A detailed view of Soviet reactions toward the Ethiopian-Somali conflict as of early September 1977, showing Moscow’s envoy to Addis Ababa’s conviction that Ethiopia would emerge victorious from the war. However, this document also gives a somewhat critical view on the part of Yugoslav’s diplomat regarding the Soviets’ unofficial and unsuccessful attempt to persuade Ethiopia to surrender part of Ogaden in order to appease the Somalis.

A Yugoslav diplomat offers a detailed view of the increasing level of formal contact between the Soviet Bloc and Ethiopia in mid-1976, also witnessing the local competition between the Chinese and the Soviet Bloc and comparing their modes of conduct.

The importance of avoiding conflict in the Horn of Africa as outlined by Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko.

Belgrade’s envoy to Mogadishu outlines the potential Somali rationale behind the invitation of Western observers to inspect Soviet facilities in Berbera. International attention surrounded the facilities following rumors and intelligence that the port was actually a military base.

Representatives from Brazil and Yugoslavia discuss the Brazilian proposal to the United Nations (1) denuclearization of Latin America, 2) Cuba will not interfere politically with its neighbors, and 3) guaranteed sovereignty for Cuba), about various leader's opinions on the resolution and about the difficulty that might be involved in the implementation of these policies.

The Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro tells the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry about Brazil's proposal to the United Nations (denuclearization of Latin America, Cuba will not export revolutionary operations, Cuban guarantee of independence) and about how difficult it might be to implement the various aspects of this resolution. For example, when it comes to discussions of the evacuation of Guantanamo, Americans "stop their ears."

A telegram from the Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry expressing their pleasure with Tito’s message.

The Yugoslav Embassy in Havana and Ambassador Vidakovic tell the Foreign Ministry that Yugoslavia has been mentioned in Cuban press articles for their involvement in the Cuban Missile Crisis. He also discusses other popular headlines about the crisis situation.

The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry relays to its embassies a summary of the Brazilian proposal on the Cuban Missile Crisis which, they say, mainly includes: the denuclearization of Latin America with inspections, Cuba's commitment to not "export" revolutionary operations, and guarantees to Cuba for sovereignty and independence. Allegedly, Castro welcomed the idea of the above plan. Brazil thinks that the USA could accept it after negotiations.

Yugoslav officials remark that significant publicity and acknowledgment was given to Tito’s message and initiative in regard to Brazilian President João Goulart’s messages, and Yugoslavia's activity in the UNO [United Nations Organization] has solidified their reputation as that of the nonaligned.