The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meetings with President Yeltsin in Moscow (18 - 20 February 1996) here: Chancellor’s Conversation with President Yeltsin on 19 February 1996

J. Bitterlich                                                                                                                          Bonn, 26 February 1996

M e m o r a n d u m

Subject: Chancellor's Meetings with President Yeltsin in Moscow (18 - 20 February 1996) here: Chancellor’s Conversation with President Yeltsin on 19 February 1996[1]

Below is a summary of the two-hour conversation (including D. Ryurikov, the signee and the interpreter) that took pace and a very friendly and trustful atmosphere focusing mainly on Russia’s domestic perspectives.

1. Domestic Perspectives with regards to Russia’s Presidential Elections on 16 June 1996:

President Yeltsin especially focuses on the following elements. More recently, he had started out his campaign in Jekatarinburg and Chelyabinsk. With regards to organizational matter, he basically relied on the structures that had been established during the campaign for the Duma elections last year. Moreover, he relied on stewards that were used in the regions. He was planning to announce his elections program in a large gathering at the Kremlin taking place still in February following his report on the state of the nation. During the next few months, he was planning to visit as many of the 87 regions as possible.

He had discussed all of this with a diverse group of people from asking them for the main issue in the election campaign, potential shortcomings and mistakes or criticism with regards to hit Presidential style of leadership. This had revealed complaints in two issue areas which had had to resolve or at least explain in a positive manner during the election campaign. This would be essential for his perspectives to win it.

(1) Ending the Chechnya Conflict 

He had been presented 7 different options to end this conflict. He had requested the establishment of two commissions (members of the Presidential Council; government) in order to submit relevant proposals within two weeks. His aim was to end bloodshed in time prior to the elections. He wanted a peaceful resolution of this conflict.

(2) Resolving the Social Problems

There was a necessity to pay to disburse in overdue wages, pensions, and the salaries for the military ("the pensioners made up 38 million votes"). Another additional problems was that the wages and pensions had not yet been sufficiently adapted to inflation (Example: A student still received the old stipend entailing 85,000 Rubel - that was 30 DM which was in no way sufficient).

Discontent was also on the rise among veterans and in the army, and this benefitted the Communist Party. Moreover, the 25 million depositors formed a large group causing potential unrest. They had last all their savings during the crash of the banking system last year. They had to receive compensation.

Thanks god, the strike movement did not spread. It had been very active in the last few weeks. The Communists were certainly trying to keep the pot simmering and to exploit this movement. IN contrast, economic development were a reason for hope (the decrease in production during the last couple of years tends to zero, growth anticipated; decrease in inflation; reduction of budget deficit). The essential thing for him was to facilitate a turn-around in public mood during the next few weeks with regards to the social question. In this regard, the conclusion of the IMF assistance program for the next three years was especially important.

Basically, the the election was a duel between the Communists and him. The Communist were pursuing disciplined efforts based on their structures throughout the country (for instance, this enabled them to deliver newspapers everywhere with direct access to people’s apartments). He was still trying to make Yavlinsky join his camp. Yavlinsky did not have any chances of winning this, but he was still maintaining his candidacy. His hope was that he could make him surrender. However, the time was not yet ripe for it.

During the election campaign, he would underline the fact that he had initiated political and economic reforms. His plan for the second tenure was to conclude them in a positive way. In contrast, the Communist had the clear intention to reverse the reforms. In part, they relied on protest voters whom he had to win back again. He thought he had good chances to win the elections even during the first round, especially as voters generally tended toward consistency and stability.

Upon the Chancellor’s query about rumors of Vice Defense Minister Kokoshins‘ dismissal, President Yeltsin says that the Deputy Defense Minister would remain in office.

2. Bilateral Questions

a) The Critical Attitude of German Media toward Russia

President Yeltsin very clearly criticized the German media's critical and negative attitude towards Russia, which had gotten worse in recent months. Information would be deliberately distorted. This jeopardized the political efforts to establish good relationships. The media promoted fear of Russia among young people in Germany.

The Chancellor, on the other hand, emphasized that this criticism was only partially justified, that the great majority of Germans wanted cordial relations with Russia. The Chechnya conflict was currently affecting this picture quite considerably. Russia herself had to help to improve her image in Germany.

b) Improvements in Military-Technical Cooperation

President Yeltsin spoke out in favor of deepening military cooperation (joint maneuvers, consultations with commanders, exchanges of officers, etc.). This must also include the delivery of Russian high-tech materials.

The Chancellor agreed in principle to reinforcement exchanges of soldiers, agreed in the rest of the examination.

c) Double Taxation Agreement

The Chancellor asked for the work to be accelerated for the early conclusion of this agreement. This was important for the German economy.

President Yeltsin agrees.

(d) German-Russian Historians ‘Commission

President Yeltsin and the Chancellor basically agreed on its composition ("no politicians"); the relevant agreements ought to be concluded in 1996.

e) Return of Cultural Goods

In response to question from the Chancellor, President Yeltsin referred to work in the Duma that had not been carried out beforehand. The legal basis was very important for his government.

Note: In response to my questions, Ryurikov said that from Yeltsin’s vantage point, there was a common mandate from September 1995. It was important for the Russian leadership to show a certain reciprocity. He would like to contact me in mid / end of March to discuss how to proceed, including a possible joint discussion in Moscow with the people who are most important for this.

3. International Questions

a) NATO Enlargement

The Chancellor raised this topic himself and again explained the position (see his speech at the Wehrkundetagung on 3 February). He was certain that he would find a solution with President  Yeltsin next year after the elections taking into account both the interests of the Central and East European states and those of Russia.

President Yeltsin, who asked twice with regard to the timeline and possible resolutions in 1996, referred in particular to the domestic political perception of this question.b) "European Security Council"

At the end of the conversation, President Yeltsin briefly referred to ongoing Russian considerations on the creation of a "European Security Council" in addition to the UN Security Council within the OSCE, without specifying the exact content and further operational procedures.

Note: In response to questions from me, Rjurikov explained the current state of these considerations, which had been discussed in confidence with Paris and others over the past few months. As soon one reached progress in Moscow, he promised to call me.

(Bitterlich)