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November 2, 1962

Summary of a Conversation between Cde. A. M. Rumyantsev, Editor-in-Chief of the journal 'Problemy Mira i Sotsializma', and Cde. Blas Roca, Member of the Secretariat of the National Leadership of the United Revolutionary Organizations

Blas Roca explains that the Cuban Missile Crisis "ought to be viewed as a defeat" for Cuba and the Soviet Union.

July 5, 1961

Record of a Conversation between N. S. Khrushchev and Chen Yi, Deputy Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China

Chen asks Khrushchev to go over the pressing international issues and he presents the USSR's stances on the situation in Laos, South Korea, and Cuba. Khrushchev also raises problems in GDR and difficulties in negotiations with Western powers with regards to the German question. Khrushchev also mentions Soviet plans to launch a spaceship and resume nuclear testing. The two leaders also discuss the challenges of agricultural development.

September 20, 1960

Record of Conversation between N.S. Khrushchev and Prime Minister of Cuba Fidel Castro

April 5, 1963

From the Diary of A. I. Alekseyev, Record of a Conversation with Cuban Minister of Industry Ernesto Guevara, 25 February 1963

Alekseyev and Guevera discuss Soviet and Cuban foreign and economic relations, and trip to the Soviet Union proposed by N.S. Khrushchev.

May 24, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol No. 32 (continued)

The Presidium decides to adopt Protocol 32.

October 25, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol No. 61

In response to President Kennedy's letter protesting the placement of missiles in Cuba, Khrushchev proposes a resolution to the crisis. When the time seemed right he would offer to dismantle the missiles already on the island (the MRBMs or R-12s) if Kennedy pledged not to invade Cuba.

December 3, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 71

Protocol 71 gives details to the immediate fallout of the Cuban Missile Crisis from the Soviet perspective. Thanks to Castro’s so-called Armageddon letter and his five points, by December 1962 (date of this protocol), Khrushchev was calling the Cubans “unreliable allies.”

November 16, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 66

Protocol 66 is the first Malin note dated after the Cuban Missile Crisis, on 11 November. The tone of the protocol indicates that Castro is not pleased with Khrushchev's handling of the crisis, and there is a growing sense of distance between Cuba and the Soviet Union.

October 28, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 63

According to Protocol 63, Khrushchev probably assumed that Kennedy’s patience was at an end and the Cuban Missile Crisis might either be resolved or spin out of control, and the Kremlin again considered how it might respond to a US attack. If anyone suggested a preemptive strike, or even a retaliatory strike, against a target outside of the Caribbean, Malin did not note it for the official record.

October 27, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 62

Protocol 62 illustrates how it was Khrushchev who raised the stakes during the missile crisis and dictated a new letter to Kennedy indicating he would only remove the missiles from Cuba in exchange of the United States withdrawing its military bases from Turkey and Pakistan. The Pakistan demand would later be dropped, however and the US would only agree to remove its IRBMs from Turkey.

Pagination