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October 18, 1979

Note regarding the Meeting between Minister of State Wischnewski with the Deputy Iranian Minister and Government Spokesman Dr. Sadegh Tabatabai on 19 October 1979 from 12:50 to 14:20 Hours in the Federal Chancellery

Tabatabai conveyed his government's regret over the assassination attempt on the German Merck administrative director Leib in Tehran that was organized an anti-government, anti-foreigner terrorist gang. The new revolutionary group and it's new laws and demands are described. Tabatabai continues to say that all negative rumors about the new regime, such as persecution against women and minority religions, is Zionist propaganda. The revolution has greatly damaged business. The fate of the Kurds are discussed.

April 5, 1978

Nuclear Waste Disposal of Nuclear Power Plants Iran 5 - 8; Here: Meeting of Mr. State Secretary with Dr. Etemad on 8 and 9 April 1978

Documents summarizes a meeting between Haunschild and Etemad on an upcoming visit to Tehran. It also includes information on talks held in March 1978 with Ahmad Sotoodehnia of the Atomic Energy Organization of lran.

November 26, 1969

US Embassy Bonn Telegram 15293, 'NPT – Text of FRG Note on NPT Signature'

This telegram detailed the conditions under which the West German's would ratify the NPT, which depended on the results of EURATOM-IAEA safeguards negotiations.

November 28, 1969

State Department Telegram 199360 to US Embassy Bonn, 'FRG and Swiss NPT Signatures'

On 28 November 1969, West German Ambassador to the United States Rolf Pauls signed the NPT at the State Department and delivered a statement and a detailed note. At the signing Secretary Rogers spoke about the treaty’s value, the “historic” importance of the West German signature, the U.S. understanding that the UN Charter “confers no right to intervene by force unilaterally in the Federal Republic of Germany,” and a reaffirmation of U.S. security guarantees to NATO and the Federal Republic.

November 5, 1969

Memorandum of Conversation between Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Ambassador Helmut Roth, 'US-FRG Consultations on NPT,' with memorandum attached

During these consultations on the NPT, the chief West German official, Helmut Roth, Chief of the Foreign Office’s Disarmament Section, reviewed the progress of the talks with Secretary of State Rogers. Roth emphasized the importance of the “reaffirmation” of US security commitments “at a time when [the Federal Republic] was signing a renunciation of nuclear weapons for its own defense.”

April 30, 1969

Thomas Hughes, Director, Office of Intelligence and Research, to Secretary of State, 'FRG - Further Delay on NPT Signature,' Intelligence Note-327

Noting that the same objections to the NPT remained, INR opined that some West German politicians were using them “to rationalize an opposition that is really based on nationalistic emotions and on the political advantages to be derived from playing upon these emotions.”

November 27, 1968

Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 'Prospects for the Nonproliferation Treaty'

According to this CIA evaluation, the West German governing coalition was so divided and so antagonistic to the Soviet Union in light of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia on 20 August that action was “unlikely for the time being.”

July 26, 1968

US Embassy Bonn Telegram 14922 to State Department, 'Eppler on NPT'

Erhard Eppler, a Social Democratic member of the Bundestag, gave embassy staffers his perspective on the political status of the NPT. Highly critical of Kiesinger for his “hold-back tactics” on signing and ratification, Eppler believed that the longer the delay the more likely that the treaty “would become entangled in election campaign politics.”

January 23, 1968

US Embassy Bonn Telegram 7557 to State Department, 'FRG Defense Council Meeting on NPT'

This telegram detailed an FRG Defense Council Meeting on the NPT. While recognizing that the agreement on Article III was “progress,” Kiesinger continued to criticize the treaty’s “inflexibility,” which he saw as a danger to West Germany’s “longer term” security interests. Kiesinger, however, professed willingness to consider signing the Treaty, even to be an early signer, if Washington could comply with a few basic “requests,” such as “safeguards against Soviet pressure” and some improvements in Article III.

October 6, 1967

State Department Telegram 50379 to US Embassy Bonn, 'NPT'

In this meeting with Deputy Under Secretary Eugene Rostow, West German Embassy official Georg Lilienfeld listed desiderata, including a limited y duration, assurances against Soviet blackmail, acceptable language for the safeguards article, “more balanced rights and obligations,” and non-recognition of the German Democratic Republic.

Pagination