July 13, 1950
Ciphered telegram, Filippov [Stalin] to Zhou Enlai or Mao Zedong (via Roshchin)
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3305
BEIJING Only by ciphered telegraph
SOVIET AMBASSADORSent 03:15
Transmit to ZHOU ENLAI or MAO ZEDONG the following:
“1. The English have officially appealed to us through their ambassador in Moscow and declared that they, being bound by the decision of the Security Council, cannot now make proposals regarding a peaceful settlement of the Korean question, but if the Korean People's Democratic Republic withdraws its troops to the 38th parallel, then this could hasten a peaceful resolution of the Korean question.
The English ask the Soviet government to express its opinion.
We consider such a demand by the English to be impertinent and unacceptable.
We intend to reply that the Korean question has become too complicated after the armed foreign intervention and that such a complex question can be resolved only by the Security Council with the participation of the USSR and China and with the summoning of representatives of Korea in order to hear their opinion.
Communicate your views.
As regards the statement of the Indian ambassador, we have decided not to answer him, since they made it clear that his statement is his personal opinion, in which the Indian government is not involved.
2. It is not known to us whether you have decided to deploy nine Chinese divisions on the border with Korea. If you have made such a decision, then we are ready to send you a division of jet fighter planes—124 pieces for covering these troops.
We intend to train Chinese pilots in two to three months with the help of our pilots and then to transfer all equipment to your pilots. We intend to do the same thing with the aviation divisions in Shanghai.
Communicate your opinion.”
Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov
Telegram from Stalin to Mao and Zhou Enlai detailing his response to the English protest concerning "the Korean question." Also, a request for confirmation of Chinese troop movements to the Sino-Korea border, in case of a repulse of North Korean forces. Finally, a confirmation of the plans to train Chinese pilots on Soviet jets, to be followed by the transfer of the jets to Chinese possession.
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