This statute creates an inter-governmental commission aimed at coordinating the efforts of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People’s Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People’s Republic, the USSR, and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to prevent exports that might be used by capitalist or developing countries to reach their military or economic potentials.

Treaty establishing the Warsaw Pact in response to the integration of West Germany into NATO.

This document details the scope and implementation of military coordination between Polish and Soviet forces.

This document sets out plans to coordinate the air defense forces of the Soviet Union, Poland, East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Coordination primarily includes, for example, the mutual exchange of information regarding detection, tracking, and actions of enemy targets.

This document introduces the trilateral military exercise known as Druzhba-85. Involving troops from the Soviet Union, East Germany, and Poland, the September 1985 exercise was implemented with the goal of improving commands and staffs in joint offensive operations; identifying more effective methods of military organization; coordinating allied commands and staffs; and deepening international political ties via military coalition. The exercise is premised on a hypothetical scenario in which NATO forces exacerbate East-West tensions and launch an offensive against the Warsaw Pact countries. The document provides additional detail on the operational procedure of the exercise.

This document describes Warsaw Pact military exercises conducted between 25 May and 2 June 1988. Summarized in detail, the comprehensive exercise brought all facets of the combined forces to "wartime strength" in response to a theoretical threat posed by NATO.

Report on the course and results of the 20th Session of the Committee of Ministers of Defense of Warsaw Pact Member States held in Bucharest on November 24-25, 1987.

This is a transcript of a lecture delivered by Sergei Akhromeyev, the Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, to the Polish General Staff about Soviet military doctrine in early 1988. The document defines what the Soviets meant by military doctrine, differentiating between the doctrine of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact by stressing the former’s wider range objectives, especially concerning the use of strategic nuclear weapons. In addition, it identifies contemporary issues facing Soviet doctrine and analyzes topics such as nuclear non-proliferation, reduction of nuclear stockpiles and refutes the idea that nuclear weapons should be used in a counter-offensive operation. It stresses the importance of defense, negating offensive military preparedness in lieu of purely defensive Warsaw Pact capabilities (albeit altogether sufficient to successfully deter a NATO attack from the West). It also discusses the results of the March 2-3 1988 NATO talks and concludes that the West is not willing to stop the arms race and is increasing its offensive capabilities. The Warsaw Pact’s response should include increased military research, better vigilance to capture signals of a possible attack and more tactical and technical training for the military command. It asserts that even though a war is less likely than in the past, quoting Gorbachev, “the nature of capitalism itself can be the cause of war.”

Meeting minutes taken by Romanian Ambassador Vasile Sandru at sessions of the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee, taking place in Moscow on 22-23 November 1978. Session I contains a speech by Leonid Brezhnev in which he discusses détente, Warsaw Pact economic cooperation, disarmament, national liberation movements, and relations with China, the Western countries, and Japan. In Session II and III political leaders of the other Warsaw member countries respond to Brezhnev’s speech. Session IV features a report by Commander-in-Chief Viktor Kulikov on the United Armed Forces. He recommends an increase in military expenditures. All of the leaders agree, except for Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania.

Letter from Gomulka to Khrushchev discussing Polish opposition to Soviet proposal for a Non-Proliferation Treaty. Gomulka suggests that the treaty will further split the communist camp. While discussing the state of Sino-Soviet relations, the Polish leader suggests that the Soviet Union and the PRC adopt a common position in matters of foreign policy in order to strengthen the power of the Socialist camp.