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October 9, 1945

TASS Digest, 'Reactions to Truman's Message to Congress about the Atomic Bomb; etc.'

This document was made possible with support from Blavatnik Family Foundation


9 October 1945


Sheet 33-o




TM. IL. 3133, 3134, 3139, 3144, 3141, 3148. WASHINGTON, 5 October /TASS// Truman’s 3 October message to Congress in which he proposed a policy with regard to the atomic bomb has not led a resolution of the disputes between groups insisting that the US keep the “secret” of the bomb and others proposing the creation of international control. Up to the present time not one of these groups has criticized Truman’s proposal, and representatives of each of them declare that Truman supported their point of view. Since 3 October Congress has scarcely achieved success in the business of approving the bill proposed by Truman, the creation of a “commission on atomic energy matters” to exercise control over the American factories and resources needed to obtain atomic energy and to pursue research work. This week the House of Representatives was occupied with consideration of another bill, and the Senate, after two turbulent sessions, could not determine what  commission [Translator’s note: SIC, probably Committee was intended] should consider the bill reflecting Truman’s proposal. The differences in which Republican Senator Vandenberg (from the state of Michigan) headed the opposition to the leader of the Democratic Party in the Senate Barkley (from the state of Kentucky) led to a rivalry which often arises in Congress in connection with specific questions.


However, as the correspondent of the New York Times reports from Washington, rumors are circulating in private circles that some senators opposed the government proposal that the bill be considered by the Armed Services Commission since the Chairman of the Commission, Senator Thomas (from the state of Utah) is too “international”. On the other hand, some supporters of the government’s position are speaking out against Vandenberg’s proposal to create a new joint Senate and House of Representatives commission to consider the question of atomic energy since they fear that Vandenberg will head this commission. During the Senate debates on 4 October in his statement Vandenberg described his motives, including a desire to touch on the question of atomic energy on an international scale, although Truman had proposed that Congress consider only the domestic problems, and promised to give notice of the results of the proposed international discussions. Vandenberg stated sharply that he did not agree with this part of Truman’s message and thinks that Congress ought to have the right to take part in solving international questions.


Connally, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Commission, although he is a Democrat, supported the objection of the Republican Vandenberg to giving this question to the Armed Services Committee for consideration, declaring that this would be a violation of the rights of the Foreign Relations Commission (Connally, giving a speech before a war veterans’ organization in Chicago on 1 October, also said that he is strongly against revealing the secret of the atomic bomb).


Democratic Senators Hatch (from the state of New Mexico) and Lucas (from the state of Illinois) opposed the Armed Services Commission considering this bill for other reasons. They declared that they oppose the creation of War Department control over the development of atomic energy. As Hatch pointed out, he favors the bill being sent to the Foreign Relations Commission for consideration, and added: “Who knows what influence the atomic bomb had on the meeting of ministers of foreign affairs in London”[?] Finally, Barkley declined a suggestion to send the bill to the Armed Services Commission for consideration, but stated that he would submit this proposal again the next week. Thus, the Senate did not even take the first step toward implementing Truman’s proposals.


According to a report of the Associated Press agency from Washington, the President’s proposals concerning international talks perplexed many members of Congress since he evidently intended to inform all countries about the methods of the use of atomic energy in peacetime, but to keep the atomic bomb a secret. Several senators approvingly interpreted Truman’s proposal as directed at the US keeping the atomic bomb secret; among them were the Democrat Johnson (from the state of Colorado) and the Democrat Ellender (from the state of Louisiana). Republican Senator Butler (from the state of Nebraska) cynically declared that the proposal about international talks “obviously has the goal of playing for time, undertaking nothing that I approve”. In opposition to this, Democratic Senator Mitchell (from the state of Washington) declared that, in his opinion, the atomic bomb will not be able to kept secret for long, but Democratic Senator Fulbright (from the state of Arkansas) demanded that control of atomic energy be handed over to the United Nations Security Council. Some members of the House of Representatives commented upon the proposals in the same manner. Democrat Douglas (from the state of California) suggested handing over information about the atomic bomb to the United Nations “as soon as possible” since the US “needs friends” at the present time, but if it does not report this secret then it will later consequently not be able to propose giving the Security Council the right to investigate the scientific secrets of other countries.


