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December 11, 1995

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Memorandum by Robert S. Rochlin, 'Implications of an Indian Nuclear Weapons Test'

Memo from senior scientist at the ACDA, Robert S. Rochlin, discussing the possible serious political and diplomatic consequences of India launching a nuclear test. In the event that Rao had made a decision to test, the United States did not have enough “leverage” to encourage a policy reversal or to prevent a regional arms race; Washington would need to organize a “concerted intervention by all the major states.”

December 11, 1995

State Department Telegram 285472 to US Embassy in Tokyo, 'ACDA Director Hollum’s Meeting with Japanese Officials'

Talking points for Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Hollum from the State Department. Hollum was instructed to “urge” the Japanese to convey their concern to the government of India and “strong opposition [to] any such tests.” The State Department did not want to make any public statements about the situation because that “would be counterproductive,” that is, it would tip the U.S.’s hand Japan to tell Tokyo to voice its concerns over the possible Indian Nuclear Test to New Delhi.

April 19, 1971

Memorandum from Andropov to Ustinov, Regarding US Positions in the Anti-Ballistic Missile Negotiations

KGB chief Andropov analyzes the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty negotiations, particularly the US negotiating positions and the preferences of various Washington agencies.

February 19, 1960

A.A. Wells, Director, Division of International Affairs, to Philip J. Farley, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Disarmament and Atomic Energy, 'Control of and Cooperation in Gas Centrifuge Research and Development Program'

The development of the gas centrifuge method, according to this report, would make production of U-235 (and by extension, nuclear weapons) possible for as many as 20-30 foreign countries. The U.S. is thus forced to consider its strategy for how to limit proliferation despite this new, cheap technology.

February 1, 1989

Ciphered Telegram No. 19, Embassy of Hungary in the Soviet Union to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

Lengthy report on India's current domestic and foreign policies. Includes discussion of India's upcoming parliamentary elections and preparations by Rajiv Gandhi and the Congress Party. Foreign relations in Asia with countries such as China, Cambodia, and Afghanistan are discussed, as well as India's involvement in disarmament talks through the Six Nation Five Continent Peace Initiative. Lastly, India's relationship with the Soviet Union in foreign policy and trade is described.

November 12, 1986

Ciphered Telegram No. 342, Embassy of Hungary in India to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

Information from a Soviet diplomat who states that the Soviet Union expects India to become a nuclear power soon and anticipates negative consequences for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

February 9, 1988

Report, Embassy of Hungary in India to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

Report on India's response to the signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty by the United States and Soviet Union. India supportive of disarmament efforts, in part because of its concerns about China and Pakistan. Describes a speech made by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi at the Six Nation Five Continent Peace Initiative summit in January at Stockholm.

October 31, 1974

Memorandum, Hungarian Foreign Ministry, on India's Policy on Nuclear Disarmament

An extended Hungarian Foreign Ministry memorandum explicating the development of India's policy on nuclear arms and disarmament from the 1960s as well as a discussion on the reasons that the socialist countries--including Hungary--have chosen not to condemn India for its May 1974 nuclear explosion.

August 14, 1981

Report on Diplomatic Actions Taken Concerning Foreign, Nuclear-Related Supplies to Pakistan, Richard L. Williamson, Arms Control Disarmament Agency (ACDA)

ACDA report on the lasting effects of the November 1978 demarches on inverters and plutonium reprocessing technology. Describes the objectives of the demarches and the direct effects on the Pakistani nuclear program, including preventing the shipment of equipment from France, West Germany, Norway, and Switzerland. Concludes with an overview of international norms of nuclear commerce.

Pagination