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November 28, 1989

Decision About the Measures Regarding the Decision of the KGB Collegium of the USSR of 5 September 1989, 'About the Tasks of the State Security Services of the USSR Regarding the Defense of the Soviet Constitutional Regime'

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About the measures regarding the decision of the KGB Collegium of the USSR of 5 September 1989 “About the Tasks of the State Security Services of the USSR Regarding the Defense of the Soviet Constitutional Regime”


Examining the respective questions, the collegium notes that the Committee for State Security of Moldavia develops its activity under conditions of an abruptly more acute operational situation in the republic. Heightened social tensions, confrontations in the domain of interethnic relations, and attempts to form parallel political authority have been noted. An important role in this process is being played by the extremist wing of the Popular Front of Moldova, which systematically provokes mass disorder, anti-social actions, [and] disobedience towards authorities.  A considerable destabilizing action is exercised by the extremist elements of the “Edinstvo” [Unity] associations, “The Union of Working People of Moldavia,” and “Gagauz-halki.” The movements among the ranks of the Gagauz for the creation of autonomy, the organization of political strikes by the Russophone population of Transnistria have deepened the process of delimiting national terrain.  Anti-social elements have been activated, nationalist, chauvinist manifestations have been incited, [as has] the abuse of the rights of citizens on this basis. The number of threats addressed to the Soviet party active has risen considerably, the interest of some persons for the purchasing and fabrication of weapons has increased.


On the basis of the processes taking place in the republic, the reorientation of the aspirations of the special services of the adversary, principally the USA, FRG, Israel, [and] the special organs of Objective 24, as well as other foreign subversive centers tied to them for obtaining information of a political nature, has been noted. Using the legal modifications in the domain of international relations, the open character of our society, their representatives seek, from the artificially exaggerated positions on the Bessarabian and Jewish questions, as well as under the mask of religion, to bring political prejudice, to create a network of informers, a basis for the realization of some anti-constitutional and other hostile actions, to transfer them onto the territory of Moldavia.


The timely organizational and practical measures taken by the republic [KGB] regarding the restructuring of operational activities, their harmonization with the political and operational situation have permitted it, generally, to assure control over this evolution. The Soviet party organs of the USSR KGB were informed in a timely and professional manner.


However, the aggravation of the situation, the modifications in the tactics of the adversary, the transfer from the concept of fighting against ideological subversion to the concept of defending the Soviet constitutional regime imposes the adoption of some organizational [and] operational measures [related to] agent networks, and other measures of more efficient security, of some new approaches of principle in evaluating current phenomena, some new forms and methods of prevention actions of an anti-socialist nature.


Taking the above into account, [and] coming under the implementation requirements of KGB USSR order no. 0640 of 17 October 1989.


The Collegium has DECIDED:


  1. To create Section “3” within the framework of the KGB of the Moldavian SSR, dissolving Section 5. To subordinate to the efforts of the collegium, of the leadership personnel, with the support of the party organizations, affirmations to the personnel of some conscientious understandings of the fact that the formation of new subunits constitutes the result of the practical restructuring of the organs of state security, affirmations of a contemporary conception of the fight against the subversive intelligence activities of the adversary.


To provide a principled basis for the activity concerning the defense of the Soviet constitutional regime. Accordingly, the service obligations of leadership and operational personnel of Section “3” are to be elaborated by 1 January 1990. Likewise, the necessary correctives in conformity with the new tasks in the service obligations of the workers in Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, [and] 6 and of the municipal organs will be introduced.


The inspectorates, together with the operational subunits must elaborate by the first trimester of 1990, proposals for the continual improvement of the interaction and coordination of activities for the fight against the actions of adversarial special services and of the foreign anti-Soviet centers used by them. To complete, by the same term, with organizational and operational measures the lineal plans of the general committees for the for the fight against the special services of the USA, FRG, Israel (“Kedr”[Cedar], “Vektor” [Vector], “Foton” [Photon]) and against the special organs of Objective 24 (“Zaslon” [Cover]).


  1. The leadership and operational personnel of Section I and of Section “3” must be established by 1 March 1990, in the aim of renewing the fight against the adversary, the subversive centers of the USA, FRG, Israel, of other Western countries, as well as the propagandistic organs of Objective 24, which have the republic in their sights. To elaborate measures oriented towards the exposure of their interests in the social-political processes of the republic, towards the prevention and curbing of actions against the Soviet constitutional regime.


The [KGB] subunits and the municipal and county organs, given the organizational role of Section 2, will be taking more energetic measures to identify in the channels of foreign tourism, technical-scientific relations and cultural exchanges, and individual entrances, the emissaries and missionaries of anti-Soviet centers and organizations [in order] to paralyze their political intelligence collection operations, to obstruct destabilizing operations, first of all, in the domain of international relations.


Section “3” and the municipal and county organizations must undertake more active work regarding the prevention of attempts by foreign clerical centers to push foreign sect formations onto the path of confrontation with the authorities, of inculcating in them an anti-socialist state of mind on the basis of clericalism. To differentiate these actions without error from the aspirations of the faithful for satisfying their religious needs. To neutralize the aims of the Patriarchy of Objective 24 of influencing the clerics in a pro-Romanian nationalist spirit.