The press interpreted Truman’s proposals about the use of atomic energy on an international scale in a number of ways. Radio commentator [Steel] declared that Truman’s message is “a clear compromise between the demands and pressure of the army and cartels on the one hand, and scientists headed by Secretary of Commerce Wallace and former Secretary of War Stimson, on the other.[“] He pointed out that Truman’s message disappointed the scientists, somewhat “although the President definitely made a step toward international cooperation in the matter of the use of the new energy”. However, Truman’s proposal to initially hold talks with Britain and Canada means that the use of atomic energy will be kept secret from the Soviet Union, even if temporarily, but an international agreement would become pointless without the participation of the latter. In like manner Childs, a correspondent of the newspaper the New York Times, declared that Truman had postponed the adoption of a final decision on the question of the international use of atomic energy. The Baltimore newspaper The Sun writes that “the value of Truman’s proposals is that they are only proposals”. Radio commentator [Galemore] declared that the proposal to put the atomic bomb outside the law is reasonable, but as long as the deadly weapon remains the private property of some countries it is impossible to blame other countries if they begin to feverishly strive to get corresponding information.


However, the newspaper New York Herald Tribune states with approval that Truman’s proposals are distinct in vision, and the main attention in them is devoted not to the question of “disclosure of a secret” but in the conclusion of an international agreement about atomic energy. The newspaper declares that until the conclusion of an agreement the most backward countries will be in a disadvantageous position, but the US is not among them. The newspaper The Washington Post declares approvingly that Truman expressed a desire “to buy the maximum possible international security”, while keeping the secret.


Commentaries of the provincial press have been received, which in the majority of cases were written before Truman’s message. Judging from them, the suggestion of scientists about the creation of international control of the atomic bomb influenced even the most conservative newspapers. The latest example of such statements by scientists, of which there were many, is a report of the Associated Press correspondent from Chicago on 4 October. According to this report, “Chicago scientists working on the creation of the atomic bomb”, and representing 95% of scientists who worked on this problem, declared that in the years to come some countries would have a sufficient quantity of atomic bombs to cause a world catastrophe, and therefore the Americans should support Truman in the difficult task of ensuring international control. Such conservative newspapers as The News (Detroit), Courier Journal, and Republican (Springfield), Commercial Appeal (Memphis), Globe (Boston), and Times Dispatch supported the scientists’ views. However, other large newspapers, like for example the Chronicle (Houston), Inquirer (Philadelphia), Observer (Charlotte), Press (Pittsburgh), and The News (Newark) demand that the US keep this secret, referring to the fact that if other countries know it then this will create a threat to the US.




ZN. KN. 3932. LONDON, 8 October /TASS/. The Parliament correspondent of the Press Association agency reports that right after Churchill’s return to London Ralph Assheton, the Chairman of the Conservative Party, reported to him about an unofficial meeting of 200 Conservative candidates, which was held on 5 October, who were not elected to Parliament. It is assumed that Churchill as leader of the Conservative Party will accept the suggestions of the meeting about improving the work of the local organizations of the Conservative Party. The correspondent confirms that the suggestion of some Conservatives to seek agreement with the Liberal Party will not be accepted by the leadership of the Conservatives. The proposal to put the policy rejecting control of private enterprise as the basis of the activity of the Conservative Party will encounter the most support.


It is expected that in the next few days Parliamentary debates will be launched on the question of the control of industry and commerce. Conservative members of Parliament will oppose continuation of the control for five years, over prices in particular. They will demand that the period of control be reduced to just two years.




VB. IN. 3208. NEW YORK, 7 October /TASS/. As the Associated Press agency reports from Lisbon Prime Minister Salazar has dissolved the National Assembly and issued an order to hold general parliamentary elections on 18 November.


Addressing the leaders of the Uniao Nacional Party, Salazar declared that he would restore civil liberties on such a scale as other countries do not know, and will welcome the participation of opponents of the government in the election campaign. He called upon the Uniao Nacional to include the names “the best people” in the lists of voters, regardless of whether they support the government or not. Salazar reported the restoration of freedom of the press sufficient to provide an opportunity to carry out election propaganda, and also reported about the abolition of special military courts which investigate political matters, a general amnesty for political prisoners except those sentenced to death for murder and terrorism, and restrictions regarding the secret police.




