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Documents

June 4, 1957

Department of State Office of Intelligence Research, 'OIR Contribution to NIE 100-6-57: Nuclear Weapons Production by Fourth Countries – Likelihood and Consequences'

This lengthy report was State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research's contribution to the first National Intelligence Estimate on the nuclear proliferation, NIE 100-6-57. Written at a time when the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom were the only nuclear weapons states, the “Fourth Country” problem referred to the probability that some unspecified country, whether France or China, was likely to be the next nuclear weapons state. Enclosed with letter from Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Division of Research for USSR and Western Europe, to Roger Mateson, 4 June 1957, Secret

1996

Excerpts from Recollections by the Former Soviet Ambassador in North Korea Aleksandr Kapto

Aleksandr Kapto reflects on the Soviet Union's normalization of relations with South Korea, and the consequential fallout in relations between North Korea and the USSR. According to Kapto, North Korea threatened to develop nuclear weapons and withdraw from the NPT as a result of Soviet-South Korean rapprochement.

May 28, 1987

Letter from Rolf Berthold to Cde. Erich Honecker

In anticipation of a visit by Zhao Ziyang to East Germany, the Ambassador of the GDR in Beijing reports on China's economic reforms, the leadership within the Chinese Communist Party, and China's relations with the GDR, the Soviet Union, the United States, and Japan.

December 11, 1989

Telegram of the Hungarian Embassy in Moscow about V. M. Falin’s Briefing on the Malta Summit on 11 December

V.M. Falin, Head of the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, provides a briefing about the Malta Summit.

December 6, 1989

Rezső Nyers’s Typed Notes to Miklós Németh on Gorbachev’s Briefing on the Malta Summit on 4 December

An official report by Nyers about the Malta Summit prepared for Prime Minister Miklós Németh.

December 4, 1989

Rezső Nyers’s handwritten Notes on Gorbachev’s Briefing on the Malta Summit at the Meeting of the Warsaw Pact Leaders in Moscow on 4 December

Unofficial hand-written notes by Rezső Nyers, President of the Hungarian Socialist Party, taken took during a briefing by M. Gorbachev at a Soviet Bloc summit in Moscow on 4 December, just a day after the meeting with President Bush at Malta.

September 15, 1958

Report to Central Committee on Press Conference about 'Provocative and Subversive Activities of American Radio Stations'

Description of a 1958 press conference in Moscow organized by the State Committee on Cultural Relations, with KGB assistance, to discredit Western broadcasts to the USSR and Eastern Europe. The press conference drew on the presence of alleged former employees of the radio stations.

June 11, 1976

George Vest to the Secretary of State, 'London Nuclear Suppliers Meeting'

This document provides an overview of the London Nuclear Suppliers' Meeting which included the addition of the five newest countries to the original seven. Most old and new members were receptive when Washington lobbied them to support a “long term and stable regime of restraint” on the export of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technology. While the French were supportive of the moratorium proposal, the Germans were uncomfortable with it, not least because of the implications for their deal with Brazil.

June 10, 1985

Speech, East German Minister of State Security Mielke, 'At the Enlarged Collegium Meeting on 7 June 1985 about Further Preparation of the XI SED Party Congress'

This speech by East German Minister of State Security Mielke is about technological, intellectual, and ideological preparations for war by the west and how to uncover and organize indicators of a potential attack.

January 14, 1983

Ministry of State Security (Stasi), Brief Note, 'Issues to Discuss with the Leadership of the KGB of the USSR'

This brief note written by the Ministry of State Security includes a number of questions for the leadership of the KGB in the USSR, such as whether other elements, like military doctrine or emergency responses, should be examined as possible options for starting a war.

Pagination