  1. Section “3” and the intelligence analysis section must undertake, at a new [higher] qualitative level, the analysis of operational intelligence regarding the plans [and] intentions of the nationalist leaders and community formations, about the tendency of the adversary to make contact with them in the aim of achieving over time the intensification of social tensions, to forecast possible extremist manifestations on an anti-socialist basis. To operationally and qualitatively inform Soviet [central KGB] and party organs on these issues, to elaborate proposals on the perfecting of the activities of the [KGB] subunits and of the municipal and country [KGB] organs regarding the defense of the constitutional regime.


To concentrate the efforts of the leadership and operational personnel on the penetration of peripheral processes, which are occurring in the Popular Front, Union of Working People of Moldova, “Gagauz-halki,” [and] “Unity” [Edinstvo] movements, [and] in the informal groups that are appearing once again.  To assure clandestine influence over leaders with nationalist, chauvinist mentalities, over the secret instigators and organizers of extremist actions, the interception of organizational channels with fellow-travelers from other regions of the country and from abroad.


Sections 3, 4, 6 and the municipal and county organs must identify and energetically strangle the emissary activity of activists of the above-mentioned associations regarding the exacerbation of national discord, of anti-socialist dispositions in the work collective, of the provocation of political strikes [and] anti-social actions.


To more energetically apply towards hostilely-disposed elements measures conforming to the new Laws on State Crimes. The Section for Penal Investigation must review categorically its attitude towards its participation in the work of the units for operational evidence files, in the documentation of illegal actions by some physical persons, especially during the stage of their preparation.


  1. The operational subunits of the [KGB] must, in their activity with foreign agents, within the framework of the development of some active measures and of manipulating foreigners, should give increased attention to the identification of the persons implicated in the organization of international terrorism, to intentions to transfer their activity to the territory of the republic, to their contact with elements with extremist dispositions. The [KGB] organs of Leuseni, Kotovsk, [and] Cantemir counties will be raising the efficiency of measures regarding the search for means of terror and other subversive actions at the points of entry into the MSSR.


To react more operationally to signals regarding the threats of physical retribution for nationalist and chauvinistic motives, the acquisition and keeping of arms, [and] toxic substances. To study in detail, during the course of their verifications, the motives and aims of the above-mentioned illegal actions. To correlate the measures from the framework of the fight with organized crime with the identification of the attempts of criminal groups to exit abroad, in order to enter into contact with extremist elements with the aim of intensifying the atmosphere in social and national spheres.


  1. The leadership personnel of the KGB, taking into account accumulated experience, must obtain a qualitative change in counterpropaganda and in prophylactic and preventive activity in the solution of the problems pertaining to the defense of the Soviet constitutional regime. To assure, in the same order of ideas, the preparation of each operational collaborator. To bring their content in conformity with the contemporary evolution of the operational situation under the new legislation, with the directives of the CPSU CC and the MCP CC. To support itself more on the work collective, on the healthy forces of society, on well-known men of science, of culture, of art, to organize constructive relations with the people’s deputies, to actively draw into the prophylactic measures the atmosphere of the collective, as well as that of the citizens and groups of persons whose activities could take on an unconstitutional character.


Entering into the implementation of the requirements of the decision of the USSR KGB Collegium “About the development of transparency in the activity of the USSR KGB organs and troops,” to raise through the means of mass information the level of propagandistically assuring operational measures regarding the discovery of the actions of the special services of the adversary, of the foreign subversive centers and of the anti-socialist elements oriented towards the undermining of the foundations of the Soviet regime.


To more broadly explain to society the role and importance of the KGB organs in contemporary conditions, to use more energetically the means of information in order to compromise before public opinion the organizers, instigators, and specific active participants in anti-constitutional actions. To do this in such a manner that the measures undertaken will be understood by the working people and supported by them.


  1. The inspectorates must systematically study the practical work of Section “3,” and of the other KGB subunits and municipal and county KGB organs in the domain of the defense of the constitutional regime, to make proposals regarding its improvement. The Section cadre will study, in the first half of 1990, the efficiency of the repatriation/assignment of the cadres of Section “3,” [and] establish measures to improve their completion in the future. To take into more serious consideration the professional, cultural and political preparation of candidates, their aptitude for the work in the proposed sector.


The methodological-didactic commission must foresee for the leadership and operational personnel of the KGB, the lessons regarding the issues tied to the organization of work in the respective directorate, the Section of Investigation will give legal assistance.


To hold hearings in the framework of the KGB leadership in September 1990 on the progress of the formation of Section “3” from its chief, and from the chiefs of municipal and country KGB organs from Bender and Orhei within the framework of the work group.


  1. To task with the control of implementation of the present decision of the collegium Cdes. D. M. Muntean, I. F. Pogonia, [and] A. I. Maloman, deputies to the President of the MSSR KGB, in conformity with their service obligations and the Inspectorate.


President of the KGB of the Moldavian SSR, Gh. Lavranciuc (signature)


In response to the increase of anti-Soviet and Romanian nationalist propaganda, the Moldavian KGB decides to form a new organization, Section 3, "to provide a principled basis for the activity concerning the defense of the Soviet constitutional regime." Detailed instructions are given for the new Sections operations and activities.

Document Information


ASISRM, inventory 8169, dosar 6, filele 157-161; Document No. 106 in Elena Negru and Gheorghe Negru, “PCM şi Naţionalism (1965-1989): Documente adunate în cadrul programului de cercetări effectuate de câtre Comisia pentru studierea şi aprecierea regimului tolitar communist din Republica Moldova,” special edition, Destin românesc, vol. 16, no. 5-6 (2010), pp. 328-332. Translated for CWIHP by Larry L. Watts.


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