LR. IN. 3222. 3225. NEW YORK, 8 October (TASS). According to a report of the United Press agency on 7 October President Truman made an impromptu speech in Caruthersville (the state of Missouri) in which he declared that the world could not endure one more war.


Briefly on the events that have passed since his assumption of the office of president, Truman said: The San Francisco Conference was convened on the 25th day of April--just 13 days after I was sworn in as President of the United States. That conference was successful, and just about 4 months after it was convened, the United States Senate approved the Charter of the United Nations by an overwhelming majority. There were only two Senators against it, and I never did understand why they were against it. At any rate, the United States entered on an entirely new development of its foreign policy.


Some 3 months after that I went to Berlin to meet with the heads of the Governments of Russia, Great Britain, and the United States, in order to discuss the world outlook for the coming peace. The deliberations of that conference will be felt for generations in the final peace.


Just a little less than a month after I became President, that is, 26 days after I was inaugurated, the Axis powers in Europe folded up. On the 12th day of August, Japan folded up. In the meantime, one of the most earth-shaking discoveries in the history of the world was made--the development of atomic energy was discovered. That discovery was used in the last war effort against Japan, and the effect of that atomic bomb is too terrible for contemplation. But we have only begun on the atomic energy program. That great force, if properly used by this country of ours, and by the world at large, can become the greatest boon that humanity has ever had. It can create a world which, in my opinion, will be the happiest world that the sun has ever shone upon.


Now I am reminding you of all these things which have taken place in the last short 6 months to impress upon you the terrible responsibilities of the President of the United States. The President of the United States is your President. I am telling you just what his responsibilities are, because you are my friends and I think you understand the difficulties which I face.


Now it is just as necessary to have the cooperation of every branch, and every member of every part of the Government of the United States, from the constable in this township to the President of the Senate. We must have that cooperation. We must go forward--we are going forward.


We understand that the road to peace is just as difficult and maybe more difficult than was the road to victory during the war. And the reason for that difficulty is that we all distinctly understand that after every war there is bound to be a letdown, there is bound to be a change of attitude, there are bound to be a great many of us who say, "Oh well, I don't have to work any more. I don't have to take any interest in the welfare of my Government any more." We can't have that attitude. We must cooperate now as we never have before in the history of this country. We have the greatest production machine that the world has ever seen. We conclusively proved that free government is the most efficient government in every emergency. We conclusively proved that, by our victories over Germany and Italy and Japan and their allies. In order to prove to the world that our reconversion program can be handled just as efficiently, and that our tremendous production machine can be operated for peace as well as for war, we must all get in and push.


That doesn't require anything in the world but plain understanding among ourselves. That requires the cooperation of management and labor and the farmers, and every storekeeper, and every man who has an interest in the Government of the United States. And by showing that we ourselves know where we are going and why, we can show the rest of the world the road to liberty and to peace. We are not anywhere near stalled on that road. We are only beginning to travel it.


We are going to have difficulties. You can't do anything worthwhile without difficulties. No man who ever accomplishes anything can expect to do it without making mistakes. The man who never does anything never makes any mistakes. We may make mistakes. We may have difficulties, but I am asking you to exercise that admonition which you will find in the Gospels, and which Christ told us was the way to get along in the world: Do by your neighbor as you would be done by.


And that applies to you, and you, just as it applies to Great Britain and France and China and Russia and Czechoslovakia, and Poland and Brazil. When the nations decide that the welfare of the world is much more important than any individual gain which they themselves can make at the expense of another nation, then we can take this discovery which we have made and make this world the greatest place the sun has ever shone upon.


Now, in 1938, I stood on this platform right here and explained to you that our then isolationism would eventually lead to war. I made that speech after President Roosevelt made his speech at Chicago in 1937, in which he warned the world that we were approaching another world war.


We can't stand another global war. We can't ever have another war, unless it is total war, and that means the end of our civilization as we know it. We are not going to do that. We are going to accept that Golden Rule, and we are going forward to meet our destiny which I think Almighty God intended us to have.


And we are going to be the leaders.


Thank you very much.




