In a meeting with Italian Defense Minister Guilio Andreotti, McNamara had several matters to raise, but soon brought up the Jupiters and the need to “substitute something more responsive and less vulnerable to sabotage or direct attack.” When Andreotti raised the possibility of a naval deployment, McNamara agreed, suggesting assigning Polaris submarines to SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe), “with an Italian role in the targeting.” Suggesting that the U.S take the initiative on the matter, Andreotti preferred that it be settled before the spring 1963 elections.

Kennedy, McNamara and Rusk moved ahead with the Jupiters matter by making plans to bring it up with Italian and Turkish defense ministers at the NATO meeting in Paris in December 1962. The goal would be to persuade them of the obsolescence of the Jupiters, the dangers that they posed during the Cuban crisis and in future crises, and the need for “better arrangements,” such as “a rearrangement of Polaris deployments.”

President Kennedy continued to monitor the Jupiter missiles problem. During a meeting with Rusk a few weeks later, McNamara explained that President Kennedy, who he had seen in Palm Beach on December 27, had asked him what steps were being taken “to remove the Jupiters.” Consistent with that, McNamara favored the “earliest possible date” and asked whether a “deadline” could be set for April 1 to begin the removals.

Brandt agrees to Kohl's request to serve as a mediator and interlocutor for the Iraqi side in an effort to achieve the release of hostages in Iraq.

Over two days of meetings, Bush and Mazowiecki discuss German reunification, the future of relations with the Soviet Union/Russia, and NATO.

Discussion between Andreotti and McNamara concerning the political aspects of the MLF

Analysis by the Head of the Italian Delegation to the North Atlantic Council (Alessandrini) of SHAPE meeting chaired by Gen. Norstad to examine Western/Soviet missile balance.

Cagiati sends Andreotti a report about the meeting in Washington, which concluded Giulio Andreotti's period as Minister of Defense. Cagiati thanks Andreotti for his work, that made sure that "in this period the relationship between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense has been strong and efficient like never before". The report describes the meeting (the first meeting of this working group) and the viewpoints of the participants, with special attention payed to the US nuclear policy. The document describes also the fields which require further investigations by the Working Group. There are Cagiati's personal reflections too.

The report examines the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance and the uncertainty of the current phase, which consists of forces not always appropriate to its cohesion. Alessandrini analyzes both the transformations in the international context and those inside NATO, the issue of political, economic and military consultation, the debate about the multilateral force and ANF. The conclusion underlines - despite all the current problems - the positive results of the history of NATO, an alliance that represents to date not only the deterrence against possible Soviet threats, but also the most important interlocutor in an eventual East-West dialogue.

The document is part of a broad series of "Informative Reports" drafted by RICA and sent by Alessandrini to Andreotti (Minister of Defense), concerning the forthcoming meeting in London of the Atlantic Council at a ministerial level.
With regards to the Defense Planning, Italy claims (together with Germany) that it is absolutely indispensable to have available a well-balanced both conventional and nuclear arsenal, to preserve the SACEUR's credibility, on a political level too.

The document is part of a broad series of "Informative Reports" drafted by RICA and sent by Alessandrini to Andreotti (Minister of Defense), concerning the forthcoming meeting in London of the Atlantic Council at a ministerial level.
With regards to nuclear problems, the document hopes for a gradual way out from NATO's current paralysis, through a process of integration, rather then the attempt to solve also these problems by mere coordination among the Allies.