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Documents

December 1962

Report of the Commander of the 51st Missile Division concerning the Operations of the Division during the Period from 12 July through 1 December 1962

Commander of the 51st Missile Division General-Major Igor Demyanovich Statsenko's detailed postmortem on the deployment of Soviet missiles to Cuba in mid-1962 and their removal later that year following the nuclear confrontation with the United States. The report includes an attachment titled: "Some Questions of Operational and Tactical Concealment during the Operation of the Division on the Island of Cuba."

November 2, 1962

Summary of a Conversation between Cde. A. M. Rumyantsev, Editor-in-Chief of the journal 'Problemy Mira i Sotsializma', and Cde. Blas Roca, Member of the Secretariat of the National Leadership of the United Revolutionary Organizations

Blas Roca explains that the Cuban Missile Crisis "ought to be viewed as a defeat" for Cuba and the Soviet Union.

January 21, 1961

From the Journal of S.M. Kudryavtsev, 'Record of a Conversation with Prime Minister of Cuba Fidel Castro Ruz, 21 January 1961'

Fidel Castro discusses the conditions of the Cuban economy and militia and expresses his belief that Cuba-United States relations are heading in a positive direction.

November 6, 1962

Ciphered Telegram from Anastas Mikoyan to CC CPSU

Mikoyan reports to the CC CPSU regarding his conversations with the Cuban leadership. Fide Castrol had concerns about the possible withdraw of all Soviet weapons and all military specialists from Cuba and the possibility of UN inspections on Cuban territory.

October 30, 1962

Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Rio (Barišić) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry

Fidel Castro, after his first contacts with Brazilian President João Goulart’s special envoy Albino Silva, accepted well the Brazilian thesis which contains following: Denuclearization of the whole of Latin America and the embargo on atomic weapons delivery; Inspection by UN; Cuba would commit neither to export revolution nor to carry out any subversive activities; Cuba would be given guarantees for keeping its sovereignty and independence. The USA will accept the plan after negotiations. Russians “couldn’t think of anything better.”

November 16, 1962

Telegram from Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 6:30 p.m., Friday

Pinto discusses the current situation in Cuba and feels certain that Cuba depends more and more on Soviet economic help, but that Fidel Castro feels sure of that there will only be an overthrow due to an American invasion or by a prolonged total blockade, that will have more grave international implications.

November 14, 1962

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 3:15 p.m., Wednesday

The tight secrecy continues to surround the conversations with Anastas Mikoyan, however in a conversation with Pinto, he reveals information concerning: Fidel Castro, Cuban-Soviet relations during the crisis and Cuba's refusal to submit to international inspections.

November 9, 1962

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 11:30 a.m., Friday

Pinto meets with Anastas Mikoyan and Fidel Castro to discuss Brazilian-Soviet-Cuban relations.

October 28, 1962

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 6:45 p.m., Sunday

Pinto describes a meeting with Roa in which Roa repeats a message from Fidel Castro's proclamation that the evacuation of the American base Guantanamo should be directed at not only the United States, but also the Soviet Union, to show both that Cuba is not a toy of the great powers and should be heard in the coming negotiations.

November 13, 1962

Record of Conversation between Mikoyan and Fidel Castro, Havana

The conversation was recorded after the Cuban leader refused to see the Soviet envoy for three days in a reaction to the new demand. Castro starts by declaring his disagreement with the decision to remove the IL-28s but, assures Mikoyan that the revolutionary leadership discussed the issue and agreed to the removal. Mikoyan presents all his arguments to show that the withdrawal of the planes would end the crisis and make the US non-invasion pledge more credible. He acknowledges the “negative psychological effect” of the decision and reiterates that all the rest of the weapons would stay in Cuba so its security would be guaranteed without the obsolete planes. They also agree on the rules of verification of the withdrawal.

Pagination