LM. ML. 101220. LONDON, 9 October. The Reuters Agency, referring to a report from Budapest of [Lerman], correspondent of the newspaper News Chronicle, says that the first free elections in Southeastern Europe, the municipal elections in Budapest, were held yesterday evening and brought victory to the liberal democratic forces. The opposition Liberal Agrarian Party (the Independent Party of Smallholders, TASS note) received an absolute majority. A coalition of the Communist and Social Democratic Parties which, as expected, would receive two-thirds of the votes, got only 42. Today, when only 4,000 ballots remained to be counted, the Agrarian Party has 290,000 votes, 50,000 votes more than the coalition of the leftist parties. Three small parties received 35,000 votes.



9 October 1945TASS




IB.ZN.IL.10101.AF132. LONDON, 9 October. As the Reuter Agency reports, in his speech in the House of Commons devoted to the failure of the conference of ministers of foreign affairs, British Foreign Secretary Bevin declared, “from the moment of the closing of the session of the Council I have refrained from making any public statements until the convening of the House of Commons. The conferenced opened on 11 September and, having studied the provisions concerning the Council described in the protocol of the Berlin Conference, I considered it justified to propose the following procedure to my colleagues at the opening of the session. I said that it would be improper [neudobno] if some of the Council members were removed from some meetings.


It would be even more improper, I said, if [we] had to ask some members to leave certain meetings at a time when we discuss particular points of the agenda. I thought that the work of the conference could be organized better if agreement could be reached that all five members take part in all discussions even in the discussion of questions relating to a peace settlement, but the right to make decisions in the council would be given only to the members whose governments had signed or should have signed the corresponding surrender terms. US Secretary of State Byrnes holds to the same view as I, but Molotov said that he agreed with my proposals if, as he understands them, they mean that all five members of the Council attend meetings and take part in the discussion, if they want, but that a decision should be made only by the delegations representing the governments which signed or according to conditions worked out by the Council, should sign the corresponding surrender terms.


Inasmuch as all agreed with this interpretation of the Berlin protocol, the proposal which I made was adopted without disagreement.


I am sure that when we adopted this resolution at our first meeting that we thought that we had correctly interpreted the agreement reached by those who had signed this protocol. The Council had 16 plenary meetings over 10 days of persistent work in accordance with this resolution and achieved considerable successes not only on general questions, but also on the questions of the treaties.


We actually achieved agreement regarding a draft treaty with Finland and decided to pass this question to the deputies. We achieved considerable successes with regard to a draft treaty with Italy. We considered and satisfactorily resolved several points of this treaty. For example, in the complex question of the Italian-Yugoslav border the Council decided to hear the opinions of the governments of Yugoslavia and Italy, and also of Australia, South Africa, and New Zealand.


Having heard them out, the Council entrusted its deputies with drawing up a report regarding a line which would leave a minimum of the population under foreign rule. It was also suggested that the deputies make a report about an international regime of the port of Trieste. It was proposed to transfer the Dodecanese Islands to Greece, but final agreement was not reached on this question.


On the question of the fate of the Italian colonies the American delegation offered a proposal which the government of His Majesty has charged me with supporting, inasmuch as it thought that this proposal is wise and farsighted and would provide an opportunity to avoid friction between the great powers in these regions, and also an opportunity to conduct a great experiment in the area of international cooperation. The American proposal provided transferring all these Italian territories as a whole to the collective trusteeship of the United Nations. After discussion it was decided that the question of the trusteeship over the Italian colonies should be handed over to the deputies, who should use the American proposal as broadly as possible and also take into account the alternative proposal of the trusteeship of one country.


Thus, concerning this difficult question, in spite of different views we achieved general agreement with regard to the basis on which it could be considered in the future.


Continuing my report about the work on the peace treaties, I should say that at the early stage of the conference we began to draw up a draft of the treaties with Romania and Bulgaria. The Council had proposals of the Soviet, British, and American delegations. We accepted the Soviet proposals as a basis and some points of the British proposals were rejected.


Then we started to discuss the American proposals about a draft of a peace treaty with Romania. These American proposals raised the question of recognition of the government of Romania, inasmuch as it was apparent from them that, being ready to discuss the draft, the American government would not hold talks about a peace treaty with Romania until a new, more broadly-representative government was created in this country.


Almost the same question arose in connection with a draft of a treaty with Bulgaria. Inasmuch as big differences in views existed about this question, in the hope of easing the difficulties of the existing situation, I proposed conducting an independent investigation of the situation in these two countries (applause).


