris

Regarding the attitude of the Socialist International

to the Rapacki Plan

Top secret

Code message No 454

from Paris, transmitted Jan. 12, 1958, 17.00 hrs

I spoke with Jules Moch, who took part in the recent session of the Socialist International’s commission for collective security and disarmament in Paris. He told me that:

1. All the socialist parties whose representatives took part in the session (SPD, Labor, the Dutch and the Belgian parties) opted for the need to continue talks with the East, especially to take up the Polish initiative, regarding the creation of atom-free zone in the heart of Europe as a serious step on the road to détente.

2. Only the SFIO leadership (Guy Mollet, Commin) took a decisive position against any attempts at partial solutions, and the Rapacki Plan in particular, citing Dulles’s and Gaillard’s arguments that this plan weakens the Atlantic Pact by creating a special status for West Germany and that it would eventually lead to German neutralization, US troops withdrawal, etc.

3. The strongest support for the Polish plan came from the SPD delegation, headed by Ollenhauer, who in a separate conversation with Moch stated that the Polish plan is now the only feasible way that could lead, through nuclear disarmament and – to use their terminology –'[through] further engagement' of both parts of Germany, to their rapprochement and – eventually – to their reunification.

4. Moch was completely isolated in the SFIO delegation. He favors, with all the known reservations, a debate on our proposal. He wrote the article in Monde Didlomatique primarily because of Galliard’s interview. He claims the Quai d’Orsay and the army are against him. He is very skeptical as to the possibility of changing the SFIO’s position. He thinks that we should rather try to influence the right so that it take a position on the Polish plan in the oncoming parliamentary debate on foreign policy. Perhaps certain Gaullists or moderates? In his opinion, an additional difficulty in the fact that the Polish Plan is being put forward alongside subsequent Soviet proposals, which naturally makes public opinion in the West distrustful. He finds Gaillards’s statements irresponsible and detrimental to France. From the conversation I inferred that he is familiar with the contents of instructions that De Carbonel is to receive in this matter. He promised to inform me, should something new turn up and asked to be informed in return.

/–/ Gajewski

AMSZ, ZD. 6/77, w. 59, t. 827

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