I have said enough to show some difficulties in the talks which we held, and also the considerable successes which were achieved in the course of the discussion in the first 10 days of the Council’s session. Therefore I was surprised when on the morning of 22 September Molotov told Byrnes and me that we had all violated the Berlin agreement and that he could not agree to continue the discussion of peace treaties on the basis of the procedure according to which we had worked for 10 days.


I told Molotov that I did not agree that the Berlin agreement prevents us from working since we are working, and I pointed out to him that we all agreed at the first meeting that we intended to work in just such a manner.


Byrnes discussed this question with Molotov many times during the next several days but could not come to agreement. Molotov asserted that the Berlin agreement should be interpreted in one way, and Byrnes and I thought that it ought to be interpreted otherwise than how it had been interpreted when the Council adopted its resolution on 11 September. During these discussions I tried to find a broader interpretation which would provide an opportunity to the dominions and the other governments, which made a considerable contribution to the cause of the defeat of the Axis powers, to express their views on a peace settlement. Inasmuch as the three ministers of foreign affairs could not come to agreement concerning an interpretation of the agreement we decided to get in touch with the heads of the three governments. President Truman and Attlee supported the point of view expressed by Byrnes and myself. Stalin supported the point of view expressed by Molotov, and thus we have not come close to agreement.


Now I should say a couple of words about the Berlin agreement. It quite clearly says that the drafting of peace treaties with Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland is an immediate and important task of the Council. It says that other members, besides those who signed the terms of surrender, will be invited to participate when questions directly concerning them are discussed. I should explain here that, in accepting an invitation to take part in the work of the Council, the French government declared that, like it or not, it is interested in all the agreements in Europe. It is also pointed out in the Berlin agreement that the Council can change its procedure in accordance with a problem under discussion, and we thought that all members of the Council, including the Soviet Union, were agreed that this is what we should have done when the 11 September resolution was worked out. That day, when it was decided to invite some governments to send representatives for the discussion of the question about Trieste, the representative of China was in the chair at the Council meeting and it was in his name that the invitations were sent. As chance would have it he was the chairman at this meeting. Thus, on 11 September and for 10 days after this Molotov evidently agreed with this and we never thought otherwise. He later told us that his new position resulted from the instructions of his government.


If we had agreed with the interpretation on which the Soviet delegation insisted that would have meant in the discussion of the treaties with the Balkan countries we would have actually had to tell the representatives of France and China, “You should leave the room while we discuss this question”, and we switched to the treaty with Finland we would have had to suggest that the United States also leave the meeting. Such a request from several powers addressed to their partners would undoubtedly cause international complications which, in the opinion of the American and British delegations, ought have arisen. Further, by what means could this be reconciled with the United Nations Charter, which charges the five powers as permanent members of the Council with special responsibility for maintaining world peace.


Inasmuch as we could not reach agreement regarding the interpretation of the Berlin declaration and inasmuch as the general questions of the agenda were exhausted, the time had come when we had to find out whether we could at least come to agreement about what had already been subject to discussion. But we encountered the same difficulties when it came to this.


Molotov suggested that instead of one protocol reflecting the decisions of the Council there be four separate protocols: the first protocol, reflecting the common decisions, which should be signed by all five members of the Council; the second, about a peace treaty with Italy, which should be signed by the representatives of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, the United States, and France; the third, concerning Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, which should be signed by the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United States; and the fourth, concerning Finland, which should be signed by the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. After some discussion we agreed with Molotov’s proposal. Then he declared that before we sign any protocol at all the Council should remove from the minutes the decision adopted on 11 September. No one was inclined to do this except him (exclamations of approval). This actually would not have given a correct idea of the Council’s work. However, we suggested that a paragraph be inserted in the protocol from which it would be clear that Molotov declared on 22 September that the resolution adopted on 11 September is a violation of the Berlin agreement, in the opinion of his government. Byrnes and I made everything dependent on us in order to convince Molotov that the provisions providing for the creation of the Council were sufficiently broad to allow a reasonable interpretation. Byrnes tried to solve the difficulties, suggesting that the conference was created to consider peace treaties when they were developed and for other countries to be invited to this conference of the five powers which had substantially contributed to the defeat of the Axis powers. But the Soviet representatives declared that only the three powers which had signed the Berlin agreement should discuss or express themselves about this proposal.


As the House knows the conference ended on Tuesday, 2 October. On Monday evening Molotov said that he could not sign a single protocol if his point of view was not accepted. But that evening the conference was extended until Tuesday at the suggestion of the Chinese minister of foreign affairs. I devoted Monday to consultations with my colleagues and exerted every effort to find a way to overcome the difficulties.


But it was clear that there was little hope of any agreement. It seemed to me, like to Byrnes, that the differences of the Soviet delegation, although they might seem technical, in fact touch on an important question of principle – to what degree can the “Big Three” exclude other nations from the discussion of questions having great importance for them, a principle which I thought it necessary to uphold.


I know that disappointment reigns in the House of Commons and in the entire world in connection with the failure of the first session of this Council which was created to discuss not only peace treaties, but also many other questions. Many other questions, besides the preparation of peace treaties, were discussed, if not decided at the Council session. For example, the question was raised of European ground and sea routes which will be so important when a system of European transportation was created again, and the question arose of supplying people with food. We could not solve this question. Reparations and other problems of Germany were also discussed. The question was raised of the government of Austria and providing food to the people of this unfortunate country. Successes were achieved in the area of the latter and several other questions.


A return to normal and happy conditions in Europe should be the first step to which the peace treaties should be – that is what the world expects. A temporary interruption, I hope, would lead to further talks about these questions on a basis which would be the best for a permanent peace, for I am convinced that this is what the whole world wants.


Possibly when we met in London in September we were too close to the two great victories to be in a state to reach an immediate agreement.


For the future I will say with confidence that, given time and if we continue to display patience and understanding with regard to the difficulties of one another, we will overcome the current differences and any others which might manifest themselves.


For our own part, we will undoubtedly strive to work in the same spirit of cooperation in which the countries worked which were united to wage the war against our enemies.


In conclusion I would like to read a telegram which Molotov sent me when leaving our country and my reply to him.


Molotov wrote, “Leaving the borders of allied Great Britain please pass to the British government my gratitude for the warm reception given me and my colleagues.


I express confidence that our further cooperation, which became stronger in the victoriously concluded war against our common enemies, will continue in the interests of the peoples of Great Britain and the Soviet Union and the strengthening of peace in the entire world, will overcome the temporary difficulties which exist in this path, and that together we will strive for the successful achievement of this great goal”.


I replied, “I was very glad to receive your courteous message on the occasion of your departure from Britain after the conference of ministers of foreign affairs.


I share your confidence in our further cooperation in the interests of the peoples of Great Britain and the Soviet Union and for the strengthening of peace in the entire world.


We might, as you say, encounter difficulties in this path, but the cause which we serve is so important that every effort should be applied to achieve this great goal. People throughout the entire world wants peace, an economic revival, and an increase of the standard of living. The accomplishment of this should be our first-priority goal”.


Winston Churchill, the leader of the Conservative opposition, declared that members of the House of Commons, without regard to party affiliation, are indebted to Bevin for the clear, moderate, and authoritative statement about the disappointing events which occurred.


Churchill added that the opposition will be ready to discuss with the government the question of whether it would be convenient to hold debates next week or a week later.


Bevin replied: I am thankful to Churchill, I would not like to interfere with start of discussion or debate when the House wishes this. But I think that the situation is delicate at the present moment. If the debates are delayed somewhat then the tension might lessen, and this would better serve international interests.


One Labor member of Parliament asked whether the governments of the dominions had been fully informed about the daily course of the conference.


Bevin replied: We have sought for the dominions to always be with us, and the Prime Minister has taken steps, although there has not been much time to establish whether it is possible to hold consultations with the prime ministers of the dominions before the conference opens, but they could not be here by this time. Therefore maximum close contact was maintained during the conference.


Labor member Captain Blackburn declared that members of the House recognize that Bevin had defended the rights of small countries well, which Britain has always advocated.


Stories include disputes in the US about putting the atomic bomb under international supervision, a speech by Truman on the atomic bomb, British conservative party politics, the dissolution of the national assembly in Portugal, elections in Budapest, and a speech by British Foreign Secretary Bevin on the conference of ministers of foreign affairs.

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RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 97, ll. 14-28. Contributed by Sergey Radchenko and translated by Gary Goldberg


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